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What has changed in the Arab world? Compared to what this world was like over a thousand years ago? How do order and consciousness work – then shift the coordinates of reality – in our Arab world from Napoleon’s campaign (which is said to be the start of questionable self-awareness) until today?
Has this system of consciousness severed its link with a haunted history with the struggle of predatory forces, with gratuitous violence, fanaticism, bigotry, fragmentation, chaos, inhumane and unjust situations, as well as contempt? of labor, production, diligence, etc. ?
The structures of underdevelopment which only produce underdevelopment; On the other hand, it is linked to another cultural universe, which is the human being in his most recent development and his most beautiful manifestations, or is he still linked, in spirit, in thought and in action, to this story that carries him, with the windings of his consciousness, to the bottom?
It seems that the communication hypothesis is the most plausible, not only in terms of semantics included in the global manifestations of cultural discourse, but also in terms of fact / reality semantics. What if the late Arab thinker / Muhammad Abed Al-Jabri had studied, in his great project consisting of four parts, the Arab spirit, from his training during the period of codification, then his training in a general structure governing the system of conscience, then its manifestation in both minds: the political and the moral, then all the determinants The principle that he evoked and underlined is in itself the determinants which organize the whole Arab movement on two levels: theoretical and practical.
However, if Al-Jabri had spelled out the period of “formation of the Arab mind” in a limited time frame with the period of codification, indicating that this is what formed what followed, and then came to be. transformed into a system of consciousness that governs all of Arab history from those early days until today, so I don’t see it all. The lapse of time stopped at this decisive moment in our history, because despite its centrality and impact on everything that followed it is, as it is a period / practice, recurring. I don’t just mean what Al-Jabri meant that the current Arab mind is ruled by him, for fun
I mean rather that the current Arab spirit practices through it the codification of its gifts, it confirms it, by restoring its structure, even by increasing its strength and its size. Be a period of continuous training, cumulative in the long term; But without going beyond the first determinants, it turns rather in the same orbit, turning in a vicious circle from the first centuries / the era of codification until today; While its new is its old, its enlightenment is, in the restored context, its rigid fundamentalism, its renewal is the eye of its tradition, its modernity is but a foolish restoration of its antiquity scattered on the sidewalks of the world. ‘history.
Last week’s article was about (the history of violence in Islam), that is, the history of Muslims. And violence is not only what manifested itself in the major events that I have referred to, briefly and implicitly, in this article, but violence in all its manifestations, even what appears to be mild violence, if you want !
If the slaughter of children in their mothers’ quarters (as it did to Sir Ibn Artah), and the holy city was plundered and raped for three days after killing ten thousand of its inhabitants on its outskirts / in Al-Harra, and before that the massacre that affected the most sacred religious figures of his time / Karbala, and all this during a period which is said to be Tehran, a period which Muslims consider, according to archaeological tradition, to be the most sacred and charitable period. And even more than that, everything that happens in the hands of Muslims, and in an Islamic space, if it denounces, abhors and condemns these practices, the size of the circle of denunciation, despondency and condemnation has never reached the limit of forming immunity, that is to say, he did not rise to form a solid public opinion that prevents such facts from the outset, or on the contrary, at least it is prohibited to repeat it after having absorbed the ugliness and ugliness of its first facts.
Yes, a solid public opinion has not formed, a collective consciousness which enters as a difficult number in the equation of reality has not crystallized, and thus frames the course of the real event, or at least helps frame it and determine the most important. paths. Unfortunately, what has happened is rather the opposite, which should be at the center of the historical monetary process, as it was justified (justified by realistic necessity or legal necessity, or both, given that the former is a prelude to the second), and so it was repeated in the context of this
Justification on a regular basis, until normalization with it, thus becoming an essential aspect of the natural social movement. Stability, healing, justice and the promotion of the human principle become the urgency, the rare, the fleeting exception, the miracle that breaks the law of constant historical reality, the dream that looms like a flash of hope , the fragile margin aboard the violent atrocities that have crushed man on more than one level in Arab history is long, not glorious.
