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As a result, economic largesse is turning into a debt trap even as the Philippines' strategic situation worsens.
When President Xi Jin Ping arrives for his first state visit to the Philippines on November 20, Malacañang will host a man at the height of his power. He has virtually the undisputed control of his government and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that oversees him. His anti-corruption campaign rid the regime of likely challengers.
Perhaps the most striking measure of his primacy was that the CCP Congress earlier this year removed the constitutionally mandated term of office of two terms.
On the international scene, he is cleverly positioned to assume the role of world leader on which US President Donald Trump, with his erratic behavior, seems to want to withdraw. In addition, he has not hesitated to use the resources of the rapidly growing Chinese economy to gain allies and influence governments. Its transcontinental infrastructure "Belt and Road" initiative deliberately evokes the image of the ancient "Silk Roads" linking imperial China to the beginning of modern Europe when the Middle Kingdom was numerically uno.
Xi will meet a head of state who is also at the peak of his political career. (READ: Duterte shades in the Xi Jinping in China)
Undoubtedly the most powerful president of the Philippines since Ferdinand Marcos, Rodrigo Duterte has, in the last two years, dismissed the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, obtained indisputable control of the Senate and House of Representatives, incarcerated his The Senate's main political opponent, forcing most of the media to self-censorship, won the support of most members of the military base and the acquiescence of the high command and subjected one-third of the country to martial law.
Its consolidation of power has given rise to little public protest. Indeed, its popularity rating remains quite high, despite – or perhaps because of – a bloody anti-drug campaign that, according to critics, would have resulted in the extrajudicial execution of thousands of alleged drug users and resellers.
There is probably chemistry between the two leaders.
The uninhibited Duterte did not hesitate to proclaim in public that "I love Xie Jing Ping". Xi is more reserved, projecting an attitude of kindness tolerance towards Duterte, much like that of a big brother towards a big brother (although he is eight years younger than his counterpart). Xi regards Duterte as a boon that materialized at a time of growing crisis in the South China Sea, a gift that China did not expect and for which it did not work. He is grateful to the Philippine leader, although he is careful to separate his personal attitude towards Duterte from Beijing's unwavering strategic objectives in the disputed region.
And beyond the personal relationship, There is a deeper connection between the two leaders: a belief in authoritarian leadership, to which they attribute China's rise to economic and political prominence.
No bromance below
Duterte's welcome on the red carpet will not be matched by a member of his people.
Beijing's incursions into the Philippines' exclusive economic zone in the South China Sea and the strengthening of its bases on the maritime formations belonging to that country have given China the image of a tyrant and provoked widespread resentment. These steps unfortunately ignited already strong prejudices about the Chinese among many Filipinos.
The recent offer by Premier Li Keqiang of an olive branch to leaders of Southeast Asia at the recent ASEAN summit in Singapore: the promise of initiate and conclude negotiations within three years of a very delayed Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea. Filipinos – and ASEAN – are right to be skeptical, since China has promised to participate in the COC negotiations several times over the last sixteen years, but it has never been successful.
The last promise will likely be largely a public relations effort aimed at arousing popular goodwill for the presidential visit.
The dispute over the South China Sea is not the only problem Filipinos worry about their giant neighbor.
To carry out its ambitious Build, Build, Build program, the Duterte government contracted about 368 billion pesos ($ 7.2 billion) in loans from China, at a relatively high interest rate of 2 million. at 3%. Partly to finance this effort, the government passed the so-called TRAIN law by Congress, the main element of which was to increase consumption taxes on petroleum products by six pesos in three years.
Given that oil is a major energy source in almost every industry in the country's intensive economy, TRAIN has encouraged other sectors to increase their prices in anticipation of higher oil prices, which has led to a sharp rise in oil prices. galloping inflation which has reached its highest level in nine years. 6.7% in September, which, according to some, could foreshadow a spiral of prices of the Argentine type that it would be extremely difficult to control.
It is therefore not surprising that inflation has become associated with Chinese borrowing.
Beijing's concerns
Popular perceptions are worrying Xi since he wants to make sure that the new Manila-Beijing relationship will be sustainable.
His concern was exacerbated by speculation about Duterte's health, which could only be fueled by the president's missing key meetings at the recent ASEAN Summit in Singapore, which left the Filipino leader's subordinates scrambling. to explain. The question of who will succeed Duterte and whether this person will be so sympathetic to Chinese interests is clearly an issue that Beijing does not take lightly.
The Chinese are probably painfully aware that the institutional support provided by Duterte in Beijing is fragile.
The High Command of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) remains a bastion of support for the US military because of its longstanding ideological, political, and military assistance. (READ: Enemy at sea, friend of the leader: the Philippine army forges ties with China)
Professional diplomats at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are still impressed by Duterte's abandonment of The Hague's legal victory over the South China Sea, on which many of them have worked, and by the fact that They had to endure the embarrassing and very amateurish antics of political figures like former Foreign Secretary Alan Peter Cayetano.
Teddyboy Locsin, a former media specialist known not only for his diplomats but for his fireworks, should not remove their resentment. For foreign affairs professionals on Roxas Boulevard, amateurs such as Cayetano and Locsin are dead meat for Beijing's disciplined and determined diplomatic service.
The army and the DFAH being an inhospitable territory, the de facto link with China became the Ministry of Finance headed by Duterte's finance secretary, Sonny Dominguez. It is therefore not surprising that Philippine foreign policy towards China has been less motivated by strategic concerns and increasingly by dollars and cents, or more accurately by the renminbi and the yuan.
According to her experience under the corrupt presidency of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, Beijing knows that the benefits of yuan diplomacy are not sustainable and that what is decisive is to win the assent of the institutions that determine foreign policy and strategic military of the Philippines.
Missed opportunity
The Duterte Administration has had the opportunity to set up a truly independent approach in its first few months.
As we had proposed in an article published in the New York Times On October 18, 2016, since it was Washington's fear of military encirclement that motivated China's behavior, the Philippines could have applied a more calculative policy of using the Hague legal victory as part of a strategy to get China to accept the demilitarization of the South China Sea in exchange for the withdrawal of the Philippines from the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with the United States.
Instead, Duterte unknowingly imposed himself in a policy of strategic appeasement in exchange for economic largesse, a commercial territory and a legal advantage against money. .
As a result, economic largesse is turning into a debt trap even as the strategic situation in the Philippines is deteriorating as Beijing continues its basic construction in the country's western territories of the Philippine Sea, while in the heart of the archipelago, the United States quietly uses EDCA to rebuild the network of bases they lost in 1992 in order to massively project their power to China.
The new relationship between China and the Philippines is only two and a half years old. Some people think that there is still a chance for a reset. It's a wishful thinking. Unfortunately, Philippine diplomacy is today guided not by strategy, but by Duterte's spontaneous instincts, incomparable for the cold calculation of his idol, Xi.
Xi's state visit will be marked by many hyperbolic toasts to "the eternal friendship of the Filipino and Chinese peoples". But the twinkle of the Xie-Duterte bromance will not hide the reality: in the same way that previous administrations were allowed by Washington, it was preparing to be swindled, eyes wide open, by Beijing. – Rappler.com
Former Congressman Walden Bello opposed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with the United States and drafted the House resolution calling for renaming the South China Sea at sea in the western Philippines. Ia Denise Maranon is a political analyst in the organization of the Laban ng Masa research team. Contact: [email protected].
