Did Camp David condemn the Palestinians?

by
Dennis Ross

The Camp David Accords have long been hailed as a prime example of American diplomacy at its best – a historic agreement that laid the groundwork for the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, as well as guidelines for an interim period of autonomy. Palestinian. and for future final status negotiations that Washington hoped to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The new book by Seth Anziska, Preventing Palestine: A Political History of Camp David in Oslo, tells a very different story. Rather than celebrating the Camp David Accords, he describes them as largely responsible for the denial of self-determination and the creation of a state by the Palestinians.

In addition to questioning conventional wisdom about the Camp David agreements, the author's personal story will not fail to spark a heightened interest in the book. He was raised as an Orthodox Jew in the United States and traveled to Israel to study at a religious school known as yeshiva during his year between high school and college. His yeshiva was in Gush Etzion in the West Bank and his year began in August 2001, at the height of the second intifada. The second Intifada was bloody – 1100 Israelis and nearly 4000 Palestinians were killed. Palestinian suicide bombers attacked Israeli buses, cafes, restaurants and other public places – and Israel's crackdown and closures cost Palestinians in the West Bank a great deal.

For Israelis, this wave of Palestinian terrorism came as their government was about to make far-reaching concessions that would have created a Palestinian state. Yasser Arafat, leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), rejected the proposals in July 2000, but he also refused the parameters of US President Bill Clinton presented in December of the same year. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak proposed at the July summit. I played a key role in drafting the parameters presented by the US government as a bridging proposal at the request of Israeli and Palestinian negotiators. And I was present at the meeting between Arafat and Clinton when Arafat rejected them. His rejection and resort to violence left Israeli public opinion convinced that there was no Palestinian partner for peace.

Anziska's particular view is that his reaction to being in Israel and the West Bank at the time provoked not only Palestinian acts of terrorism and empathy for what the Israelis felt, as was probably the case for many of his comrades. In addition, he describes the hardships suffered by the Palestinians and their impact on him: "We would cross a large checkpoint on the outskirts of Beit Jala, a Palestinian city adjacent to Bethlehem, where there would always be a long line of Palestinians sitting in their car or around, waiting to get in. While our bus was bypassing the waiting line and passing through the checkpoint, I watched them from the armored window, something was not expected at these times. frequent trips. "He saw what he calls the dark conditions endured by the Palestinians and their contrast with the" Jewish population living or traveling in the West Bank ".

Publicity

These disparities troubled him and led him, after his yeshiva year, to pay more attention to the "political nature of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians". Anziska's empathy for the suffering of the Palestinians speaks volumes about his humanity and pushes him to try to understand what could have led Palestinians to commit violent acts of terrorism.

"Non-national, non-state arrangement"

He believes that the conflict is rooted in the denial of Palestinian national rights and believes that it continues for this reason. For this reason, he decided to investigate why and when the process of denial of Palestinian rights took root.

After becoming an academic, her studies eventually resulted in a Ph.D. at Columbia University and this book – a study that, among other things, relies heavily on archival documents and declassified documents. Some of these documents are publicly revealed in his book for the first time and many readers are likely to find them interesting. (Full Disclosure: Anziska describes a number of memos that I wrote in the 1980s under the Reagan Administration.)

Anziska's main argument includes several parts: the Camp David Accords allowed the Israeli vision of the territories to win at the expense of Palestinian national rights; this vision – which was in reality the idea of ​​former Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin – allowed not only the limited cultural, functional and economic autonomy of Palestinians as individuals, but their also denied the collective right to self-determination and sovereignty over the lands of the West Bank and Gaza; it allowed Israel to expand the settlements considerably and to control the West Bank without formally annexing it; The United States and Egypt may have spoken well about Palestinian rights, but they have acquiesced in the Israeli vision, especially because the Israelis were much more determined than the Americans or the Egyptians. and that by excluding the PLO from diplomacy, at a time when it was evolving and interested in engagement, the other three parties excluded the key representative of the Palestinian national movement and have deprived the Palestinians of all rights of speech, thus guaranteeing their statelessness. and deep frustration. Finally, argues Anziska, the Oslo peace process of the early 1990s inherited the structural architecture of Camp David – meaning autonomy and a transitional period rather than a true state – and gave birth to the city. 39, Palestinian Authority. But the Palestinian Authority remains powerless to influence the construction and expansion of the Israeli colony and is far from being a state.

