China and Pakistan plan to become rich together. The price? Human rights.

My older brother and I had a mouth-watering match on our country last summer.

We had talked about a trip I made a few years ago to Gwadar, a centuries-old fishing community that millions of Pakistanis – including my brother – see as an omen. a glamorous, rich and unimaginable future. Gwadar is located just at the entrance to the Persian Gulf, in the southwestern Pakistani province of Baluchistan an exceptionally poor province and rarely peaceful. Finally, it is expected to become the jewel of the Sino-Pakistani economic corridor, a $ 62 billion branch of China's "Belt and Road" plan to expand trade and relations in Asia and Europe.

For Pakistan, the project is a way to meet the needs of a rapidly growing and aggressive population, already fifth in the world, and challenges Washington after years of tension with the United States. away from the Pacific dominated by the United States and support the slowdown in economic growth especially in the vast western regions of the country. Officials say nearly half a billion tons of shipments – including oil from the Middle East that meets a large chunk of China's needs ] – will eventually cross Gwadar every year.

m a skeptic, but we are not many. For the 200 million Pakistanis who, like me, were born and raised outside Baluchistan, the region is a national black hole. The province is the size of Germany and is home to gas and mineral reserves that, we are told, will guarantee a Pakistani economic miracle. But it is less considered a real place than the American version of the American West of the 19th century – and with little fanfare or responsibility, Pakistan has subjected the native population of the province, especially the 7 million owned to an ethnic minority called Baloch. decades of threats, abductions, torture and discrimination. The result has been four insurrections, the most recent and the most vicious of them.

My brother thought that I was a naive liberal for warning that Pakistan 's plan to crush the Baluchi and borrow billions from China was likely to be condemned. Many in our circle of well educated Pakistanis believe that Pakistan will know what it is doing, or will manage in one way or another disastrous consequences like a massive debt to the authoritarian state the most powerful in the world. My brother intends to invest, and he is obsessed with making sure that our widowed mother is well positioned for billions of dollars in business, assistance and loans Chinese who will arrive in Pakistan by 2030. Our mother's new neighbor in the tony suburb where we grew up is a Chinese executive protected at all times by at least eight security guards.

But a decade of writing about Pakistan has convinced me that the prediction of the country's future is like politely asking fate to spit on your face. There is certainty in the only nuclear-armed country in the Muslim-majority world: the military, rich and irresponsible like no other institution, calls projectiles. He is delighted with the Chinese project because it involves a massive injection of foreign money without any pesky demands on democracy. And it is certain that Baluchistan should be handled with force and manipulation – even if it has never really tried the alternative.

On July 25, Pakistan will hold critical elections for the future planned by the army. In recent months, the military has beaten political leaders, the press and independent Pakistani civil society as it has not done for years. Senior leaders want to consolidate power once and for all after being challenged by elected governments since Pakistan's last military dictatorship in 2007. The survey results will show if they are successful. The general mood is one of dismay: Pakistan's most popular politician is now in jail; the Pashtun minority group, an even larger group than the Baluchis, is organizing unprecedented protests; the currency and the stock market are in free fall; the neighborhood worsens as the Taliban and the self-proclaimed Islamic State strengthen and tensions increase between Iran and Saudi Arabia; and the United States is considering new ways to punish the country for supporting militancy.

Questions about Pakistan's relationship with Baluchi – what they withdraw from big plans with China, and if there can be a I did not spend the the last two years since I took a tiny plane to Gwadar discussing Baluchistan with Pakistanis of high rank, knowledgeable Balochs, Western officials, human rights defenders and activists.

My questions have a lot to do with the peculiarities of this province in a country – how does the great Pakistani vision of the coinage of money and the reorganization of world politics relate to the long and sad history of a minority

But they also concern a dilemma facing countries around the world as disconnections develop between modern and efficient capital and state power, and regular humans and emotional. beings attached to their identities and their lands. Pakistan and China seem to think that they can bully Baluchistan to get what they want. Are real progress possible without justice?

The policy of treating Baluchi as a problem to manage is as old as Pakistan itself. It is the country 's iconic founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who launched the first army operation in the province in 1948, giving up after a few months to a gentleman' s agreement with the ruler of the country. a 400-year Baloch quasi-state called the Kalat Khanate. Small squads of Baloch nationalists launched revolts that year and in 1958 and 1962.

