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Few Australian politicians want to admit that the "reinforcement" is aimed at another country. But this is happening as Australians are increasingly concerned about the sharp rise in China's diplomatic, economic and potentially military presence in the South Pacific, a region long considered by Canberra as its "backyard".
Does Australia have an overreaction? If not, why now? And can an economy of less than one-eighth the size of China really compete with China's ambitions in the South Pacific?
No further evidence of these alleged negotiations has been published. It was later denied by Vanuatu and scrapped by China. Still, the reports generated at least as much interest and concern from China 's well – known program of island construction in the South China Sea and the militarization of these islands. artificial islands.
In Australian strategic circles, the idea of a naval base supposedly located about 2,500 kilometers from its coastline was not just raising eyebrows. This contributed to the country's sense of vulnerability.
Moreover, the unofficial policy of the allies has long been that the United States and Japan secure Northeast Asia, that the United States, with the support of Australia, secures Southeast Asia. East and Australia has the primary responsibility for securing the South Pacific. Perhaps a naval base hosting APL ships in Vanuatu has never been chosen.
But the PLA is seeking to expand its reach and any permanent military presence of China in the South Pacific would allow its navy to "disperse" in the Western Pacific Ocean. This scenario – or any other base offered by a poor and desperate Pacific island – would fundamentally undermine Australia's strategic policy in place since the end of the Second World War.
Beijing achieves this by investing cheap loans in small economies – which would otherwise be difficult to attract foreign investment. As in Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Laos and Pakistan, the tendency of these small developing economies to accept more debt than they can repay allows Beijing to dictate the political and / or strategic conditions of any the surrender or restructuring of the debt.
Persistent suspicions that China is seeking to use Hanabata and Gwadar ports respectively in Sri Lanka and Pakistan for military purposes, for military purposes, only increase the levels of discomfort for China. Australia when it comes to China in the South Pacific.
These and other efforts have been reactive to Chinese openings.
The goal is not to outbid China in terms of short-term generosity, nor to allow the Pacific island nations to confront China to maximize the largesse of both countries. Morrison intends to ensure that these small economies choose a source of funding backed by Australia that meets World Bank standards and other international trading standards, but which is the only one of its kind. access is fast and not hampered by unnecessary regulation (typical of World Bank and Asian Development Bank loans). and which impose sustainable repayment conditions and which do not endanger the solvency of these savings.
Australia knows that it can not stop China from entering the South Pacific. But it can warn these developing economies of the price of China's heavy debt and offer them an alternative solution for funding critical infrastructure that would affect national and / or regional security.
Above all, the recent Australian policy is the belated recognition of the need to compete in a region that has remained harmless and free of potentially hostile external influence for more than seven decades.