These particular points find a constant expression throughout the book. It is interesting to note that American decision makers at the time, including myself, did not believe that the dice had been thrown away as suggested by Anziska. It is true that the Camp David structure established in 1978 would influence all subsequent efforts of the 1991 Madrid Conference to the 1993 Oslo Accords, but those of us negotiating the agreements did not see them. as an attack on the rights of Palestinians.

The basic criticism of Anziska with regard to Camp David and its aftermath is that a "tendency to canonize Camp David – even by the president [Jimmy] Carter himself – overshadowed the structural weaknesses of these early negotiations. "For Anziska, these shortcomings focused on, among other things, the meaning of autonomy and its implications.

"By focusing on individual rights and deterritorialized autonomy, rather than allowing collective self-determination," he said, "the Israeli government and its complacent US and Egyptian counterparts helped to consolidate a non-national, non-state arrangement for Palestinians. "

Persistent impact of agreements

According to Anziska, the reality of the Camp David Accords and the discussions on the autonomy they generated paved the way for limiting the possibilities of the Oslo process in the 1990s. "By conditioning Palestinian political rights on a narrowly functional and non-territorial definition of autonomy, along with the continued expansion of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories ", he writes," previous talks have compromised the possibility of sovereignty long before the government's "peace process." The 1990s had begun. "

For Anziska, the failure of Oslo should be attributed to the fundamental mistakes that were made at Camp David and after – but this raises the question of whether, and why, the United States and the United States. Egypt have acquiesced to Israel's preferences. He argues that Carter was overwhelmed by daunting regional and international challenges: the revolution in Iran, the hostage crisis, the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union and the Iraq-Iran war. These diverted his attention from the Camp David monitoring and the talks on autonomy. According to Anziska, the 1980 presidential election that announces has probably played an even bigger role in Carter's calculation. The appointment of Robert Strauss, a longtime pillar of the Democratic Party, as the first US negotiator in the negotiations on autonomy showed an awareness of the political sensitivity of the negotiations at that time. But Strauss had already negotiated successfully in the commercial field and Carter trusted him. Appointing a wise political operator does not mean that he was not prepared to oppose Israel's position, as Anziska suggests. (On the contrary, in my subsequent discussions with Strauss about the Talks on Independence, he left no doubt that he had pushed the Israelis over some issues.)

Regarding the Egyptians, Anziska stressed that Egyptian President Anwar Sadat had opposed a Palestinian state because he was convinced that the PLO would lead it and that it would become a Soviet client state – and that he had changed sides during the Cold War. The Soviets have developed close relations with the United States since the 1973 war with Israel. In addition, Sadat was most concerned about the return of his lands to the Sinai Peninsula and the serious economic support from Washington – which he desperately needed. Anziska leaves no doubt that Sadat sacrificed Palestinian interests in order to reach a bilateral agreement with Israel:

"In Egypt's weak response and its explicit adherence to the Israeli notion that autonomy would prevent rather than facilitate the creation of a Palestinian state, Cairo had allowed the advance of bilateral peace in Camp David to thwart a political solution for the Palestinians. " Sadat has certainly put the interests of Egypt first. But, in my opinion, he was not trying to prevent a political solution for the Palestinians.

In addition, Anziska contends that the United States and Egypt were also guilty of preventing the PLO from participating in the process before and after the Camp David accords. This was particularly egregious, not only because the Palestinians had to participate, but also because the PLO was evolving and seeking diplomatic engagement. Anziska says indeed that after the war of October 1973, "the PLO was seeking a place in the global diplomatic negotiations, which required a political compromise and the eventual accession of a State on a much smaller territory than historical Palestine ". He continued, moving away from armed resistance to the benefit of the commitment. "Without ignoring the violence" of the Palestinian groups in the 1970s, it is possible to emphasize a strategic revision of the Palestinian national goals and motivations underway on the eve of crucial Israeli-Arab negotiations.

The United States is forced by the Sinai Agreement

Why, then, did the Carter administration exclude the PLO from these changes? According to Anziska, one of the key factors is that Washington was under the "straitjacket" of the former engagement of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger vis-à-vis the Israelis. In 1975, as part of the Sinai II agreement, Kissinger had promised Israel that the United States would not deal with the PLO until it had recognized the right to do so. Israel to exist and accepted United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Resolution 338, adopted after the Six-Day War of 1967, is known as the "land for peace" resolution because it calls for the withdrawal of occupied territories by secure and recognized borders and the peace of all states of the world. region. the cease-fire resolution that ended the 1973 war and called for negotiations to implement resolution 242.)