In 1971, the first general elections in Pakistan placed the Baluchi nationalist politicians at the head of the province for the first time. President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto initially approved. Then he dismissed the Baluchi government over claims – disputed by historians and the United States – that they imported weapons from Iraq to wage a separatist war. Tens of thousands of Baluchi launched a guerrilla campaign and the Pakistani army, fresh from a loss in Bangladesh, fought with a bloody determination to restore its image. More than 8,000 people died.

General Zia-ul-Haq overthrew Bhutto in 1977 and wooed Baloch to point out that he could heal the wounds of the country. Concerned about nuclear ambitions and the US-Soviet proxy war in Afghanistan, he left the Balochs to themselves, giving the community a space to imagine what their society might look like in peacetime and allow for many shots unprecedented. ] Then came the 11th of September. While the United States was pouring money to the Islamic Republic to fight Afghan fundamentalists, Pakistan and America once armed, military dictator Pervez Musharraf promised an economic miracle in Baluchistan that would include a transformational development. Baluchi leaders retorted that the rest of Pakistan was already taking advantage of the natural gas in their province. The conflict escalated throughout the year 2004, until the beginning of the following year, when a doctor working in a gas facility owned by the company was in charge. State reported being raped by a group of Musharraf army officers. With Baluchi feeling that their honor was being attacked by what some were already considering as a force of occupation, a real civil war began. In the summer of 2005, clashes had killed dozens of civilians. Negotiations were off the table and the weather was hot. And on August 24, Pakistani soldiers fired back at a shot from a Baloch nationalist camp in the northeast of the province with a two-and-a-half-day assault that resulted in the explosion. a mine at the entrance of a cave. The cave has collapsed. Under the command of the Pakistani state, Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, tribal hero and former governor, was proclaimed "without the knowledge of the Pakistani state"

"rulers and l 39; army have unleashed an endless war ". ] Bugti had held important positions in the government, even during the Bhutto attack on the province in the 1970s, but he retained his credibility as a nationalist. For many Baluchi, his assassination suggested that no importance, righteousness or appeasement could lead to being treated as a full citizen.

"The government puts its own people … so they say they are ghaddar ," said Balakh Sher Mazari, a former Pakistani prime minister, using a term charged with traitor. Mazari grew up with Bugti in the 1940s; they were first generation giants of Baloch leaders in Pakistan, and both spent decades carefully balancing relations with the insurgency and the Pakistani establishment. "Why the hell would they kill Akbar?" Said Mazari. "He never did anything!"

The Bugti massacre has provoked Baloch rage levels that have been unmatched for decades, and for the first time, middle-class professionals in the province have been as willing to confront the government as tribal communities loyal to Bugti and Mazari. Both parties have since lost hundreds. Baluch activists consider that anyone who works for the government, even teachers, considers them fair and military forces have disappeared thousands of Baluchi without warning or trial – in prison or, in some cases, mass graves. Those who come back from detention speak of vicious blows and verbal abuse. When I was traveling around Gwadar, I saw gunmen everywhere, and my guides told me to stop strolling – and in one case to avoid even looking into some direction – for fear of triggering government or rebel surveillance

. The contours of the conflict – a guerrilla war between an increasingly alienated armed Baloch coalition and a world-class military force convinced that tenacity is the only way to do the job – are static.

The Pakistani army considers Baluchis as uncomfortable, different from politicians and religious fundamentalists with whom it is happy to make deals and sometimes stab in the back. He perceives their complaints about systematic under-representation and collective punishment as attacks against Pakistan itself. It's still too painful for them, and for most Pakistanis, to talk about what happened last time a repressed ethnic group was completely disenchanted with this concept because it ended in an embarrassing defeat and the birth of the independent nation of Bangladesh. For many of the most powerful people in Pakistan, giving anything about Baluchistan gives too much.

The Baluchi pressure policy now extends well beyond the province. The evidence flows sparingly. Sometimes there are protests. When I was home in Karachi, the country's largest city, in January, I spotted a small article about two Baloch University students kidnapped by a mix of police officers in civil servants and uniformed officials. Their crime: participating in a rally against the arrest of another Baloutch student

At another time, the Baloch elites could have kept the peace and provided an answer to the problem of the government and the concerns of the China. For decades, it was these men – heirs who had access to resources, contacts and eloquent philosophical arguments for the rights of their community – that defined the discontent of the Balochs for Pakistanis and the world at large. But many new leaders are not ready to push the collaboration. I met four of them shortly after my trip to Gwadar, thanks to Zarain Magsi, my former classmate, 26 years old, from a Baloch political family to political power if wide as a Pakistani newspaper says "

I arrived at the time and place that I had been given, a villa in Karachi at three minutes drive from mine, and I moved to the other end of the street. the living room, facing four young macho men with traditional outfits and facial hair. My slim pants seemed too thin. But banter, scotch and trailing English made sense. Magsi and his friends were eager to talk. They described the history of the community and the value system "Balochiat", muttering loudly to rally to each other and, when they need to disagree, to the to do with care and deep respect. They told me – and really told themselves, for what did not seem to be the first time – stories and arguments with which they had grown up, sharing a legacy of betrayal and being accused of treason.

