The stalemate of NAFTA Canada is not close

[ad_1]<div _ngcontent-c15 = "" innerhtml = "

For all the increasing trade tensions& nbsp; from the Trump administration, optimistic& nbsp; have been reassured by its apparent progress in renegotiating NAFTA. Maybe there would be at least a & nbsp;commercial victory for the administration to boast of heading towards mid-November of November.

President Trump began boasting at the end of August, when he celebrated an agreement with Mexico. This agreement in principle actually left a number of questions& nbsp; without answer. In addition, it has omitted Canada as an integral part of the North American Free Trade Agreement.

The Trump administration, after initially negotiating with the two countries, decided to talk to Mexico and bring Canada back to the table only at the end of August, after the conclusion of a bilateral agreement. Presumably, the goal was to present Canadians with a accomplished factand lobby them for quick acceptance. If so, it did not work.

The first missed deadline arrived at the end of August. It stems from the combination of a requirement of the US Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) to give 90 days notice prior to the signing of an agreement and December 1 st.^stpresidential transition in Mexico. In this case, the deadline was not met when the United States and Canada could not reach even a vague tentative agreement. The Trump administration has notified Congress only the Mexican agreement.

This notification put another clock tick. In theory, under the TPA, a notified agreement is supposed to be specific enough to allow external expert groups to analyze the agreement and allow public sector lawyers to turn broad notions into a specific legal text. . TPA allows 30 days for this exercise.

The problem for the Trump administration was that the Mexican bilateral did not make much sense in the absence of a wider trilateral. This meant that it was difficult to start drafting a legal text and that it was difficult for outside advisory groups to analyze non-existent agreements. Such problems could, however, be solved if only the administration could settle its differences with Canada.

The attention has turned to a new deadline. Assuming a last-minute Canadian deal, how fast could the sleepless lawyers make it a legal text to present to the US Congress? The deadline for submission is September 30th. Mexican Secretary for the Economy, Ildefonso Guajardo suggested& nbsp; that negotiators may only need 10 days to deal with legality issues once an agreement in principle has been reached with Canada. This suggested & nbsp; the deadline of 20 September, which had just arrived. The evening of the 20th^e, Minister of Foreign Affairs Chrystia Freeland come home& nbsp; in Canada and even refused to use the word "progress" to characterize the latest round of talks.

If that does not seem to be a big problem, it means that the chances of a revised NAFTA being implemented soon have gone from thin to slightly slimmer.

To find out why, consider what would have happened even though a televised congratulatory phone call had been launched this week between President Trump and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and highly caffeinated lawyers had managed to meet the September 30 deadline. .

There was virtually no chance that the agreement would be reviewed by the current Congress. The next step is for the US International Trade Commission (ITC) to analyze what an agreement means to the US economy. Despite the emergencies& nbsp; by the US Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer, which ITC begins to make before any agreement is finalized, TPA grants the ITC's 105 days. This clock would probably start after a real transaction. It is unlikely that the ITC will limit its analysis, particularly in view of unorthodox nature& nbsp; some of the NAFTA proposals of the Trump administration (eg rules of origin and minimum wages). The first major obstacle was therefore that the consideration by the Congress would have been postponed until next year.

The next big hurdle is whether the agreement would be granted TPA protections & nbsp; when Congress will do it. The APT makes it possible to consider an agreement without amendments, without obstruction on the part of the Senate, and without endless delays, and is therefore considered essential for the passage. However, this only applies if the White House meets the requirements of the APT. One of these requirements is to regularly consult the Congress. Representative Bill Pascrell (D-NJ), the eminent member of the House of Commons Committee on Ways and Means trade subcommittee, publicly have complained& nbsp; that the administration did not consult. His objections may carry extra weight, as he could lead the trade subcommittee if Democrats gain control of the House in November.

A second requirement is notifications. Even if Canada had reached an agreement this week, it would be difficult to say that declaration& nbsp; in Congress that there would be an agreement with Canada "if he wants." If parliamentarians at the next Congress were opposed to any of these points, a renegotiated NAFTA agreement might not be able to pass the Congress intact.

Even though a trilateral agreement had been reached on the treatment of the APT, its pathway was far from clear. Both republicans& nbsp; and Democrats& nbsp; objected to the administration's approach to the NAFTA negotiations. If Republicans listen to the objections of the business community and Democrats feel unenthusiastic about adopting NAFTA to help President Trump, even a timely deal may end up without enough support to pass next year.

The inability to convince Canadians this week therefore only slightly reduces the already difficult odds of a new NAFTA deal. Unless the administration ignores Congress warnings& nbsp; and tries to get a bilateral agreement with Mexico, the new challenge will be an agreement that the next Mexican president feel that he can sign. The major impact of the continuation of the Canadian stalemate this week will be political; The Trump administration will have no illusory market win to scroll through during the mid-term election campaign.& nbsp;

President Trump's trade policy focuses on fighting US consumers and businesses caught in the crossfire. Was this week a missed opportunity to break this trend and achieve something positive? Not even close.

