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President Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un at the Capella Hotel in Singapore on June 12, 2018. (Anthony Wallace / Pool via AFP / Getty Images)
The Rolling Stones Classic, " You can not always get what you want, "with its sober chorus ," but if you try sometimes, well, you could find, you get what you need, "was a must at rallies campaign of Donald Trump. Today, when it comes to meeting the North Korean nuclear challenge, President Trump, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo – who left Pyongyang Saturday empty-handed – and d & # 39; other officials of the administration are right to say: what they want, the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea, or "CVID".
The administration could however get what it needs – peace and security in the Korean peninsula – if Trump wants to adapt to the reality America will have to live with a North Korea nuclear; and find the safest, safest, and humiliating way to do it. It can accept this result while protecting the security of the United States and its allies.
Trump's hurry to declare victory in his negotiations with North Korean leader Kim Jong A risks locking the United States into a potentially self-destructive game. ] [tweeted] after returning from the summit last month with Kim, that "there is no longer any nuclear threat from North Korea", the president is locked on one side by high expectations and on the other by a North Korean Foreign Minister describing Pompeo's bargaining position as "gangster-like" and "cancerous". On this last trip, the Secretary of State did not meet face to face with Kim, did not deliver the Elton John CD that Trump said that he planned to give Kim as a gift, and there are reports from unnamed sources saying that the North Koreans were content to play with Pompeo.
In this kind of trading climate, it 's magical aim to get Kim to give up his nuclear weapons capability and to destroy North Korea' s nuclear infrastructure. This will certainly not happen according to America's timelines or preferences, and little progress will be made towards this goal as long as Trump thinks he can talk to Kim to unilaterally give him what he wants – CVID – in advance without giving Kim what he wants: An end to what North Korea calls "hostile politics" of America; security assurances; stopping joint military exercises United States-South Korea; withdrawal of US forces from South Korea; normalization of diplomatic relations; relief of sanctions; and economic assistance. It will not happen either. Kim, too, should consider the Rolling Stones.
[Peace with North Korea seems unlikely. But peace often does ahead of time.]
But diplomacy can work if the administration is ready to abandon its maximalist goals and engage in mutual concessions with North Korea – and if Trump and Pompeo agree that negotiations will be drawn and difficult , not a quick and easy victory. As CNN's senior diplomatic correspondent, Michelle Kosinski, tweeted Wednesday Wednesday the denuclearization, Sir Elton sings: "And I think it'll be long."
The first step is that the United States accepts the reality, however unpleasant, that North Korea is now a nuclear-weapon State. Then, we must accept to tolerate a North Korea with a nuclear arsenal if – if – the United States, South Korea and North Korea succeed in establishing conditions of reconciliation and a complete security regime for the Korean peninsula.
although separating Kim from his nuclear weapons may seem to be the only solution to the threat he poses, and would be received as a diplomatic coup for Trump, attention focused on these weapons does not. does not address the chemical, biological and conventional weapons of North Korea, all of which pose an immediate threat to South Korea and Japan and the approximately 28,000 US troops in South Korea. And a denuclearization concern diminishes the realistic and realistic ultimate game: reducing the risk of war between North Korea and South Korea, and the United States and North Korea, and creating a more stable Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia
Korea's existing capabilities, denuclearization should be a means to an end, not an end in itself. Indeed, the official idea of the Washington administration with CVID has the effect of ousting other avenues to reduce the risks of war and to hold the progress hostage to the most intractable and politically charged issue. In these negotiations, as in all negotiations, there will be a time when both parties will face non-negotiable objectives. For Kim, it will almost certainly be maintaining some kind of nuclear insurance policy. But apart from that, Trump and Pompeo probably do not know yet what is his best offer, and so it would be unwise to consider short-circuiting the negotiation process.
Concern with CVID counterproductively plays into Trump's penchant for grand gesture and ignores some realities: First, US troops on the peninsula, our naval presence in the region and our nuclear umbrella are already an effective deterrent, who has worked for years and will continue to function in the future – we do not want war but Kim either. Secondly, depending on the concessions, and agreement on effective verification measures (much like Iran), North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities and programs can be capped and reduced. Third, the improvement of North-South political and economic relations and a more normal relationship between the United States and North Korea will give Kim a greater sense of security and may encourage him to believe that he does not need a nuclear shield to protect North Korea.
[‘America first’? So far, Trump’s foreign policy mostly puts America last.]
The administration is now paying a price for its initial demands, its rush to hold last month's summit and the president's initially inflammatory rhetoric. Having hype the threat of war last year in his heated exchanges with Kim – " locks and charges " "fire and fury" " Rocket Man " – and later having exaggerates the post of peace dividend -Singapore, Mr. Trump is left with a reduced leverage; tense ties with North Korea's main boss, China, on trade; a South Korea led by a leftist president who believes deeply in the "sun" reconciliation policy and wants a North-South peace agreement; and a global approach to North Korea based on an unrealistic goal. Trump has also created the impression that he is vulnerable to being played by Kim and that he has already given too much – especially, the photo-op Kim implored – for almost nothing in return.
Giving his due to Trump for what he acknowledged in Singapore: transforming political relations between the United States and North Korea and replacing fear with trust and trust are the keys to making progress significant steps towards the denuclearization of North Korea. He obtained the release of three Americans detained by North Koreans and worked to bring back the remains of US troops killed in the Korean War. But he must still understand this: Kim considers nuclear weapons as the only effective guarantee of the survival of his regime. He will hang on to these weapons until he comes to the conclusion that the preservation of the North Korean state, in its current form, no longer depends on this nuclear blanket.
With this recognition, the administration must decide exactly what price it has to pay. willing to pay to achieve the more realistic goal of capping and reducing the capabilities and production infrastructure of North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles – and this inevitably means asking oneself until the end of the day. where he is willing to go to provide reliable security guarantees. If the United States and South Korea succeed in negotiating peace treaties and normalizing their relations with North Korea, they will achieve most of their denuclearization goals, reduce other aspects of the northern military threat -Korean and gradually integrate the North. Korea in the regional and global economy, it's worth Washington, and the world, reconciles with the idea of a nuclear North Korea
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