. Magsi recounted the life he had spent in Karachi in houses like this, while his family became the Balochs' last privileged partner for Pakistan's military and political elites. His faith in his country broke when the state killed Bugti in 2006. "I came to the conclusion that there is no other way. OK, maybe picking up the guns is not the right thing to do, but at the end of the day, if your back is against the wall, if thieves come to you, what will you do? do you do? Take all these things Baloch. A punjabi would do it too, "he continued, referring to the ethnic group that dominates the army.

Bugti's nephew, Washane Bugti, was in the room. reported to him; I had the feeling that his coming was an event.He told us how a Pakistani military officer whom he had met in a favorite store had turned an insignificant introduction into something more demanding that he "come to prove his loyalty to the state." He believes that he is being watched at all times 19659018] The group was not happy with the status quo. They felt fundamentally separated from Pakistan and even from his most powerful stories – Bugti could stop being a Muslim, he said, but he could never stop being a Baloch.But they were not doing part of the insurgents hiding in the Baluchistan caves. e Bugti to the military officer was to prove his loyalty by pointing out that he was living in the Defense, the upscale neighborhood of Karachi that we had met.

From the blue-blooded Baloch that historically dominated the community struggle, the most revolutionary – figures like Bugti Brahamdagh's cousin, who fought alongside Akbar Bugti – are now in exile. They criticize Pakistan and woo its enemies, from India to Israel, while exercising little influence on the daily events of the province. Their relatives in the country keep their status secure and complain behind closed doors, fearing a public battle damaging to equality – the way people from so many ethnic, religious, sexual and other minority communities are doing in Pakistan. Some, including in the Bugti tribe, are actually army puppets, putting a Baluchi face on a policy aimed at repressing Baluchistan.

This does not differ too much from the first six decades of Baluchistan's existence as a Pakistani province. What is new, it is the way in which the massacre of Akbar Bugti and the collective punishment of the Pakistani army radicalized millions of middle class Balochs, who are not rich enough to Defense but do not live in the arid north.

"Before, it was a lower class issue and then the elite, now it's in the middle," Magsi said. This reality is dangerous for Pakistan and, ironically, a product of its own policy, kidnappings and ban on Baloch advancement, decades of government and military propaganda discrediting tribal leaders as irremediably corrupt . The leaders who had been leading Baluchi communities for generations warned that the combination would make the community even more alienated, unless it accompanied government awareness and accountability. . The generals thought that they were just trying to hang on to power.

Allah Nazar Baloch, a former middle-aged and middle-aged medical student who heads the group of the Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) and who survived the repeated assassination attempts is the strongest character of the insurgency. . Nazar attracts young Balochs who have diplomas and want good jobs, but they think that Pakistan will always treat them as second-class citizens, even in their own region. Pakistani security forces detained him for more than a year after fighting erupted in 2005, beating him and threatening him frequently. His BLF killed and kidnapped dozens of Pakistani officials. But he developed a secret sect, though secret.

"Speaking to Baloch across the country, I discovered something of the magnitude of his calling," Mahvish Ahmad, one of the few Pakistani journalists to have interviewed Nazar, wrote in 2012. "One day, I met a young boy who was blushing, speaking of the first time that he had touched Nazar's feet. wrote long and frustrated letters asking him when they could join him in the mountains.I found poets who composed Baluchi songs in his name. "

While the Nazarite group and militias do not understand no more than a few thousand fighters, they count on tacit support among a community of millions. And they work to make sure they appear to be more sincere and legitimate representatives of the Balochs than those who are currently negotiating with the military and the government. It is difficult to blame Baluchis for an alternative to Pakistani policies, given their results so far: intrusive and ubiquitous checkpoints, plan to forcibly evict local people in Gwadar, a recent recent terrorist attack of a branch of the Islamic State. extremist groups favored by the army. What is proposed does not bode well for the stability of Pakistan or the region.

