Arab countries allow China to escape its action to suppress Uighurs

Haitham Hassanein /

On August 21, Qatar informed the United Nations Human Rights Council of its withdrawal of a multilateral letter that it had signed to express its support for China's actions against the minority. Muslim Uyghur in Xinjiang Province in crisis. Although the causes of this decline are unclear, it is difficult to see in the resolution a sign that Doha is about to publicly condemn China or reduce its bilateral relations. Ambassador Ali Al Mansouri, Permanent Representative of Qatar to the United Nations, explained the decision of his country: "We wish to remain neutral and offer mediation and facilitation services". This precise wording is not surprising since Prince Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani has met with Chinese President Xi Jinping twice in the past six months and has agreed to strengthen strategic cooperation with Beijing.

More importantly, Qatar's position highlights a broader trend: each Arab government in the Gulf region and beyond, when it has had the opportunity to present the problem with other members of the Gulf. the UN, chose to ignore the human rights violations perpetrated by China against Uyghur Muslims. Two million live in Xinjiang alone – or express their support. How then can we explain the fact that many Muslim-majority countries in fact allow China to escape its action despite well-documented abuses by its Muslim brethren?

United Nations competing messages

In July, two alliances were signed [منفصلان] Two contradictory letters to the United Nations Human Rights Council on the Uyghur issue, one criticizing Chinese policies in Xinjiang and the other supporting it. The first bloc, composed of 22 countries, called on China to end the campaign of mass arrests, surveillance and restrictions imposed on Uighurs and other minorities in the province.

The second bloc, made up of 37 countries, sent a message that sometimes resembled Chinese propaganda. Applauding the "outstanding achievements in human rights" in Beijing, the letter claimed that the crackdown in Xinjiang was aimed at fighting terrorism, separatism and religious extremism – three problems that "have led to gross violations of human rights "in the province, including" Right to life, health and development "The letter applauded some of China's specific" measures "aimed at" combating terrorism and the elimination of extremism ", such as" the establishment of vocational training and education centers ".

What strikes, is the geographical separation between these two blocks. The first bloc was mainly composed of European countries, while the countries of Africa and the Middle East, including Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the United States. Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria and the United Arab Emirates dominated the second bloc.

Why Arabic silence?

As in other parts of the world, Arab governments shape their foreign policies according to their own socio-political circumstances and a wide range of often conflicting goals. However, his general willingness to support or ignore the Chinese treatment of Uighurs seems to stem from several common concerns.

Solidarity against non-interference: Before the withdrawal of Qatar, the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) had signed a message in favor of China, despite their sharp disagreements over many other issues. One explanation is that all these countries are somewhat authoritarian and do not like outside interference in their affairs. In his view, interference in China's internal affairs would make it vulnerable to similar interference. For example, Saudi Arabia does not wish to create greater international pressure than it already faces on the issue of Jamal Khashoggi. For other GCC signatories, Egypt is concerned by international calls to improve the conditions of detention of its thousands of political prisoners. It is therefore out of the question to criticize mass arrests in China.

A: noFear of political Islam: This concern has intensified among many Arab governments since 2011, when the uprisings in the region and the power gained by supporters of political Islam coincided with a skyrocketing jihadist terrorism that destabilized Many countries. Since then, Arab leaders have been increasingly disturbed by conflicts based on religious faith and most have linked political Islam to terrorism. As such, their national counter-terrorism efforts have made them sympathetic to China's claim that the crackdown on Uighurs is aimed at fighting terrorism. This is why a country like Egypt has no objection to allow the Chinese authorities to question Uyghurs in Cairo, or to rent Beijing to have detained hundreds of thousands in Xinjiang.

Fear of separatist movements Xinjiang, where the Uighurs live, has always been of strategic importance for China as a bridge linking it to Central Asia and the Middle East. But the ethnic and cultural diversity of the region has made it very difficult for Beijing to govern and stabilize the region. After 2011, China began to fear that the turmoil in the Arab world will affect the Muslim areas of northwestern Xinjiang, encouraging separatist movements in the province to demand greater independence. Today, Beijing claims that the Uighurs debate is a Western-backed plot to block China's progress by dividing ethnic minorities between its borders – as in many Arab countries, where Governments tend to view Kurdish and other minority movements as Western countries have attempted to sow internal conflicts and encourage separatism. The Arab and Chinese leaders firmly believe that any similar movement in their country should be abolished.

A: noThe desire for economic development: China's Ongoing Belt and Road Initiative ("Initiative") aims to connect Asia and Europe with an ambitious set of land and maritime infrastructure projects, many of them in the Middle East. So far, Beijing has concluded cooperation agreements under this "initiative" with 18 Arab countries, while Chinese companies have signed contracts worth $ 35.6 billion, of which $ 1.2 billion is allocated to the energy and manufacturing sectors. In addition, trade between China and Arab countries reached $ 244.3 billion last year, and the government is preparing for two investment conferences early next month – the fourth Sino-Arab exhibition and the third Sino-Arab economic summit. Such relations offer the Arab countries an additional reason not to criticize China, which Beijing reminded them of. On August 21, for example, the same day, Qatar withdrew from the letter to the United Nations, the new ambassador of China in Doha welcomed the relations between the two countries and noted that "Qatar is the second largest supplier. of liquefied natural gas in China ".

Belief that China is too big to react: The Arab countries also have many political and military ties with China and, according to them, defend the Uighurs is not worth the risk. China has a lot of global influence and is clearly not afraid to confirm it. The Arab countries are therefore afraid to hold China responsible for what is happening in Xinjiang for fear of urging them to take various punitive measures against it.

What can Washington do?

Last year, the United States withdrew from the Human Rights Council. They could not do anything about the two contradictory messages to the United Nations. Yet Washington can still do a lot to guide international dialogue on the Uyghur issue. It was commissioned by a Uighur American citizen [بالمسؤولية عن] The Chinese case at the US National Security Council is a promising bilateral step, but US officials should also mobilize more efforts and funds to address China's international perspective.

This includes promoting Arab and Muslim perceptions of what is happening in Xinjiang – and what is happening locally for Uyghur activists in countries like Egypt. In general, the Arab world tends to neglect China's internal affairs, a problem in itself, because it has fueled the general misunderstanding of events that might interest it. An increased understanding of public opinion can make it difficult for Arab governments to comply with the most troubling aspects of China's foreign policy.

^{_{Haytham Hassanein was a member of the Glazer at the Washington Institute in 2016-17.}}

Source: Forum of Ideas