And here we begin to get into the basic problems I see with the book – both as a person who has studied the period and as a practitioner who has been deeply involved in Arab-Israeli diplomacy since the early years. 1980 as Reagan leader, George HW administrations Bush, Clinton and Obama.

The Carter administration was aware of Kissinger's commitments but thought they could reinterpret them. Because Resolution 242 considered Palestinians as refugees only indirectly, Carter and his Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, agreed that the PLO could accept 242 with a caveat, namely that Palestinians had to be treated as a people. The Saudis said Arafat would accept 242 conditions. No more need to recognize the right of Israel to exist or even accept 242 and 338 as such. Nevertheless, the PLO rejected the offer, which also hampered the Saudis. Anziska acknowledges this unsuccessful attempt but blames it on the PLO faction politics, noting that competing factions within the PLO meant that Arafat had little room for maneuver.

He further acknowledges that there were "intense American efforts to engage with the organization through intermediaries and secret channels" to gain acceptance but that the PLO, divided into two, refused to "concede the recognition of Israel without the guarantees of a state in return".

But Carter and Vance were not asking for recognition – just accepting a modified version of 242. Here it should be remembered that Israel does not appear by name in 242. What this episode reveals is that the PLO had the opportunity to join the process but chose not to do it. Interestingly, while Anziska hinted at one point that Arafat may have played his hand too much, he nevertheless justified Arafat's decision because he did not enjoy the recognition of his state status. Anziska claims that "Arafat's concerns were well-founded, since the state has never been fully represented".

Arafat was changing his mind

Above all, however, Anziska does not know what Arafat could have achieved if he had accepted what Carter had repeatedly proposed and repeated in the 1980s, when the Reagan administration, together with Jordan's King Hussein, was willing to engage in discussions with a joint representative of Jordan and the PLO. Delegation if Arafat agreed 242. The Reagan administration, in which I served, continued this effort throughout the years 1985 and 1986, believing that it could initiate a serious diplomatic process allowing this joint delegation to have direct talks with Israel. The United States sought to include the PLO, provided that Arafat accepted 242. On several occasions, King Hussein told us that Arafat was ready and that a meeting could be held. organized. At the last minute, Arafat would retreat, protect or qualify. This process lasted until King Hussein gave up, telling us that he would no longer bind his credibility to that of Arafat.

If Arafat had accepted the Carter or Reagan formulas, he would have certainly triggered a break between the United States and Israel. As a result, Arafat would have transferred responsibility to Israel, would have benefited from an inevitable US-Israeli imbroglio and would have found himself at the table. But Arafat could not or did not want to enjoy a clear opening.

The exclusion of Palestinians is a fundamental element of Anziska's critique of the Camp David accords. But the Palestinians have effectively excluded themselves several times – a reality that he has chosen to downplay. In addition, Anziska suggested that Palestinian violence had virtually ceased, except for acts of dissident factions within the PLO after 1973. 1974. And Anziska himself acknowledges that the massacre of the Coastal Highway – so far the only deadliest terrorist event in Israel – was perpetrated by Fatah, Arafat faction, in March 1978. Later, the hijacking of Achille Lauro and the l & # 39; assassination of Leon Klinghoffer in 1985, Abu Abbas, member of the Executive Committee of the PLO. Arafat did not condemn any of these acts of terrorism nor did he expel Abu Abbas from the Executive Committee.

Anziska also does not explain the real reason that President George H. W. Bush suspended dialogue with the PLO in June 1990 after an attempted terrorist attack in Tel Aviv, behind Abu Abbas. This is because Arafat refused Washington's silent reprimands to condemn the attack and to exclude or suspend Abu Abbas' membership to the PLO Executive Committee if he wished to maintain dialogue with the states. -United. It is possible that Anziska does not know the history of the suspension of dialogue by the United States; I do it because I participated in it.

The Anziska book sometimes seems to dismiss Israel's security concerns. He refers to Begin's "maudlin readings of Jewish history" as if they were overworked and necessarily exaggerated what Israel felt was needed from a security point of view. Similarly, he quotes Yosef Burg, the Israeli negotiator in negotiations on autonomy with the Egyptians, saying: "No element, agent or hostile force dares to control the center of the country. [the West Bank] ". Anziska quotes Burg as proving that Israel did not intend to surrender his sovereignty or control over the West Bank, but his fears for security were also real.

