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It is useful to note yesterday by the League of Arab States that the Arab world is under attack from three neighbors: Turkey, Iran and Ethiopia. There is undoubtedly a great deal of truth in this speech, even though, for reasons unknown to me, it overlooked a fourth neighbor, Israel, which recently succeeded in annexing East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights … and is now in the process of annexing more to the West Bank.
What we have. The reason may be that the Israeli aggression is chronic and therefore no longer needs to be remembered, as Arab official statements have been repeated over the decades.
Indeed, after suffering from a fear of aggression and expansion … Here we are, now we are suffering massively from “aggression” and “expansion” and what is to come. .
Let us forget, even for a while – like our Arab League – the historical roots of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and turn to Iranian and Turkish expansion, before our worries take us south to the new African plague Indigo.
In fact, someone with a good memory or a reasonable political culture cannot afford to miss out on a few elements of state political approaches, notably: economic interests. The second is internal policies that move outward, guided either by economics, religious or sectarian “justification”, or “legacy” (with all of its correct and mythical narratives). And the third relates to regional and international circumstances, including filling the gaps and exploiting the disparity in the balance of power … etc.
In the case of Iran and Turkey, all of the above meet without exception.
Indeed, economic interests are a vital component of Iran’s geopolitical project, whether it is expanding control of Iraq and the Gulf region with their enormous oil wealth, or controlling the waterways. navigable international routes (Ormuz and Bab al-Mandab), or to access the Mediterranean through Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. The same goes for religious / sectarian and “heritage” justifications and narratives (considering Baghdad / Al-Mada’in as a historic capital), and regional and international conditions … because Iranian leaders feel that thanks to their political unity and their sectarian fanaticism, they are able to fill Arab voids as they please.
In fact, the implementation of its project by Iran – at least for its history – is in full swing amid an unjustified Arab confusion even if the Khomeinist intentions of Tehran have been clear since 1979. Indeed, until Now, some are still arguing whether it is in the interest of the Arabs – all or some of them – the existence of the mullahs’ regime, or the return of the secular and nationalist liberal current to the domination of Iran. Ideas are still unclear as to which Arabs from Iran’s Gulf and non-Gulf countries can coexist and under what conditions.
Still in the case of Turkey, and its project, whose dimensions are expanding more and more, all the components mentioned above are present. The economic dimension was reflected at the beginning with the construction of a large number of dams on the Euphrates and the Tigris, then it appeared in the oil and gas accounts of the Eastern Mediterranean, and its perimeter was further enlarged. with the Turkish military presence … and the ensuing political and economic arrangements in Libya.
Likewise, we have in front of us justifications and parallel narratives, starting with the legacy of the “Ottoman Caliphate” which extended over more than two thirds of the Arab world and ending with the demand to defend political Islam. Sunni in the face of the Iranian political attack. Here it must be said that the Syrian “scenario”, in particular the agreements between Ankara, Tehran and Moscow, has confirmed that what unites the Iranian and Turkish projects – at least temporarily – is more than what divides them … everything as the role of “Iran the Shah” and “Turkey Bayar and Menderes” The days of the “Baghdad Pact”. Of course, one of the most important factors that encourage both sides to put aside their historical differences and coordinate their “understanding” is the existence of two common victims – the Arabs and the Kurds – as the “neighbors” find it easy to share, taking advantage of divisions that destroy their immunity.
Moreover, just as there is no vision of a single strategic interest when assessing the Arab relationship with Khomeinist Iran, history repeats itself with Erdogan’s Turkey. There is no single Arab reading of the future of relations based on good neighborliness and mutual respect with Turkey that we want or hope for. There may be agreement on the extent of the risk, but there is no serious and practical reflection on what can be done about this risk.
And we arrive in Ethiopia.
I claim that from ancient history when the Abyssinian army reached the Hejaz and the Persians and Ethiopians fought in Yemen, Ethiopia’s influence in the heart of the Arab world became weaker than that of Turkey first and then Iran.
However, I also remember that since 1948 Ethiopia has been a reliable friend of Israel and that Emperor Haile Selassie, “the Lion of Judah”, sees himself as a descendant of common Ethiopian Jewish heritage. However, during this period, Arab politicians treated Haile Selassie realistically and judiciously throughout her reign (1930-1974), and no position emerged from Addis Ababa that could be called “dangerous.” for the regional security of Arabs.
Likewise, although the leftist army seized power in Addis Ababa and the Arab powers supported the Eritrean revolution against the central Ethiopian government, then the development of Ethiopian-Israeli relations (and Eritrean-Israeli relations as well. ), there was no hostility – in the correct sense of the word – between the Arabs and Ethiopia.
The issue has recently been at odds with the “Renaissance Dam” project, which Addis Ababa is pursuing based on its electricity and water needs. And here we are now faced with a situation caused mainly by the crisis of Arab weakness … which today allows Ethiopia to take what it deems right in an “international river”, just as it allowed to Turkey to weaken Syria and Iraq in the face of the Euphrates and Tigris dams.
The lack of collective Arab awareness of common challenges, whether in Libya, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen – or any other controversial place in the Arab world – foreshadows more intractable crises.
The delay in formulating a single strategy to deal with these challenges will not only increase their number, but also increase the ambitions of “neighbors” who are impossible to blame for having filled the existing voids … These voids allow them to escape their internal crises, the failures of their economic adventures and the dilemmas of the legitimacy of their political systems.
Frankly, now is the time to stop others from correcting their mistakes at our expense … and imposing the consequences on us.
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