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Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, also known as Abu Mazen, could hold the world record by entering into agreements with the wrong people at the wrong time. In the mid-1990s, he drafted an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal. His counterpart was Israeli Minister Yossi Beilin.
Alas, Abbas was still under the feet of his boss, Yasser Arafat. He did not have the power to deliver. As for Beilin: a year and a half after the drafting of the pact, Beilin and the Labor government of which he was a member were ousted and replaced by the first government led by Benjamin Netanyahu, Likud. The Beilin-Abu-Mazen agreement remained on the plateau.
More than 10 years later, Abbas was on the point of concluding an agreement with Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. Two reasons, however, prevented the realization of the agreement: First, Abbas never said yes (recently, Olmert tried to give a more positive answer to this negative answer by insisting that "… Abbas "never said no." And secondly, by the time these two found common ground, Olmert was no longer relevant.He was a weak Prime Minister, on track He had no chance of getting the agreement that he wanted to go to the Knesset, so again, what the parties had agreed on remained on the board. .
At times, Abbas seems to misinterpret the political headwinds. An agreement with Beilin was only an intellectual exercise. An agreement with Olmert was only an illusion. Last week, as he was about to deliver his annual speech at the United Nations, Abbas had other insignificant big meetings. He met Olmert, a convicted criminal with no political future, in London. He then met opposition leader Tzipi Livni in New York. And yes, Livni is still a player in the Israeli political arena, but she is unlikely to have the power to make crucial decisions for Israel in a predictable political scenario.
The two men he has to talk to – Netanyahu and President Donald Trump – have not had that honor. Both said they were ready to sit down and talk. Trump even mentioned a possible "two-state solution". Netanyahu was intelligent enough to respond positively to his unclear message, reminding observers that a "state" can mean many things. "Everyone defines the term" state "differently," he said. "I wish the Palestinians had the power to govern themselves without permission to harm us," Netanyahu said on Sept. 26 after a meeting with Trump in New York. So, he did not rule out the possibility that this autonomy is called a state.
What was Abbas' response to these messages in a relatively conciliatory tone? He said Palestinians now see the United States "with new eyes". They did not consider the United States as a fair mediator for peace. "This administration has reneged on all previous US commitments and undermined the two-state solution," Abbas said. For Netanyahu's Israel, Abbas has reserved even harsher words, not those of a leader preparing his people for negotiation and reconciliation.
Twenty-five years after the Oslo Accords – a peace plan developed by Israelis and Palestinians in the early 1990s – there is now another plan for peace, developed by the Americans. Since the beginning of the peace process, whenever the parties seemed to lose their footing and shirk, the Americans felt the need to come to the rescue. Plans were made during the Bill Clinton, George W. Bush and Barack Obama years. To the credit of the presidents, their intentions have always been good and their plans produced no better or worse result than the initial plan developed by the Israelis and the Palestinians – this being No result. All parties seem much better at planning peace than doing it.
Like the Palestinians, Israel wants peace on its terms. He wants peace with Jerusalem. He wants peace without refugees. He wants peace as a Jewish state.
And now there is another plan developed by a team of Americans that Trump has assembled to write the "ultimate contract". And do not worry: while he still thinks that Israel and Palestine are a "real estate contract"; as he preaches someday for a two-state solution and the next day, a state is also a possibility; although he still thinks that "we are going to make a deal," his team knows more than that. The plan is nuanced, consistent and ready to be published. Ready for failure.
This could lead to a Palestinian state. And yet, Netanyahu seems confident that his plan is consistent with the concept of "letting them govern themselves without the ability to harm Israel." In other words: do not ask them if they will have a "state" – ask what you mean by "a state". . "Call it a" state ", call it a" giraffe "or a" tiara ", Israel does not care much about it as long as it preserves its ability to defend the border and prevents it to become another Palestinian enclave of terrorism such as Gaza. Palestinians want a flag? They can have a flag. They can have a government, a border, a president, they can make decisions, develop their cities, develop their economy, maintain internal security. They can have a lot more than what they have now. All of this is in the plan, but for a price the Palestinians do not seem willing to pay.
The plan is still secret because there is currently no credible buyer. The trump administration of Trump's administration was met with stiff resistance. What were Trump's tools? Use the Arab world to make the agreement of the century a regional agreement rather than an Israeli-Palestinian agreement; use sanctions and economic incentives to bring Palestinians to cooperate; to break down some of the orthodoxies that have become an obstacle to progress in all previous peace processes.
The Trump administration – senior advisor Jared Kushner, Israel advisor Jason Jason Greenblatt and their team – asked Arab leaders to commit and guarantee the plan's support. They were informed of certain principles and some of them reacted in a slightly positive way. But a commitment was not granted. Trump hoped to put pressure on the Palestinians, assisted by the Egyptians and the Saudis. But these hopes met the reality of a Middle East where commitments are scarce and their achievement even rarer.
The Palestinians were hit in the wallet by the administration, then they were told that they could get much more than they had lost if they accepted certain terms and returned to the negotiating table.
And of course, the most daring and most visible acts were those aimed at definitively killing some unrealistic dreams: Jerusalem was recognized as the capital of Israel, and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees was cut off from funds whose ultimate goal perpetuating and exacerbating the problem of Palestinian refugees.
