Why do Republicans "dismiss" Michael Cohen's case

Campaign expenses are not necessarily a subjective purpose. For example, if Trump (or any other businessman in power) decides to sue the company to remove them from the debate, so that they do not become campaign problems, these regulations do not would not be campaign expenses, but would remain personal. expenses, payable by Trump or the continued corporation. This is true even though Trump's lawyers found the lawsuits totally unjustified and only paid for unwelcome regulations to avoid a bad election campaign.

The standard "for the purpose of influencing a campaign" should be read in conjunction with the prohibition in the law of using campaign funds for personal purposes. This article and its regulations define things that are not campaign expenses, and personal use includes all obligations that would exist regardless of the campaign. Obligations to Daniels or others (as they were) were not created as a candidate. Moreover, even if Trump decided to pay the blackmail in part because he was running for president, the FEC had expressly rejected a mixed-trial test, namely that something would be considered a campaign expense if the One of the motives was to help the campaign. It must exist only because the candidate is a candidate. But Daniels' blackmail exists whether Trump is a candidate or not. Clearly, Trump may be more inclined to pay for it because it came in, but it still existed. Indeed, Daniels said that she had been threatened very early in 2012. And if she did not show up until after Trump's election, he could still pay for it, but the campaign would completed. In short, it's not just the campaign.

Second, prosecutors want that "in order to influence a campaign" be a subjective test determined by the state of mind of the actors. I believe that the test is designed as an objective test, according to a reasonable observer, defining the expenses that one did during one's mandate – for example, hiring campaign staff, buying advertisements, telephone service for campaign, office rental, printing bumper stickers, etc. I doubt that a reasonable jury could consider "payments to a mistress" as a "campaign expense". If it was literally "no matter what" in order to influence a campaign, "virtually all personal expenses made by a person in public life could be considered campaign expenses and, at least, probably the subject of an investigation. (Also note that things "which are campaign expenses MUST be paid with campaign funds.") The sentence must therefore be restricted. is consistent with the precedent of the Supreme Court which, along with the lower courts of appeal, has always noted that "the purpose of influencing" language is unconstitutionally vague unless it is limited by judicial interpretation Thus, when it was decided to rule on the language, on the side of independent expenditure, it reduced the expression "express defense" or, later, a standard objective (mention of candidate, 60 days before the election) that he stated to be the "functional equivalent" of express advocacy.

In short, the prosecutor has Cohen short-haired, so it's no wonder he's been pleading, but it's not a campaign violation. The court of appeal has not clearly stated this definition applied to contributions, but spending decisions suggest that prosecutors are excessive. And note that they had great difficulty convincing jurors to condemn the theory (see John Edwards and Payments to Rielle Hunter).

In short, short answer: payments made to a mistress to remain silent are not campaign expenses. They may violate other laws or ethical rules, but they do not violate the FECA.

In fact, the Department of Justice has never tried to do such a thing. such a claim in front of – against the former Democratic presidential candidate, Senator John Edwards of North Carolina – the Department of Justice was lost.

In addition, the Federal Electoral Commission – an independent federal agency responsible for the civil enforcement of campaign finance law – did not consider Edwards' cash donations as related expenses in the countryside when auditing the Edwards campaign.

Result: Cohen was "persuaded" to plead guilty to an action that was not a real violation of the law. … [I] Cohen did not really violate the campaign finance law, despite his misguided guilty plea – it would be impossible for Trump to have violated the campaign finance law by ordering him to take a perfectly legal action.

Again, first of all, it is probably not a campaign expense and is therefore not subject to the law. But if the American lawyer could make sure that a judge decides otherwise – and again, his theory is not invoked from scratch – there would be other interesting issues . Under the law, the press is exempted from limitations and information. Otherwise, the press could not work. (If you think about it, pretty much any story on the campaign is at least probably "coordinated" with the campaign – done with the permission and contact of the campaign and involves spending money on it. money (for traveling and publishing) .But the press is only exempted when operating as part of its "press function" (according to the interpretations of the FEC) .Thus, the Washington Post could not simply delete advertising posters saying: "Trump threatens a free press – democratic vote".

But far beyond that, the exemption has been interpreted broadly, including allowing a publication to advertise its articles. Thus, the post could almost certainly display posters illustrating the title of an editorial of the letter saying, "Trump threatens a free press and must be defeated," and perhaps below the panel "Is that? Trump is really a scoundrel? Publish to find out. "

To go in another direction, can Post's editors say, "The most important thing on our agenda is to ensure Trump's removal from office." I want a dozen or so reporters from the United States. investigation on him, full time, more if necessary.Bezos will pay then spend what you need! "I think so. In other words, the press works to elect or defeat candidates all the time.

And here is the real thing. The Enquirer buys a story and does not publish it. Ethical journalism? You tell me. I am told that this is not uncommon in the UK. But in either case, can the press work if all its editorial decisions are subject to assumptions on the part of the government? Suppose, in my example above, that investigative reporters come back, $ 130,000 in time and expense later, and say, "You know, there's really nothing in this collusion case. But you would not believe what we discovered about Clinton, Fusion GPS and the Rooskies! "And the editor says," Well, we will not tell this story. " Does the Post operate under the Press Exemption?

The story of Enquirer, though it is true that they were promised reimbursement, is about the best deal for a periodical not falling under 39, exemption from the press. (Also, the press exemption does not apply to the media under the control of a candidate, which I suppose could be discussed, although it is of course a desire to prevent types like Steve Forbes to use their publications as campaign materials). But even then, I'm not sure that this is really a way the press wants to borrow, or an interpretation of the law they want to adopt. At the CEF, we received many complaints against the press that were regularly rejected without investigation. But if we start looking at the motives of the editors, it could become risky.

But again, my basic decision is not a violation of campaign funding. Therefore, it does not matter (for campaign financing purposes) whether Enquirer or Cohen or Trump or Trump Industries or whoever made the payment.