The Arab world .. Where to go?

The Arab state of today is confused, and even at stake, as it exists between the hammer of local non-state actors below and above the state and regional and global state actors. It is prone to disintegration, but some of them have disintegrated and collapsed (Libya, Syria, Iraq, Yemen). As a result, complexity and disintegration are the most important characteristics of the current Arab political scene. The complexity concerns the high degree of overlap of factors and actors and the interaction between structural and emergency, and between local and external, on the Arab political scene. Of course, the dominant narrative in parts of the region carries the Arab Spring burden of what happened and what will happen to things. The truth is, this is a desperate attempt to justify themselves and blame others for the mistakes of regimes that have perched on and have been in the hearts of their people for decades. The Arab Spring can be compared to a stone thrown into a pond, whose stagnant waters are not renewed, and musty and stench have risen to its surface. Therefore, the phenomenon of the Arab Spring is not responsible for the disintegration of the joints of the Arab world, but rather exposed the loopholes of the political regimes in power. It exposed it on three levels: it showed the extent of the failure and the tyranny of these regimes, even their denunciation, in spite of their repressive machine; It clarified the transversality of its internal and external political alliances; It has demonstrated the ability of other regimes to bypass democratic demand in “brother” countries and abort it with a “good deal” (incitement to democracy in the name of Islam and security …) , money and weapons.
It seems that the conflict between the forces of change sparked by the Arab Spring and their opponents has been resolved in favor of the conservative forces, the forces of the status quo and the regimes in place. Even the “exceptional” Tunisian experience has begun to be exposed to certain erosion factors, which cause it to deviate from its transitory trajectory. The return of the “old guard” to power through the elections paved the way for the return of old practices, with a new outlook, as the ruling party Nidaa Tounes in the footsteps of the previous constitution, and the march towards a secure state. due to terrorist activity. Here, the terrorist winds turn according to the will of the political ships (terrorism is one of the greatest justifications for the security state). As for the aborted experiences (Libya, Syria, Yemen, Egypt), in Egypt the old regime was able to take the initiative and renew its control under new pretexts. However, with old content, as the state collapsed in Libya, Syria and Yemen.

“Rent is the backbone of the Arab economy. Decades of oil and gas revenues have not changed the characteristics and foundations of the Arab economy. The strangest thing is that part of this income, and the resulting deposits are invested to save the economies of Western countries.

If the Arab state is not solely responsible for the complexity and disintegration of the Arab political scene, given the diversity and interweaving of factors and their interactions, then it is responsible for the disintegration of the region. Some Arab countries are directly responsible for the failure of the Arab Spring in Egypt and the civil wars in Libya, Syria and Yemen, committing a strategic error. It financed and armed, and still does, non-state actors, to strike the regimes of these countries, to find themselves in an open confrontation with these actors. Most of these countries were allies of America in its war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, when the United States used Islamic organizations that turned against it (after the American need them was no longer necessary and that the divorce was pronounced between them) to hit America at home and its interests in several regions.
However, this local political failure and its regional extensions are not the only ones: these regimes have failed another test. In its regional position, as it is in the relationship with Iran. After the deal on the Iran nuclear deal, it turned out that she was confused about herself. For decades, it has claimed the strength and merit of its alliance with the United States, but the latter do not share the same reading on Iran. We are not exaggerating if we say that the Iran nuclear deal has exposed the strategies of some Arab countries, at least on two levels. First, he showed that his weight is neglected in the game of nations, and that the effect of his alliance with America is not global. Second, he exhibits his selectivity, as he steps up the tone regarding Iran’s possible nuclear weapons, and lowers his voice regarding Israel’s real nuclear weapons, perhaps sympathizing with America, so he loses on both. fronts. Some of them have also hinted that he was seeking to replace the other Western powers by approaching them (especially France) after being disappointed by America. However, these forces also have their own calculations and interests, and they are also drawing closer to Iran. The Arabs must have mismanaged the conflict with Israel, and here they mismanaged relations with Iran.
Economically, the Arab scene is no less bleak, as rent is the backbone of the Arab economy. Decades of oil and gas revenues have not changed the characteristics and foundations of the Arab economy. What is even stranger is that part of this income, and the deposits that flow from it, are invested to save the economies of Western countries from the financial crisis, and much of the rest is ravaged by corruption. .
Socially, things are not in the best conditions. Arab societies are also disjointed and floundering in structural crises. Official religious discourse, and unofficial justification, has reached unprecedented levels, as large sectors of Arab societies have become the first to be affected. with religious and social issues. Marginal, turning its back on fateful questions. The culture of atonement has moved beyond the culture of thought and the culture of justification over the culture of responsibility. Corruption has become an Arab institution in the state and in society as well, where it has a social vector, and since corruption is rife there is no way to hold politicians accountable.
Of course, these questions are not inherited or tied to Arab mood, as some might argue, but are socially and politically constructed, meaning they are planned and desired. The goal, of course, is to distance people from democratic demands, by making them wade through a vicious cycle of marginal issues that do not touch the pillars of existing regimes, but rather create a social movement that gives the impression that each is giving their opinion in the discussion … And this, as a political outlet too, so as not to inflict much popular anger on the rulers. And the biggest loser, in the end, is the Arab state, whose order is not yet established.