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Photo: ISS
Activists.
analysis
By Omar S Mahmood
The recent activities of the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA), the Boko Haram faction which replaced Abubakar Shekau as party leader in 2016, have raised questions about his position and his possible reinforcement. Some key developments regarding leadership and operations suggest such a shift in perspective for an organization that is becoming a growing threat in the Lake Chad Basin region.
Although this has not been officially confirmed, it is generally accepted that Mamman Nur, a key ISWA leader, was killed in August by his own commanders. Nur was considered by many to be the true power of the faction, given its status as an experienced jihadist with international relations.
One of the explanations for Nur's murder is internal dissatisfaction with his policy, including the release of about 100 schoolgirls kidnapped in Dapchi earlier this year (the group still holds a Christian student).
The Nigerian government claimed that this publication was part of ongoing negotiations with the faction – negotiations that, so far, have shown no other visible sign of progress. In this sense, Nur may have been perceived as relatively moderate or more willing to engage with the Nigerian government than other members of his movement were comfortable with him.
It is generally accepted that Mamman Nur, a key ISWA leader, was killed in August by his own commanders.
This raises major questions about the status of Abu Musab al-Barnawi, governor of the Islamic State appointed by the Islamic State. It also leads to questions about the relationship between ISWA and the Islamic State, since it is the second major leader in two years whose group members have passed away. .
Yet the ISWA-ISWA links seem intact, at least as far as messaging is concerned. The number of ISWA messages broadcast on social media of the Islamic State has increased since Nur's death.
Since August, 23 claims of ISWA attacks have been promoted by Islamic State messaging agencies such as Amaq News. The contrast with earlier courier models in 2018 is striking, as only four similar attack claims were released before July. Messaging changes in the past have preceded major changes within the group, and the growing publicity of ISWA's activities at least demonstrates that virtual relationships with the Islamic State seem uninterrupted by the announced end of Nur .
The allegations of attack report a series of disturbing incidents targeting Nigerian military bases in northern Borno State. Many assaults have resulted in the escape of security personnel, at least until the arrival of reinforcements or the use of air power. These attacks show no signs of slowing down, as evidenced by the assault last week in Metele and another in Kangarwa a few days later.
The attacks increased the ISWA offensive, allowing militants to raid weapons during raids. Although the faction has not occupied any sector for a long time, the ability to dictate the pace of war is a worrying sign of its capabilities in this part of Borno State. This suggests that the group is not weaker after Nur's announced death.
ISWA has also demonstrated changes in its position vis-à-vis the hostages. Previously, ISWA's history of high-profile abduction victims had generally yielded positive results: a team of geologists abducted in July 2017 was released in February, as were all Dapchi schoolgirls except one. .
The attacks put ISWA on an increased offensive, allowing militants to loot weapons during raids
Recently, however, ISWA has been less patient with regard to hostage negotiations. In mid-September 2018, ISWA executed one of the three aid workers in its possession, claiming that the Nigerian government had ignored their demands. A 30-day response time expired in mid-October, resulting in the execution of another.
ISWA justified these executions as they had not done with previous hostages. The two executed humanitarian workers were Muslim women, but after their deaths, they explained how they were considered apostates because they had abandoned Islam while working for an international organization.
But Dapchi schoolgirls are not convicted in this way, although they attend a government-run school and are warned not to continue this education upon their release. The abducted geologists were also treated differently despite their collaboration with the Maiduguri University and their trip in an army-protected convoy. They were even told that they could resume their work after their release. In this sense, ISWA's operational approach to hostage-taking has evolved in recent months, resulting in more difficult results.
Combined, the announced disappearance of Nur, the increased promotion of ISWA activities on the ISIS messaging channels, the frequency of attacks on military outposts in the north of the state by Borno and the various hostage results herald more radical prospects for ISWA. Given the timing, it seems to be related to Nur's disappearance.
The insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin region has undergone subtle changes that could herald a new stage
These changes also raise questions about the relationship between ISWA and the Shekau faction. While ISWA increases the frequency of its attacks, the Shekau faction did the opposite – at least with its controversial suicide attacks on soft civilian targets.
The last successful attack had already occurred in mid-August (although other attempts were reported and the Nigerian army arrested an attentive woman in November). Given the unpopularity of these attacks with ISWA, the reduction could also be interpreted as a way for Shekau to take responsibility during a period of internal turmoil.
Any reconciliation would be difficult, however, given Barnawi's message denouncing Shekau's ideology as recently as June. Yet Barnawi's status within his own faction is unclear as a result of Nur's announced death. It is possible that a new group of activists who maintain links with the Islamic State, but differ from Nur's less confrontational approach and Shekau excesses, will emerge.
Although the leadership dynamic remains uncertain, it is clear that the insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin region has undergone subtle changes that could herald a new stage. Until now, the ramifications have been dramatic, with ISWA having been able to reinforce its capabilities to the point that the pushback of security forces in the north of Borno State is now commonplace . The dynamics of internal leadership may have been the tipping point between the relative containment of a regional threat such as ISWA and a new wave of terror in what has already been a long war in the region from Lake Chad.
Omar S Mahmood, Senior Researcher, ISS Addis Ababa
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