Trump and Ukraine: Operation shock and fear – Internal Policy of Ukraine – Analytics, Articles, Exclusive



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Every meeting of Putin with Trump creates a "shock and fear" effect in Ukraine.

Immediately draw the pictures of the second Yalta, the global betrayal of Ukraine, the "sale" of Crimea. Surprisingly, the fact that those who, a few months ago, were satisfied with the lethal defensive weapon of the United States, are now preparing to shoot at the back of an American partner who, in fact, does not does not recognize Ukraine as an ally.

In the event of a meeting between two irrational actors, such as Trump and Putin, no forecast for the results of their appointment is that a forecast. However, the great concern raised by this summit shows once again how vulnerable US-Ukrainian relations are under President Tramp. That's despite the fact that Trump is far from being the first and perhaps not the last American president who is seeking a "reset" of relations with Putin. With the fact that for the American president, as we could see in the last year, the resonance at international meetings is often much more important than the result. Therefore, it is possible that the outcome of the meeting may be the result of the meeting, as explained by US National Security Advisor John Bolton. And maybe the beginning of something more unpleasant for Ukraine.

In one way or another, the meeting between Trump and Putin is a good reason to analyze where we have underestimated Trump's White House, and where, on the contrary, we overestimate, and we must make efforts.

First, in the context of the recent statements by the US President on the return of the G7 and possibly on the affiliation of Crimea, it is clear that Trump's transformation must not be done under the influence of public opinion. – should not be. We must start from the assumption that Trump will not change in his basic views on America and the world.

Second, we must rely on the fact that Trump, in particular, does not bypass Ukraine as a country. He has no positive emotional attachments to Ukraine. Faster, on the contrary. As a result, he does not wish to invest his time, energy and money in the democratic development of Ukraine. For him, Ukraine is a matter of internal political agenda. In particular, an important aspect in his confrontation with the Congress, which last year, especially by Ukraine, organized an offensive on his presidential powers by codifying sanctions against Russia.

The Ukraine for Trump is not an opportunity, but mostly an obstacle. . An obstacle, in particular, to establish his relations with Putin. Not without reason, they say in the diplomatic circles, he gathered last year all the people involved in the Ukrainian file and asked them not to "probe" the Ukrainian question anymore. The US President does not care too much about Europe with regard to the concept, which for decades was the interest of US policy for the Old World in general and Ukraine in particular – "Europe is whole, free and at peace".

The influence of advisors and administration members who can play the role, as Americans say, "adults in the room" (adults in the room) is clearly overestimated. After the appointment of Bolton's National Security Advisor and Pompeo, Secretary of State – two unidentified politicians in Trump's resistance, Trump did not aim to tailor his policy to advisors but was determined to tailor councilors to his policy. New national security advisers and state secretaries could bring significant added value to Russia's deterrence if, together with Defense Minister Jim Mettis, they could cooperate and coordinate their efforts to curb Trump. After all, to contain Russia, you need someone who could have retained Trump from Russia in the beginning. It seems that there is no such coordination. Like all the friends, who, they say, was established in his day between Mettis and the former Secretary of State Tillerson.

Today, it is an important topic for Ukraine – the US Secretary of Defense, Jim Mettis, will he keep his post? Maybe our main promoter is the current US government. Recent reports of President Tramp's dissatisfaction with the Pentagon's political decisions are not very encouraging in this context. Although we must take this into account, even if Mettis remains in power, his ability to influence the president becomes, according to available information, more limited. While Mettis has de facto carte blanche for military / defense issues, there is now a tendency for the White House to adopt individual decisions in the area of ​​responsibility of the Minister of Defense (for example, drills). military with South Korea). Thus, it is possible that the most important role that can play the advisors and members of the close administration of Ukraine is to slow down some political decisions of Trump until the he comes back to them or that he forgets their existence.

Thirdly, Trump's US security strategy and trade-out documents, which have been specially resolved, once again support Trump's security as a matter of economic security. It seems that those who export the most cars or steel to the United States believe that US national security is much more threatened than the one that intervenes in the elections, arouse hostility in American society, violate the territorial integrity of the partners and threaten the allies. Russia, with its low level of trade with the United States and its GDP, is almost two times lower than that of a US state (California), it is paradoxical that Tramp is less threatened not only by China, but also by such important allies. like Germany or Japan. Despite the fact that Germany and Japan not only import their products in the United States, they have also created hundreds of thousands of jobs in their automobile abroad (more than 600,000 and 800,000 respectively). A single small dashboard: the world's largest BMW plant is not found in Germany, but in the state of South Carolina in the United States.

In such a logic, Ukraine can in no way be a threat to the Trump administration. However, as history shows with the decision to introduce additional duties on imports of steel and aluminum products into the United States, every country trading with the United States is vulnerable. Ukraine has decided to introduce additional duties on steel and aluminum in March. And although Ukraine last year is only 24th among all importers of similar products in the United States and with its 256,000 tons, it does not seem very convincing about 6 million tons exported by Canada, nearly 5 million tonnes exported by Brazil. , we note that the new restrictive measures concern 20-25% of the total exports of Ukrainian products to the United States during the last three years.