">

For all the With increasing trade tensions emanating from the Trump administration, optimists have been reassured by its apparent progress in renegotiating NAFTA. Maybe there would be at least a commercial victory for the administration to boast of heading towards mid-November of November.

President Trump began boasting at the end of August, when he celebrated an agreement with Mexico. This agreement in principle actually leaves a number of unanswered questions. In addition, it has omitted Canada as an integral part of the North American Free Trade Agreement.

The Trump administration, after initially negotiating with the two countries, decided to talk to Mexico and bring Canada back to the table only at the end of August, after the conclusion of a bilateral agreement. Presumably, the goal was to present Canadians with a accomplished factand lobby them for quick acceptance. If so, it did not work.

The first missed deadline arrived at the end of August. It stems from the combination of a requirement of the US Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) to give 90 days notice prior to the signing of an agreement and December 1 st.^stpresidential transition in Mexico. In this case, the deadline was not met when the United States and Canada could not reach even a vague tentative agreement. The Trump administration has notified Congress only the Mexican agreement.

This notification put another clock tick. In theory, under the TPA, a notified agreement is supposed to be specific enough to allow external expert groups to analyze the agreement and allow public sector lawyers to turn broad notions into a specific legal text. . TPA allows 30 days for this exercise.

The problem for the Trump administration was that the Mexican bilateral did not make much sense in the absence of a wider trilateral. This meant that it was difficult to start drafting a legal text and that it was difficult for outside advisory groups to analyze non-existent agreements. Such problems could, however, be solved if only the administration could settle its differences with Canada.

The attention has turned to a new deadline. Assuming a last-minute Canadian deal, how fast could the sleepless lawyers make it a legal text to present to the US Congress? The deadline for submission is September 30th. Mexico's economy secretary, Ildefonso Guajardo, suggested that negotiators may only need 10 days to settle legal issues once an agreement in principle with Canada has been reached. This suggested a deadline of September 20th, coming and going. The evening of the 20th^eForeign Minister Chrystia Freeland returned to Canada and refused to use the word "progress" to qualify the last round of talks.

If that does not seem to be a big problem, it means that the chances of a revised NAFTA being implemented soon have gone from thin to slightly slimmer.

To find out why, consider what would have happened even though a televised congratulatory phone call had been launched this week between President Trump and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and highly caffeinated lawyers had managed to meet the September 30 deadline. .

There was virtually no chance that the agreement would be reviewed by the current Congress. The next step is for the US International Trade Commission (ITC) to analyze what an agreement means to the US economy. Despite pressing demands from US Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer that the ITC should do this before any agreement is finalized, TPA is giving the ITC 105 days. This clock would probably start after a real transaction. The ITC was unlikely to end its analysis, particularly given the unorthodox nature of some of the Trump administration's NAFTA proposals (eg rules of origin and minimum wages). The first major obstacle was therefore that the consideration by the Congress would have been postponed until next year.

The next big hurdle is whether the Accord would be granted APT protections when it is passed by Congress. The APT makes it possible to consider an agreement without amendments, without obstruction on the part of the Senate, and without endless delays, and is therefore considered essential for the passage. However, this only applies if the White House meets the requirements of the APT. One of these requirements is regular consultation with Congress; Representative Bill Pascrell (D-NJ), the prominent member of the House Committee on Ways and Means Trade Committee, complained publicly about the lack of consultation with the administration. His objections may carry extra weight, as he could lead the trade subcommittee if Democrats gain control of the House in November.

A second requirement is notifications. Even though Canada had reached an agreement this week, it would be difficult to say that the notification deadlines had been met by the congressional statement that an agreement would be reached with Canada "s & # 39; He wished it. To oppose any of these points, a renegotiated NAFTA free trade agreement may not have been able to pass the Congress intact.

Even though a trilateral agreement had been reached on the treatment of the APT, its pathway was far from clear. Republicans and Democrats opposed the administration's approach to the NAFTA negotiations. If Republicans listen to the objections of the business community and Democrats feel unenthusiastic about adopting NAFTA to help President Trump, even a timely deal may end up without enough support to pass next year.

The inability to convince Canadians this week therefore only slightly reduces the already difficult odds of a new NAFTA deal. Unless the administration ignores the warnings of Congress and tries to get a bilateral agreement with Mexico, the new challenge will be to reach an agreement that the next Mexican president believes he can sign. The major impact of the continuation of the Canadian stalemate this week will be political; The Trump administration will have no illusory market win to scroll through during the mid-term election campaign.

President Trump's trade policy focuses on fighting US consumers and businesses caught in the crossfire. Was this week a missed opportunity to break this trend and achieve something positive? Not even close.