Sharing the influence between the Turkish and Iranian projects

The situation continues to worsen in Libya and the repercussions of the Turkish project’s expansion interact. The situations in Iraq, Lebanon and Syria are also experiencing a crisis and an economic collapse linked to the consequences of the concentration of the Iranian project. So, as the Israeli government prepares to announce its plans to annex parts of the West Bank by ending the “illusion” of a two-state solution, influence in the Arab world is in the West is shared between the Turkish and Iranian imperial regional projects in a context of competition or coordination depending on the location and size of the interests.

And if the non-Arab expansion was one of the results of the fall of the Arab regional order, it would not have been possible without the approaches of the great powers which are only concerned to realize their interests in the first place and allow the Arab vacuum to be filled by the growth of regional expansion projects which benefit from the absence of Arab projects or alternative Arab projects.

What is fueling the conflict is the fact that the Arab region has great economic and strategic importance. Within its interior, there are about 62% of the world’s oil reserves in addition to gas and minerals. This region is located in the middle of the globe and represents 10.2% of the world’s surface area. Its location overlooks important seas and seaports, and it has a large population. This is why it has been and still is a stage for the different projects and axes, which have sought and seek to control their interactions and to take advantage of their potentials, and to try to redraw their map or to arrange balances there. .

A century ago, the Ottoman Empire was “the sick man” and its Arab heritage was shared among the European victors of World War I. Currently, the Arab world is seen as “the sick man” at the start of the 21st century, and we are witnessing a serious effort to dominate it and share its influence there, not only at the adult level in the international game, but also among the regional powers that surround it.

During the “Arab unrest” or (Arab Spring) that began in 2011, hope for the emergence of the “Arab democratic wave” crept behind a clear new dynamic of rising powers in the Middle East, crystallizing practically for a future of Turkish and Iranian influence to the detriment of a “new Arab future”. There is no doubt that the wars and events that followed the waves of “Arab transformations” have considerably weakened Arab countries, leaving them vulnerable to the effects of external interference and internal disintegration.

With the benefit of hindsight, one can see that the tremors that began in 2011 caused a sharp break in the political scene in the Middle East, just as it did in 1919, after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in of World War I, Britain and France shared the Arab Middle East, and the former got The Lion’s Part.

In the current era, however, competition between Tehran and Ankara is emerging, and there is a complementary coordination phase, as well as on the Kurdish question in particular. At first glance, the “Islamic Republic of Iran” seemed to be the winning side, but conditions in Iran and the countries in its orbit show the fragility of the gains. From here, with what is happening in Iraq, Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean, up to Libya, Turkey emerges as the party that advances in the regional game under the watchful eyes of Washington and Moscow and the shadow of an eclipse of European roles.

Amidst the turmoil in Arab countries and the efforts of the forces of political Islam to rule them, it can be said that Turkey and Iran have divided the Islamist movements among themselves. The Turks turned to support the Islamic Brotherhood from Tunisia to Egypt, while Iran tended to support the Syrian regime and its regional forces and militias, including Hamas and some radical Sunni Muslims. .

And in view of the absence of a loyalist current openly affiliated with Sudan and North Africa, the Brotherhood and its peers have emerged in political Islam as the main players in the region, which made Erdogan Turkey a rising power (in cooperation with Qatar), while Iran has not opposed it. This scenario of accepting the role of the other and integrating with them could occur in Lebanon, where Turkey is trying to focus in certain areas, and it will not necessarily be to confront Hezbollah, but rather to try to play an alternative role to historical Arab roles.

As regards the Palestinian question, despite the strong Turkish-Israeli relations from the 1950s to 2002, Ankara under the reign of< Parti de la justice et du développement >> continued its relations with Israel and was also close to the Iranian approach by focusing on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for the benefit of its regional game; For example, when it comes to Hamas, there is sometimes harmony and competition. On the other hand, with the worsening situation in Syria, the clear difference between Turkey and Iran has emerged. While Iran supported the Assad regime, the Turks supported its opponents and provided them with a safe haven. However, as part of the Astana process, understandings and a practical sharing of spheres of influence under Russian auspices emerged. Therefore, both sides can find a way to protect their strategic and financial interests, regardless of which regime takes power in Syria.

Indeed, the last few years have seen more Iranian-Turkish rapprochements on the Kurdish question and the situation in Iraq. He also appeared in the recent Turkish military operation in northern Iraq, as Ankara seeks to expand its tripartite military coordination with Baghdad and Tehran to include the areas of energy and trade as part of the sharing of the influence between Turkey and Iran in Iraq and Syria and in helping the Iranian regime to circumvent US sanctions.

It is evident from this presentation that the factors of convergence outweigh the factors of conflict between the Turkish and Iranian projects when it comes to the Arab world. Despite the difference between Wilayat al-Faqih’s ideological proposal and Turkish Islam which embraced the last Islamic caliphate, and despite the historical Ottoman-Safavid confusion, Recep Tayyip Erdogan addressed all currents of political Islam, including the one led by Iranian rule. In this regard, we can say that the game of mutual interests organizes the links between the two neighbors inhabited by nostalgia for imperial glories.

* Quoted in “the Arabs”