Fourthly, there are many reasons to believe that Putin remains Trump's authority. How many meetings and unfulfilled promises of Putin to the US president, so that his credibility is pale in the eyes of Trump, is unknown. On the other hand, the experience of Merkel and Holland, on the one hand, has become a new disappointment for European partners and the experience of Berlusconi and Schroeder, on the other part, as a result of intensive communication, the capture and capabilities of Putin. only intensified. We must understand for ourselves that every meeting Putin and Trump is an opportunity for the Russian President to conduct another campaign of discredit against Ukraine. Since the Bucharest Summit at NATO, when he explained to Bush, in the presence of NATO leaders, that "Ukraine is not even a state", many new plots appeared. He, speaking in diplomatic circles, is already tired enough of stories about what Ukrainians will do, God willing, Ukraine on the territory of the so-called DNR and NRL. Trump may still have to hear it in detail. Crimea is another vulnerable issue for the US president. Since the election campaign, Trump has adopted a rather specific attitude to the annexation of Crimea. On the one hand, he made categorical statements that people in Crimea actually wanted to be with Russia, thus indirectly justifying annexation. On the other hand, for several years he has ruthlessly criticized President Obama for allowing Putin to annex Crimea. Even last year at a meeting with Poroshenko, according to our diplomatic sources, he directly asked the Ukrainian President: "Do you agree that Obama gave Putin Crimea?" ? " So, if you follow all of Trump's statements on this subject, public and non-public, it seems that he continues to prefer to condemn Obama, not Putin, to what happened to Crimea.

Clearly, Ukraine must be ready for permanent "slides" in dialogue with the White House until the end of the Trump presidency, when positive decisions will change with negative statements . In addition, there will always be a sense of presence of two parallel governments in the United States with slightly different rhetoric and a slightly different view of the role and weight of Ukraine. From the category: "There is Trump, but there is the United States". How to act in this case?

First of all, as shown by the experience of the past year, because of the low priority of Ukraine for Trump, many things can be done either in the Inertia or without the personal blessing of the president. This holds for both Ukraine's various technical support programs, which have been launched in past administrations, and for policies to support various reforms. The last few months have clearly shown that even with the continued involvement of the State Department, some important decisions on the agenda of Ukrainian reforms, especially in the context of the fight against corruption, can be displaced.

Unfortunately, we must admit that Ukraine has not succeeded in substantially correcting its image in Washington, taking advantage of the arrival of a new Ukrainian team, sometimes not very well informed . As in previous administrations, the perceptible perception of Ukraine as a deeply corrupt country prevails. So, as long as Ukraine does not show and therefore does not report the result to the same level of Romania, corruption can be a serious reason for blaming Ukraine even among the members of the EU. administration for whom this question is not a priority. And it may already be used by the US President, if we believe Trump's statements at the meeting of G7 leaders, where he told Western leaders that Ukraine was one of the worst countries in the world to defend its position.

And here, as can be seen, the tactics of buying American support, obviously logical to bet on Ukraine by entering into coal purchase contracts in Pennsylvania or to modernize the Ukrzaliznytsya rolling stock with General Electric Transportation, is insufficient (I write about it in more detail in the quarterly reviews of Ukrainian-US Truman Index). In addition, Orban Hungary has also signed a nearly $ 1 billion contract with General Electric for the supply of turbines to the Paks NPP. The purchase of US support was mainly used to eliminate the negative loophole of an election campaign in which Ukraine was not part of the supporters of the Trump campaign and to establish a direct contact with the current US President. But in the medium and long term, only this tactic will obviously not be enough. Moreover, by signing only two of the aforementioned contracts, Ukraine is already grateful for the help that the United States has brought us, at least after the annexation of Crimea: the United States is currently implementing a $ 1.2 billion aid program. , while a contract with GE is worth a billion dollars.

As for President Trump, we must not forget that there is a question where his convictions coincide with the interests of Ukraine. For example, increase the defense spending of European partners of NATO. European countries are more resistant to external security threats in the interest of Ukraine. And in this context, it should be noted that given Trump's obsession with this idea, Ukraine could have communicated better to Washington because without even being a candidate for membership in the NATO, it already spends 5% of GDP, of which – more than two NATO "necessary".

Some will say that there is a question of the North Stream-2, in which we, although for various reasons, but also are on the same side as Trump. However, some American insiders insist that Ukraine should refrain from excessive expectations specifically for the US president, as it is not certain that Trump really understands all the risks of this project and to what extent its position is firm. Will we not suddenly see that, unlike the State Department and the Congress, which is more coherent in this area, is it ready to hand over a North Stream-2 map to European partners at the first opportunity?

Nobody also prevents Ukraine from playing more of one of the key elements of Trump's policy under the pseudonym "anti-Obama." Who knows, maybe the lethal defensive weapon Tramp is it okay because Obama did not give it to Ukraine? Although, perhaps, someone just explained to Trump that Ukraine will become a permanent buyer of this weapon in the United States. Perhaps the argument has worked: if a lethal weapon is the most symbolic gesture of support from Ukraine, why not give it to "the child" and his " "attentive educators in the United States calmed down?

Finally, Ukraine still lacks an American history well understood about itself. Respectful Congressional interlocutors, who spoke on this topic, believe that the problem of Ukraine is that it seeks to tell everything at once – both about the revolution, about the war and about the reforms. With different voices, with different intonations. In Georgia, for example, they are different stories and, they say, it works better on the shores of Potomak. But another question arises: is it possible to tell a compelling story about Ukraine, if the role of the Ukrainian victim is already exhausted and if the role of the winner has not been written yet?

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