Hard to reject security problems

In the eyes of Israel, it is the actions of the PLO, not rhetorical allusions of moderation, that define the organization.

Israeli security concerns, given the actual behavior of the PLO and other security threats, have led many Israelis, from their right, to believe that it was too risky to abandon the territory. While Begin's ideology was influencing his vision of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the perception of Burg and other people of what they might live with could have been changed by the emergence a true Palestinian partner who did not play a double game against terrorism and who understood the Israelis fears and was willing to accept the security measures that settled them.

Instead, Arafat repeatedly failed to condemn the violence against the Israelis and only accepted the resolution 242 in 1988, while he was trying to prove its relevance in view of the Impact of the First Intifada – a popular uprising initiated and organized by ordinary Palestinians in the West Bank. Gaza, not by Arafat. This uprising forced Arafat to demonstrate its relevance and, later, after choosing the wrong side to support Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War, he desperately needed to get back into the game and play a role in the process. Oslo which had earned Israel recognition. 1993.

Anziska's book too often seems to absolve Palestinians of any responsibility for their plight. They were excluded, but essentially because they chose to be – from 1977 to 1988. Arafat could have said yes to Carter or Reagan, but the lowest common denominator was defining the policies of the government. 39, OLP until the costs of irrelevance become too high.

Perpetuating the impression that Palestinians are mere victims who have played no role in their lives, unfortunately, perpetuates the fact that conflict is the fault of all others. Palestinians are not and have not been powerless to influence their reality. Unfortunately, however, the sad truth is that at critical moments, Palestinian leaders have chosen to say no and the Palestinian people have paid the price of the rejection of their leaders.

Options for Palestinians Later

The idea of ​​autonomy born at Camp David did not guarantee that the Palestinian state would be denied later.

After all, in December 2000, Clinton's parameters provided the Palestinians with a viable state with 97% of the West Bank territory, 100% of the Gaza Strip and a guaranteed corridor linking the two; it would have been an independent state. The Clinton administration negotiators, including myself, presented the parameters at the request of both parties in order to bridge the gaps that they could not overcome. these parameters go well beyond what was proposed earlier that year. Yet, in my presence, Arafat rejected Clinton's parameters.

But it's not just Clinton's parameters that would have defeated the limits of autonomy if the Palestinians had said yes or offered a serious counterproposal. The offer of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in 2008 and the Obama / Kerry principles of March 2014 would have had the same effect. There has been no serious response to these proposals. Palestinian leaders have repeatedly said no or have not reacted when they have had the chance to realize their national aspirations.

None of this means that Israel has made the work of the Palestinians easier or that its settlement policy was compatible with the emergence of a Palestinian state. The growth of settlements and the settler population – from about 5,000 people in the time of Camp David to 100,000 at the time of Oslo to more than 300,000 today Outside of Jerusalem – made the Palestinians both helpless and doubtful of Israel's true commitment to two states.

Anziska is absolutely right on one point: he observes that Begin was willing to grant citizenship to Palestinians in the West Bank and that, if he had done so, it would have transformed Israel demographically.

Begin, who was liberal in civil law and human rights, did not want to abandon the territory of the West Bank, which meant for him that the civil rights of those who were already there should to be recognized – and that it might not be a law for Jewish Israelis and another for Arab Israelis. As a result, he was going to give progressive citizenship to the Palestinians in the occupied territories for a period of seven years if they so wished and he hoped that the immigration of Jews from the diaspora would preserve the Jewish majority of Israel .

In fact, this policy would have led to a binational state. The current Israeli government may not accept Begin's concept of citizenship for the Palestinians, but unless it preserves the option of separation by building only in the settlement blocs existing and not outside of them, its current path leads to a single Judeo-Arab State. (I do not believe that the alternative of a state in which Palestinians are denied equal rights – a perversion of Begin's vision and Zionist ethics – is sustainable. in time.)

It is not too late for Israel to avoid this outcome, but it will have to act in a way that preserves the possibility of a Palestinian state to remain a Jewish and democratic state. Given that Anziska felt that Camp David was about to deny a state to a Palestinian, it is paradoxical that the very vision that he claims to prevent a Palestinian state could still create an Israeli imperative.

Dennis Ross is the former US envoy to the Middle East and adviser to the Washington Institute for Near Eastern Policy. He is the author of several books, most recently Cursed to succeed: Truman's US-Israeli relationship with Obama.

Preventing Palestine: A Political History From Camp David to Oslo in Seth Anziska, Princeton University.