Abbas responded to the three movements in one powerful sentence: "Jerusalem is not for sale and the rights of the Palestinian people are not for negotiation". "Jerusalem" is the war cry that can deter Arab leaders from taking the Trump train. "For Sale" means clarifying that Palestinians will not let economic hardship or economic incentives distract them from their ultimate goal. "Rights" means that Trump was wrong to brag that Jerusalem and the refugees are now off the table. Maybe it's off the table of Trump and Netanyahu – but that's exactly why Abbas does not see the need to negotiate with these leaders. This is exactly why he called for "the convening of an international peace conference on the basis of relevant UN resolutions and terms of reference and parameters approved by the international community". He called the conference to insinuate that the Trump plan is not feasible. table.
All parties seem much better at planning peace than doing it.
This is not because Israel is in a hurry to sign an agreement with the Palestinians. This is not it. Like the Palestinians, Israel wants peace on its terms. He wants peace with Jerusalem. He wants peace without refugees. He wants peace as a Jewish state. He wants a peace that the other party is not willing to grant.
Yes, Netanyahu knows that one day, one way or another, the Palestinian issue will need a cure. But he does not see this problem as urgent. Not when the neighborhood is concerned about Iranian aggression, Russian interventionism, syrian bloodshed, Islamic radicalism.
Netanyahu is confident enough about the Trump plan. But he is not too confident for two reasons: the erratic nature of the president and the dynamics of the negotiation, if it ever materialized. Trump does not like failure and, declaring that an agreement between Israel and Palestine is his goal – a goal that he always says likely to be achieved – he Is entrusted to Abbas and Netanyahu. They can make it fail. They can make him look like a loser.
The Prime Minister is aware of the danger that Trump, because of his commitment, falls in love with the idea of peacemaking and that this emotion has been problematic in past negotiations (the former Secretary of State John Kerry and The Iran Agreement is a recent example). The Prime Minister also knows that the negotiations could lead to many unexpected results: what if his coalition collapses? What if his only choice was to rely on the opposition parties, who want him to be more accommodating with the Palestinians? What if the audience suddenly began to pressure him to give more? What happens if Israel is diplomatically missed?
Of course, there is no danger that this will happen as long as Abbas prefers to make deals with imaginary rulers of imaginary states rather than real rulers of real states. If the game of Abbas is a waiting game, forget about Trump and wait for a more friendly American president in 2020; forget Netanyahu and wait for his legal problems to discourage him – the Israeli prime minister is not in a hurry either. As his American speech of September 27 shows, Palestinians are relatively few on his agenda. They are a nuisance, not an existential threat. They are a diversion, not the real power game of the Middle East. In fact, one of the main concerns for Israel is the risk that the United States will be diverted from these important issues to play the game of a futile peace process.
Netanyahu's and Abbas's speeches on September 27 to the United States Organization are just a preparatory practice. As is always true in this area, the next few months could be dramatic. Abbas should speak in a few weeks to leaders of the PLO – his original audience. This will be his most important speech, where he will present his strategy for the future. If he has a plan with really daring moves, he will do it when he announces it.
What can he do? It can go so far as to dismantle the Palestinian Authority. That is, cutting one's nose to punish Israel. In such cases, the burden of dealing with the Palestinian population in the West Bank will fall on Israel. But Israel's main concern is not such an approach. It is much more likely to cut all Palestinian Authority funds in Gaza.
Most observers of the United Nations speech at Abbas – few Americans watched, most viewers being fascinated by Christine Blasey's Ford-Brett Kavanaugh audience at Capitol Hill – focused on his denunciation of Trump, his denigration of Israeli law that Netanyahu has brilliantly defended), his insistence on the need to reverse US policy on Jerusalem. The Palestinians themselves were no less attentive to Abbas's impatient message to Hamas leaders.
"We have an agreement," Abbas told the United States. "The Palestinian government assumes its responsibilities in both Gaza and the West Bank, and then we build our state on the basis of a law, an authority, a system and a legitimate weapon. We do not accept the state of militia.
The case – unfortunately – has an unsolved problem. In the words of Abbas, Hamas "did not agree to implement it". In other words: Hamas would not let Abbas control Gaza. In fact, in the current conflict between these two Palestinian factions, Hamas parliamentarians met in Gaza two weeks ago and said the presidency of Abbas was illegal.
Gaza is a bomb against which Abbas holds a security lock. Almost every day, thousands of Gazans participate in violent demonstrations near the Erez crossing in Israel. The economic situation has again bottomed out, fueling rabies among the residents of the Strip – against Israel, Hamas and the Palestinian Authority. Abbas can turn this rage into a weapon by deciding to cut $ 96 million that the Palestinian Authority sends to Gaza each month. It can turn this rage into a weapon that can fire the first blow in another war between Israel and Gaza.
Twenty-five years after the Oslo Accords – the anniversary was just two weeks ago – it is not easy to remember that Gaza started all over. I was there the day Arafat crossed the border to conquer the territory – and then when he moved to Jericho, his second stop.
In Gaza, the history of the peace process can easily be condensed. First step: the euphoria and the beginning of a Palestinian regime. Second step: violence and terror. Third step: an Israeli withdrawal. Step four: Hamas takes over. Step Five: Continuous eruptions of violence. All this in twenty-five years. All this, with only a fraction of the time when the situation seemed optimistic.
The Palestinians had their first chance to make Gaza a better place and ruined it in an Intifada. They then had a second chance, when Israel left, and turned to internal violence. Then, Hamas had a chance. He had the territory for himself and decided to use it as a springboard for the war against Israel. And now, Abbas wants to get it back.
The probable result: another war. It seems that we are always ready for it.
Shmuel Rosner East Senior political editor. For further analysis of Israeli and international politics, visit Rosner Estate.
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