Nearly all parties contesting the July elections say that they will offer a better deal for Baluchistan. The previous ruling party, the Muslim League of Pakistan-Nawaz, boasts of having already appointed Baloch prime minister of the middle class rather than tribal kingship; Senior officials of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf and Pakistan Peoples Party, widely accused of having the support of the army this time around, told HuffPost that they would rebalance the Chinese plans for to obtain real gains for the country's ethnic minorities. But the true stewards of the project that will determine Balochistan's future will be the same before and after polling day: the Pakistani army, whose vision of the province is already clear, and the Chinese government.

According to Zahid Shahab Ahmed, a researcher at Deakin University in Australia, who has already taught in Pakistan, Zahid Shahab Ahmed explains that Pakistan's domestic politics extends to other countries than its own. vast plan of development of the belt and the road. Chinese officials are now ubiquitous in big cities. In February, the Financial Times revealed secret talks between militants from Beijing and Baluch, and in March, a delegation of US journalists invited to Gwadar by the Pakistani government met with Zhang Baozhong, the head of China Overseas. Ports Holding Company. Dressed in a Pakistani outfit, Zhang tells them that he sees the country as a "good boy" who does "good things", according to the defense reporter Kristina Wong.

There Is Evidence That Chinese Decision Craftsmen recognize that Baluchi are people to be reckoned with rather than just being insurgents, said Andrew Small, a German Marshall analyst Fund which has spoken at length with officials of both governments. Ahmed noted Chinese plans for a hospital and school in Gwadar. The Pakistani army has stepped up its efforts to recruit Baloch, he added. On the eve of the elections, Magsi said the army had wanted to convince the military to give up "outdated policies".

But no government relies on soft power to fix its problems, and China's approach to its own counterpart of Baluchistan – Xinjiang's predominantly Muslim province – is to crack down with massive surveillance, l Intimidation of dissidents and their families and severe restrictions on the ability of locals to express their culture. A draft master plan for the economic corridor published last year by DAWN, Pakistan's largest English-language newspaper, proposed similar proposals, suggesting that the two governments had discussed monitoring systems in every major city in Pakistan. "The signals collected by the surveillance system will be transmitted to a command center, but the plan does not specify who will be assigned to the command center, what kind of signs they will look for and who will provide the answer," the DAWN analysis. plan bed. Pakistani officials said the plan was a "live" document that has not been finalized yet.

The ruthless network of human rights activists in Pakistan and some political figures are already protesting against the prospect of increased repression in the name of prosperity – all in the context of hacking unprecedented and government restrictions. Other regions align with Baluchi for less idealistic purposes: Smaller regions fear being circumvented if the Chinese concentrate their trade routes to Gwadar, not in the western half of the country, including included in Baluchistan, but in the eastern province of Punjab, the heart of the army. "Distribution … must be done in a transparent manner, it must be done fairly," said Osman Saifullah Khan, a recently retired senator with commercial interests in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province in the north-west of the country. Khan sat on one of the three parliamentary committees supposed to oversee the plan. He has never seen the final roadmap or other key details

These are the Western powers with a long history and profound influence in Pakistan, the United States and the United Kingdom that are more likely to win the hold. Although they are not directly involved, the Gwadar project has great implications for these governments. US authorities consider that it is essential to prevent instability in Pakistan – in Afghanistan but also because of Pakistan's huge nuclear arsenal. Meanwhile, a Pentagon document last summer has shown concern about a possible Chinese military presence in Baluchistan; There is a precedent for this result, since China took control of a Sri Lankan port strategically located in December as a repayment in a similar economic agreement.

Regional actors close to the United States are also wary. The United Arab Emirates does not want competitors for the profitable neighboring port of Jebel Ali. India is working on its own competing port, in Chabahar, Iran, a few hundred kilometers from Gwadar, and recently got naval access in a neighboring port of Oman, friendly city the United States. In early 2016, Pakistani authorities captured a former Indian Navy officer in the province and accused him of being a spy; although New Delhi belies the statement, the Indian press linked it to Indian intelligence .

The Pakistani establishment has long suspected that its historical rival is clandestinely assisting the Baloch insurgency – an apparent proof of this is making life harder for those seeking equitable treatment for the Baluchi, tells me the tribal heir Magsi, The governments of the United Kingdom and the United States are well aware of the Baluch concerns, HuffPost told several officials of both countries. But the Americans have been hoping for years that the Chinese intervention could curb the extremists who flourished in the midst of the fighting in Baluchistan and who would be largely supported militarily by the Pakistani army, told me the ## 147 ## 39; former head of the State Department Shamila Chaudhary. Working under Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, she said Washington did not consider participation in Balochistan a priority for the United States. This is unlikely to change under the chairmanship of Donald Trump a believer in the brutal management of Muslim communities .