From there, the dreamy and exceptional period of Omar bin Abdulaziz, who reigned only two years, between 99-101 AH (regardless of the circumstances and contexts of the period, and the elements of legend it contains ), becomes like it’s not a real reality, like it’s just a dream that people haven’t found it. In fact, after waking up, nothing but the beauty of memory, they only found the exception that reminds them that it is the impossible exception, while reminding them that in previous years, with all their enthusiasm, are the reality, that they are the natural that must be worked by integrating into it. This is what subsequent facts prove, because despite the “revolutionary decisions” in this very short period of time, the day after the death of the “exception” confirmed that the “state” in which all are organized. the components of the reality that surrounds it oppose it, which means that it is a cacophony of state An exceptional case that has nothing to do with reality.
When the Abbasid revolution appeared as a true and supposed ideological antithesis of the Umayyad state, when the first crushed the second with brutal violence, expressing not only revenge, but also the alleged radical difference, when it all happened product; In fact, the “revolution” was nothing more than a restoration of the same history that the Umayyad state had originally made; Insofar as it positioned itself as the expression of a predetermined history. So it was not really an ideological opposite, but rather an ideological diversification that identifies with a well-established history of violence, a history in which the sequences of the real event interact with perceptions. imagined whose shadows have remained of the realities of ancient Arab history: the “pre-Islamic” and the “post-Islamic” ”.
The Abbasid Revolution took place, and its first ruler / successor was Abu al-Abbas al-Saffah, who ruled for five years during a turbulent period of establishment. Then came Abu Jaafar al-Mansur’s brother, the true founder of the Abbasid His nickname, which he was proud of in one of his sermons, was ominous, and the course of events confirmed that he was in fact a serial killer, and even more than a thug, as Al-Mansour was more than a war criminal (in many facts recorded in the history books throughout his 22-year reign), he surpassed, in kind and in quantity, what his murderous brother had done before, to become one of the most important symbols of tyranny, violence and brutality in Islamic history.
These two, despite having lived the longest part of their lives under the Umayyad dynasty, and despite their constant defamation of its violence, grievances and ugliness, and despite the lure of the picture of the age period between 99-101 AH, which was a positive picture; But they did not want, or could not, or did not want and could not, be an extension of the transient exceptional period that they loved.
They did not fit into the administrative and moral context of the man who praised him with their languages, but were, paradoxically, an extension of those Umayyad rulers who were the worst role model for rulers in their eyes. In short, they were, at the level of saying, cursing the Umayyad rulers, and excluding Omar bin Abdul Aziz, merciful towards him, while at the level of the content of the administrative act / system, they rejected Omar, despised his method, and underestimated his achievement as a mere ascetic, dreamer, helpless, as they walked. the language except curses after curses!
There was no contradiction in this. They were ruled by a factual history, and a conceptual system, and they could only break with that factual history and this conceptual system by a miracle, and the time of miracles is over. They were the children of a deeply rooted reality, a reality made up of prejudices; Insofar as they were captives of circumstantial facts in which they were engaged by absolute necessity and by difficult choice; At least.
They created the Abbasid State / State which will be the longest and most dangerous in the history of Islam. They not only established a state which will adapt the Islamic reality which will extend, with its sequences, in the long Islamic history, but also established, frankly open, an ideology immanent in a process to form and consolidate this state, an ideology which speaks in two languages: the language of speech and the language of action, and in the end it feeds on a long and dark history (Its darkness devours the light of its weak, weak, desperate candles. You will reconstitute it and will develop it in many ways, after tapping into external resources; Not only to be more firmly established and extended, but also to be more beautiful and attractive, and thus, more self-expressive as the “natural”, the the more expressive of the feasibility criteria / the most practical, and perhaps, as the most expressive of mankind!
It is the history of the ancient Arabs, the history of Iraq and Syria, the history of the capitals of the great Islamic empires. The reality of the Arabs, in particular: has the reality of Iraq and Syria today changed anything in this story? Is what happened in Iraq over the past three decades fundamentally different from the decisive events that happened in Iraq over the three decades between 60 and 90 AH, that is, fourteen centuries before today ? More importantly, has the value system established for Arab man today, the values that govern the behavior of the vast majority of millions of Arabs, changed from those values that prevailed in the level of public perceptions in the Umayyad or Abbasid era?
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