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The 10th anniversary of the November 26, 2008, terrorist attacks in Mumbai brought tributes, commemorations and hashtags galore, but not enough introspection about whether India drew the right lessons from One of the biggest terrorist attacks on its soil. The versatility of collective memory has already relegated tragedy to a moment in history, which is remembered from time to time as a subject for further public debate.
The possibility of terrorists planning another such bold and elaborate attack against India has not been reduced. Motivation is not lacking on the other side of the border to bleed the country with a thousand cuts. The low-cost asymmetric war waged by Pakistan against India and the use of terror as an instrument of foreign policy will soon not end. India has made some progress in drawing the attention of the international community to terrorism and in leading the diplomatic isolation of Pakistan. The sharing of intelligence with other countries on terrorism and the interoperability of counter-terrorism capabilities has progressed.
But so far, we have not managed to develop a rational and consistent approach to terrorism. Therefore, the desire to prevent another 26/11 has faded into institutional apathy. This gap is guided by three structural defects:
File image of the Taj hotel in Mumbai. Reuters
First, there is not enough political will to consider terrorism as a policy issue and to reach a bipartisan consensus on the development of a coherent counterterrorism strategy. Second, Pakistan, the nerve center of global terrorism and the main source of unrest in India, is paralyzed by policies, where New Delhi's initiatives fluctuate permanently between the "awareness campaign" model. Third, strengthening the country's security apparatus by investing in police reforms or developing institutional capacity is considered too costly or politically useless.
The weight of this combined apathy weighs heavily on a country that spends more time praying and hoping to avoid another 26/11 than to strive to reduce the chances of such an attack. The police – the first person interviewed in a crisis – remains under-equipped and poorly trained. Politicians can not decide to make peace with Pakistan or hold it accountable for failing to bring the only perpetrator to justice, despite the sharing of volumes and volumes of "records". And the intelligence services are weakening each other in a perpetual and fierce war, creating vast gaps in the security apparatus and passing exploitable intelligence.
As Adrian Levy, author of Headquarters (a highly acclaimed book on the Mumbai terror attacks) written in Strategic News Internationalattacks on the Mumbai attacks (apparently provided by the United States) were not lacking in information, but the willingness and skill to respond was sufficient.
Levy writes: "Many flows of information – from foreign sources (human intelligence) and technology (technical information) provided by foreign suppliers – described the imminent attack with clarity rarely seen in this type of business. operations … (But) The mistrust between R & AW and IB, and between IB and the police … meant that the information transmitted along the line reached their point of rest in a fragmented manner, with extraordinary slowness, with reports continually adjusted and adapted, until the principal inspector (30 years in service who was actually at the front) works) received only instructions that did not reflect the gravity of the building, its context and its calendar. "
The failure of intelligence services is a symptom of the third structural flaw in which institutional capacity building or implementation of reforms is at the bottom of the priority list. In the chapter titled "Reforming Intelligence", Vikram Sood, former head of the R & AW, in his book The endless gamewarns against the episodic reforms that generally follow a debacle similar to that which took place during the Mumbai attacks.
Sood writes that such fragmented efforts "do not really address fundamental issues such as building trust, improving professionalism and valuing intelligence gathering of attractive career opportunities in the current context, in order to produce a sharp and intelligent equipment ".
The fossilization of intelligence agencies into bureaucratic units at the feet of lead is compounded by the lack of police reforms. While first responders are not well trained in counterterrorism measures, there is too much left for special agents. An effective response to a terrorist attack then becomes more difficult.
The problem of police capabilities in India is, as Paul Staniland writes in his article Improving India's anti-terrorism policy after MumbaiThe Indian federal political system leaves most law enforcement responsibilities to states, which usually have their own counterterrorism and intelligence units. These forces, especially the local police, are often poorly trained and equipped. Local staff are frequently hired on the basis of are known for their high levels of corruption. "
When we add the lack of coordination (and even palpable hostility) between state and central agencies and their endemic problems of under-equipment, training and staff, the challenge becomes greater. These, however, are the symptoms of a deeper malaise – the lack of political will to treat terrorism as a political problem rather than subject the struggle to the bank's voting policy.
Staniland sees it as a "huge challenge for a political class centered primarily on the fierce electoral competition that characterizes Indian politics," but no meaningful counterterrorism strategy can be crafted if there is no consensus. between parties on what constitutes terrorism. Harsh Pant, a colleague of the ORF, wrote about it: "Partisan politics has created an environment in which political and religious polarization is so complete and rooted that effective action against terrorism becomes practically impossible to accomplish. "
The paralysis of Pakistani politics is another element of this structural defect. On the same day, the United States announced an additional $ 5 million through its Rewards for Justice (RFJ) program, which was aimed at obtaining information "leading to the arrest or arrest of the conviction of anyone involved in the planning or facilitation of the Mumbai attack in 2008 ", and called on Pakistan to defend its positions The obligations of the Security Council" to apply sanctions against terrorists responsible for this atrocity, including Lashkar-e-Taiba and its affiliates, "has heated up for Pakistan.
Vice President Venkaiah Naidu and the chief minister of Punjab laid the first stone of the Kartarpur corridor – a project involving Pakistan's cooperation – sending contradictory signals about a country that has always refused to book even one of its nationals responsible for the Mumbai conspiracy attacks.
To top it off, Congress President Navjot Singh Sidhu chose the 10th anniversary of 26/11 to congratulate Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan on the role he played in the launch of the event. corridor. "The real credit for the corridor goes to Imran and the people who prayed for several years for its construction," Sidhu was quoted by the news agency as saying. News18.
The Kartarpur corridor and the 26/11 attacks may seem like two different things, but congratulate the Prime Minister of a country that uses terrorist agents against India to undermine its sovereignty the very day that India remembers victims of the terrible terrorist attack sponsored by Pakistan, speaks of a particular kind of insensitivity.
As long as the electoral politics of the voting banks (the main reason for the Indian Kartarpur movement) will shape India's response to terrorism and internal security, India will remain under-prepared to deal with the scourge. terrorism. The lack of premium that India gives to the lives of its citizens should outrage us.
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