Tripartite discussions. What does Gazprom want? / New time



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On the relationship between the Tripartite Talks on Transit from 2020 and the 1960s. Arbitration between Naftogaz and Gazprom

The gas transit contract between Naftogaz and Gazprom expires. Tripartite consultations of experts (European Union, Ukraine, Russia) are scheduled for 15 January and trilateral "talks" at the political level – 21 January.

The discussion of these interviews in the media and even at the political level is currently focused on issues, which are in fact ignored by the Russian side. The question, which the Russian side officially determines as a prerequisite for real negotiations, is not discussed at the same time.

What is Gazprom's language, what real demands does the Russian side make and why not talk about it? Gazprom's position is clear. Initially, the "restoration of balance" in the relations between Naftogaz and Gazprom, then real discussions on the transit.

Here are the proofs: Gazprom TV after the truce "Negotiations": "After the talks in Berlin between Russia, the European Commission and Ukraine Gazprom President, Oleksiy Miller, said: "The future relationship between Gazprom and Naftogaz, Ukraine, as well as the extension of the gas transit agreement beyond 2019, will mainly depend on the settlement of disputes and the recovery of the gas. 39, balance of interests and symmetry in the region. "We await the decision of the Court of Appeal and the volume of gas transiting through Ukraine after 2019 has not been discussed today. And these negotiations do not have the status of business-to-business negotiations. "

What is a" restoring the balance of interests "? Gazprom officially declares that the arbitration award violated this "balance in relations". In other words, the Ukrainian side must give up the victory at arbitration.

What will it mean for Ukraine? Without winning the arbitration of a gas supply contract and a transit contract for today, we should pay Gazprom over $ 73 billion for bonds. Take or pay for the period 2012-2018 and approximately $ 4 billion for gas delivered in 2014-2015. . We should buy gas at Gazprom at a higher price than we buy in Europe. At the same time, in 2019, taking into account the "take or pay" principle, we should pay $ 11 billion more gas (or 5.5 times more) for transit revenues received for gas. And we could not demand a surcharge of $ 2.7 billion for transit.

The volume of gas transiting through Ukraine after 2019 has not been discussed today

You can consider these requirements as absurd to Gazprom. I also think so, yes. But that does not change the fact that Gazprom demands it.

The fact is that Russia wants the payment of transit through Ukraine to be only a relatively small discount on Russian payments for gas bought back by Ukraine. In other words, Ukraine has to pay Russia six times the gas it receives for transit. The money has to go from Ukraine to Russia, not the other way around. It's a "balance of relations" acceptable to Russia, which she wants to restore.

That is Russia's most important contracts for the period 2009-2019: Russia is expected to receive on average $ 12 billion a year more than gas to pay for transit (no discount on the price of gas). gasoline and concessions "to be taken or paid", which must be requested separately by Putin in exchange for the sovereignty of Ukraine). This is almost 10% of Ukrainian GDP. If we did not break this balance in relations, then Ukraine would experience a significant decline in GDP rather than growth.

I am convinced that in Europe, the prevailing opinion is that Russia is unacceptable for these requirements. But for the tripartite "negotiations" to continue, they are abandoned by Gazprom's strict requirements.

This approach can be understood. However, we must take into account the North Stream 2 factor. The lobbyists of this project and some European politicians use these tripartite "discussions" as an argument in favor of the North Stream 2. Let us see, Germany and the European Commission the will do to maintain transit through Ukraine, so avoid interfering with Russia and European companies to build the North Stream 2.

It turns out to be in Russian bass. European politicians say that it is necessary to preserve transit through Ukraine and that "Vaska listens and eats", continuing to build North Stream 2, which is the main threat to preserve transit through the # 39; Ukraine.

What to do with? I do not have a ready answer. I can only share my thoughts and invite this question to the discussion, the most relevant for the upcoming trilateral "talks".

The presence of negotiations is generally better than their absence. And the participation of Europeans helps Ukraine. From the beginning of the tripartite "negotiations", the Ukrainian side, in accordance with the position of the European party, has decided not to negotiate issues already discussed in international arbitration.

However, as we see, the Russian side has always been in the opposite position (for more than six months).

Soon, it may already seem that the Ukrainian side is afraid to discuss this problem at the trilateral level. It is not like that. We avoided the issue of the implementation of arbitral awards only by trying to take a constructive position in these "negotiations".

At the same time, Naftogaz's position is as clear as that of Gazprom. The question of "equilibrium in relations" has already been examined in the manner specified in the contract – in an international arbitration.

The reverend arbitrators, including the arbitrator appointed by Gazprom, have already made their decision. There is currently no legal reason for Gazprom to comply with it. Gazprom tried to suspend the execution of this decision before the Swedish court of appeal, but also failed in this case. Gazprom may continue to try to overturn the arbitration award, but so far, this has not happened (and it is unlikely to happen again), it must make that decision.

Naftogaz does not give up complicated questions. In particular, the question of how to negotiate something with Gazprom, when in fact it does not recognize the only dispute resolution mechanism provided for by such agreements. We can only agree that Gazprom will execute, at its discretion, contracts. Who then needs such contracts?

For almost five years we have also been asking that it would be better for Ukraine to transit through its country through European companies that would buy gas from Gazprom on the border with Russia and society, which transit through Ukraine via Central Asian gas to Europe and Gazprom gas producers in Russia. Unfortunately, these capabilities are deliberately blocked by Russia and Europe still tolerates this. I note that these issues are not the subject of tripartite negotiations.

Currently, Ukraine is actively discussing what should appear in the transit contract from 2020, so that Naftogaz does not require $ 12 billion in the new arbitration provided for in the contract of transit through 2020. In addition, in the context of transit negotiations, topics such as "abandonment" and the participation of an international partner are also discussed.

Gazprom, at one point (as early as April), asked what should happen to not start a new arbitration under a transit contract. We have explained our proposal in detail. Gazprom officially declined and we launched a new arbitration

With regard to "annihilation" and the involvement of an international partner, the Russian side does not apply. In general, Mr Miller stated that he even considered that the current contract between Naftogaz and Gazprom was in line with European rules. Therefore, the position of the Ukrainian and European parties that European rules must be applied to the new transit agreement should not be divided de facto by the Russian side.

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