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On September 9, 2018 in Stockholm, the leader of the far-right Democratic party, Jimmy Akesson, addresses members and supporters of the party's electoral center. (Photo by Michael Campanella / Getty Images)
On Sunday, voters went to the polls in Sweden. The result confirmed what the polls had planned: a record for the populist national Swedish Democrat, a party steeped in white supremacy that wants to reduce the number of immigrants and refugees and hold a referendum on membership in the European Union. As the last votes are counted, the party has exceeded 17 percent, its highest percentage of votes cast.
This was accompanied by heavy losses for the two major ruling parties as a fragment of the party system in Sweden. Since the 1970s, center-left social democrats and center-right moderates have regularly won more than 60% of the vote. That dropped to 48%, a number of small parties, including the radical left, got support. Nevertheless, the center-left has recorded its lowest vote share in more than a century.
None of this was to happen in Sweden – a stable democracy known for its liberalism. But the rise of the Swedish Democrats reflects what is happening in other European countries, including the rise of the alternative for Germany, Geert Wilders in the Netherlands and the UK Independence Party, then Brexit in the UK.
So what exactly is happening in Sweden? Here is the story
In the early 2000s, it seemed that populism in Sweden had flinched. Sociologist Jens Rydgren attributed this to several factors, including strong alignment between the working class and the social democrats on the basis of economic issues. Meanwhile, identity politics was largely in the background. For example, in 1998, only 3% of Swedes felt that immigration was a priority. And the Swedish Democrats have not professionalised themselves and have moved away from a toxic legacy of extremism, which has limited its electoral prospects.
But the space for appeal parties like the Swedish Democrats was opening. According to Swedish national election surveys, fewer and fewer Swedes have declared themselves to be party members. This weakened ties between voters and traditional parties.
A second factor was the weakening of class influence. The percentage of the working class voting for the left parties is declining:
Although these parties have been supported by growing support from the middle class, this leaves even more working-class voters key group for the populists.
A third factor was the preponderance of issues related to identity and culture rather than the economy. The chart below shows the massive increase in the percentage of Swedes who think that immigration is a problem or a major problem:
In 1987, only 7% of Swedes regarded immigration as important. This figure rose to 20% in 2002 and then to 27% in 2014. It then reached 53% in 2015, the year when more than 160,000 asylum seekers arrived in Sweden.
Meanwhile, economic concerns remained weak: in 2017, only 13% cited employment or the economy as a major problem. This reflects Sweden's strong economy – and challenges the argument that national populism stems from "economic anxiety".
Immigration to Sweden is linked to growing public concern about crime, social order, terrorism and perceived threats to the national way of life. All these questions have been dealt with in the Swedish media.
At the same time, Swedish democrats downplayed their extremist roots and sought to portray a more "voter friendly" image (although accusations of neo-Nazi sympathies persist). Most of the party's messages are surrounded by apocalyptic claims of national decline and call for Sweden's traditionally robust social protection model against mass immigration.
Once brought together, these factors allowed the Swedish Democrats to mobilize – most of them from people who tend to be workers and men and who have less formal education. These are people who are particularly concerned about immigration and not just "protesting" against the institution. These are the characteristics of right-wing populist partisans in Europe.
Even though the Swedish Democrats remain in the minority, their impact is already being felt. Social Democrats have already committed to reducing social assistance to rejected asylum seekers, strengthening border and identity checks, preventing refugees from choosing where to live and permanently banning refugees from returning to their homes. failed asylum seekers to return to Sweden. The main parties also called for a stronger integration policy. Sweden's dominant parties do what many parties in Europe do: turn to issues of identity to overcome the challenge of national populism and appeal to voters concerned about immigration and terrorism.
Thus, while some commentators suggest that national populists have "underperformed" by polling only "18%," they have already won the debate in many ways.
Matthew Goodwin is professor of political science at the University of Kent and co-author of the next "National populism: the revolt against liberal democracy. "
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