The tactical battles England must win to beat Denmark – the Athletic

England have arguably never had a side with so many talented, creative and offensive balling skills – yet Gareth Southgate decides his starting XI based on England’s approach without possession. With no goals conceded in five matches at Euro 2020 so far, it’s hard to have too many arguments.

In the knockout stage, pressing was Southgate’s main concern.

The decision to move to a 3-4-3 against Germany, choosing to bring in an additional defender at the expense of a striker, was interpreted as a negative decision. But Southgate insisted it was because he wanted England to be positive without possession. “We had to go about it as we thought,” he said. “We wanted aggressive pressure all over the pitch and we thought matching them up was the right way to go. “

He returned to a four-way defense for the 4-0 quarter-final victory over Ukraine, England’s best performance of the tournament so far, with and without possession. Andriy Shevchenko’s side, like Germany, used a three-way defense, albeit in a 3-5-2 rather than a 3-4-3, which meant England could press for a different way – allowing wingers to stay open and rely on full-backs Luke Shaw and Kyle Walker to push and shut them off, leaving the two Ukrainian forwards to center-backs John Stones and Harry Maguire.

This approach would of course not have been viable against a team made up of three forwards, like Germany. Or the opponents in the semi-finals of Denmark.

Southgate is in a tight spot ahead of the semi-final at Wembley tomorrow (Wednesday). There will be calls for him to name something approaching an unchanged side – or, at least, an unchanged system – of the one that beat Ukraine. But Denmark are playing overall similar to Germany, in a 3-4-3 system, and so Southgate might consider the approach used in the round of 16 against the Germans, rather than the approach they have. chosen in Rome on Saturday, makes the most sense.

This is what Denmark is used for when building from behind.

Andreas Christensen, Simon Kjaer and Jannik Vestergaard are all strong center-backs who are also able to move the ball forward and distribute it effectively in midfield.

Pierre-Emile Hojbjerg and Thomas Delaney were one of the tournament’s most effective midfield partners. When Denmark is developing play, these two are rarely on the same horizontal line – usually one falls deep and the other pushes forward, making them harder to squeeze for a midfield duo. opposing. On the sidelines, Joakim Maehle has performed very well as a left-back right-footed, while Daniel Wass and Jens Stryger Larsen vie for the position on the right side.

The player who complicates things slightly is Mikkel Damsgaard, who retreats from the front line into midfield, dragging a defender into the pitch with him and looking to overload the midfield. His appreciation of space is excellent and England need to watch him carefully.

Kasper Dolberg may miss his center-forward role, while Martin Braithwaite – who can trade flanks with Damsgaard – offers speed behind.

The other downside is that the Danes have shown great flexibility so far.

Coach Kasper Hjulmand switched to a 4-3-3 system to surprise Wales in their 4-0 second-round victory, pushing Christensen ahead of the back row in the starting role. Again, Damsgaard figures in this shot, moving inside the flank to overload the midfielder.

This 4-3-3 was however a very surprising decision. It might not be as effective the second time around, although England should be wary of that possibility – especially because on Saturday night Ukraine improved towards the end of the first half when they are went from 3-5-2 to 4-3-3 after injury forced Shevchenko to make an early substitution.

So if hurrying is Southgate’s main intention, how does England go about it?

First, imagine that he names a camp and a system unchanged to the one that swept Ukraine.

Jadon Sancho and Raheem Sterling played close in Rome to encumber the center, but the obvious problem here is with the Danish full-backs, who would be free to advance aggressively down the flanks.

England can’t afford to let these two – especially Maehle – out on the loose. But they can’t leave them to Shaw and Walker, as Damsgaard and / or Braithwaite would likely find room, and they don’t want Sancho and Sterling to follow them and form a back six.

Overall, this shape doesn’t seem to work particularly well in terms of pressing.

But if England go to their own 3-4-3, things get a lot simpler.

The approach would be pretty much the same as against Germany – ‘match them up’, in Southgate’s words – and every English player would have a direct opponent to stop. It’s three against three at the top of the field, four against four in midfield and three against three again at the back.

What if Denmark went to their 4-3-3? This would complicate matters slightly and may force England to turn their 3-4-3 into 3-4-1-2. That shouldn’t be too much of a problem for this group of players, however – Sterling played alongside Harry Kane in the last World Cup three years ago with great success.

The potential requirement for the England right-side forward to play a central role would mean it would make sense for Southgate to pick Mason Mount, rather than Sancho or Bukayo Saka.

Full-backs would be forced to press higher on the pitch – higher than you usually find them – but that shouldn’t be a big deal either. It is, after all, quite Denmark’s alternative system.

Admittedly, the 3-4-3 undoubtedly weakens England in the future. There’s one less offensive player, which means a drop in creative ability and dribbling, but Southgate might be convinced that Kane’s recent improvement, Sterling’s goals scored and Shaw’s offensive drive mean that there is a sufficient threat of attack.

Attacking set pieces can also be crucial.

In addition, Southgate’s approach so far has been justified by results.

He’s happy to break a winning team. He is happy to work backwards pressing high on the field.

Going back to 3-4-3 probably wouldn’t be popular, but Southgate has shown little appetite to give in to the crowd.