Pakistanis have little desire to see American interference anyway, given the years the quarrels between the two countries and the direct criticism of Trump and the pressure . "With American politics, it seems like they want to push us into the arms of the Chinese," said former Senator Khan. And for China, a blind American eye is ideal. L'un de ses objectifs est de créer une demande au Pakistan pour produits fabriqués par sa propre minorité rebelle, la plupart des musulmans ouïghours, recherches de l'Institut américain de la paix ; il n'a pas besoin de conférences sur les subtilités de la stabilité pakistanaise quand il se concentre sur le sien.

De manière réaliste, le Baloutchistan ne devient pas moins inflammable de sitôt. Pendant ce temps, les enjeux augmentent, car les Pakistanais comptent de plus en plus sur le plan économique chinois pour devenir une réalité et la branche régionale de l'Etat islamique devient plus audacieuse. L'armée pakistanaise doit se rendre compte qu'elle ne peut pas maintenir indéfiniment sa répression expansionniste à l'échelle de la province, m'a dit Ahmed, l'universitaire, ou simplement continuer à changer de tactique et à oindre de nouveaux partenaires baloutches. Le changement qui serait vraiment important serait intangible: venir voir les Baloutches, des millions de personnes liées au Pakistan depuis sa naissance, comme des égaux. Pour beaucoup de gens en République islamique, cela pourrait être trop demander.

De toutes les personnes avec qui j'ai discuté du Baloutchistan au cours des deux dernières années, celle avec laquelle je voulais le plus parler était Malik Siraj Akbar

Un journaliste baloutche à la peau maigre et à lunettes, âgé d'une trentaine d'années, Akbar a été nommé par presque tous les interlocuteurs, des officiels actuels aux experts internationaux et aux chefs tribaux en attente. Il connaît très bien les points de vue des décideurs pakistanais et des nationalistes armés. Toute personne intéressée par le Baloutchistan a suivi son travail dans les principaux médias pakistanais dans les médias internationaux comme The New York Times et son blog pionnier, The Baloch Haal. Et presque tous ceux à qui j'ai parlé m'ont dit que mon histoire serait incomplète si je ne l'interviewais pas.

J'ai appris quand nous nous sommes vus que l'expérience d'Akbar de la vie au Pakistan avait été une image sympa -Baloch. Il m'a dit qu'il ne pouvait que rêver de fréquenter le genre d'écoles qu'Akbar Bugti et Zarain Magsi et moi-même avons fait. Il a plutôt étudié dans une université pakistanaise au Baloutchistan en tant que premier de sa famille à obtenir un diplôme universitaire. Allah Nazar, le leader militant, a fréquenté une école similaire en même temps. Ils connaissaient tous deux les mêmes personnes de l'Organisation des étudiants baloutches

. Les Baloutches "pourraient facilement être cooptés et faire partie intégrante du système", a déclaré Akbar. "La raison pour laquelle il n'y a pas eu d'implication de la classe moyenne dans le passé est que le gouvernement ne les a pas contrariés. Avec l'aide de la classe moyenne, ils ont neutralisé l'ensemble du mouvement. "

" Cette fois c'est l'inverse ", a-t-il poursuivi, en énumérant les noms des professionnels balochs qu'il connaissait personnellement – professeurs, journalistes – détenus , "A disparu" et, dans plus d'un cas, a été tué par les services de sécurité pakistanais.

Akbar est le genre de personne qu'un gouvernement central plus intelligent pourrait considérer comme un lieutenant essentiel. Il est passionné par la souffrance des Baloutches et clairvoyant sur ce à quoi ressemblerait un juste coup pour eux au Pakistan.

Et à compter du 14 février 2018, il est officiellement citoyen américain, vivant, travaillant et écrivant Washington, car il y a huit ans, les autorités pakistanaises bloquaient son site d'information et quelques mois plus tard, son oncle, son frère et ses parents âgés l'invitaient à les laisser partir pour demander l'asile aux Etats-Unis

; nous sommes devenus amicaux, et nous discutons de nos vies, de nos carrières, de nos amitiés dans la communauté sud-asiatique. Il me fait savoir quand il publie une nouvelle histoire ou parle à l'occasion d'un événement autour de la ville.

Mais je peux retourner à l'endroit que j'appelle encore chez moi. Je peux même aller voir Gwadar dans toute sa gloire éventuelle. Mon ami baloutche ne peut pas.