Why President Trump should say no to a Trump-Kim 2.0 summit


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President Trump and South Korean President Moon & nbsp;Jae-iWe will meet on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly today to discussnext & nbsp;steps & nbsp;In regards to& nbsp; North Korea. Moon just concluded the & nbsp;third& nbsp; inter-Korean summit,& nbsp;where he & nbsp;and& nbsp; Kim Jong-un& nbsp; inked the & nbsp;Pyongyang Declaration. Moon& nbsp; probably & nbsp;bring & nbsp;word on the future direction of blocking & nbsp;United States & nbsp;negotiations& nbsp;more than& nbsp; North Korean denuclearization.

& nbsp;Moon & nbsp;should& nbsp; reiterate KimDesire of & nbsp;Trump-Kim Summit 2.0, a follow-up meeting & nbsp;at& nbsp; the & nbsp;June 12 & nbsp;Singapore suMmmit-The & nbsp;first-the encounter between& nbsp; an American president sitting & nbsp;and& nbsp; a North Korean leader. & nbsp;Athe catalysts & nbsp;also anticipatee& nbsp; than& nbsp;Moon will transmit, & nbsp;approving, & nbsp;Kim"S& nbsp;calls for the United States to sign a peace declaration.

A second summit and a declaration of peace, at that time, would be a mistake.

Since the Singapore summit, Kim & nbsp;a & nbsp;not much moved to denuclearization. Dismantling of & nbsp;Sohae& nbsp; missile test site& nbsp; and promises to dismantle & nbsp;Yongbyon& nbsp; nuclear facility & nbsp;do nothing to contain the NorthNuclear and missile programs. & nbsp;Rather than sacrificing significant abilities, both actions are like a child getting rid of old toys to make new ones. A simple withdrawal of capabilities of little use to North Korea now that they have more advanced weapons capabilities.& nbsp;

Like Singapore, North Korea and the United States are no closer to achieving denuclearization than they were before. & Nbsp;ThThe Singapore Communiqué was a weak& nbsp; document short of details and & nbsp;what& nbsp; th detailsthere was & nbsp;understandd some terms that should be& nbsp;unacceptable.& nbsp; take,& nbsp; for example,& nbsp; the definition of denuclearization. Ccomplete denuclearization,& nbsp; in North Korea, & nbsp;The denuclearization of the entire Korean peninsula, including US nuclear assets that serve as a nuclear umbrella to the US ally, South Korea. & nbsp;United States and North Korea & nbsp;are& nbsp; no closer to & nbsp;accept the & nbsp;UN & nbsp;legally-binding & nbsp;definition of denuclearization – complete, verifiablee, irreversible dismantling of North Korea's nuclear program& nbsp; – that & nbsp;they & nbsp;were June 11th.

These key terms need& nbsp; to be & nbsp;notegotiateto go out. & nbsp;Again& nbsp; thus far, North Korea & nbsp;refuses& nbsp; cooperate with closed meetings led by Secretary Pompeo. & nbsp;Insteadthey& nbsp; insist& nbsp; on negotiations with President Trump himself. & nbsp;This & nbsp;can be an attempt to create divisions within the admiadministration. & nbsp;And& nbsp; it can work. & nbsp;A& nbsp; a few weeks ago,& nbsp;President Trump & nbsp;canceled& nbsp;a planned trip tovolving & nbsp;Secretary Pompeo and the new Special Representative for North Korea's Politics& nbsp; Stephen & nbsp;Biegun& nbsp;Just 24 hours after the announcement. & nbsp;

& nbsp;The signing of a peace declaration now has the potential to weaken the US hand in nuclear negotiations with North Korea. & Nbsp;As a Senior Fellow of the Heritage Foundation for& nbsp; Northeast Asia Bruce & nbsp;Klingner & nbsp;argues, a declaration of peace& nbsp; risk of compromising alliance security, & nbsp;reduce presence of American troops & nbsp;on the Korean peninsula, and curb efforts toincrease& nbsp; pressure & nbsp;sure& nbsp; North Korea.

& nbsp;It's not clear either what & nbsp;would be won& nbsp; by such a declaration. Like & nbsp;Klingner& nbsp;points out:

& nbsp;The United States has already repeatedly provided declarations of non-hostility and promised not to attack North Korea with conventional or nuclear weapons. These documents had no impact on the continued production of nuclear weapons by North Korea. & Nbsp;

Why & nbsp;would this piece of paper be expected& nbsp; have a greater impact than the promises already provided?

& nbsp;Rather than sign a peace declaration, the United States should coordinate closelyKorean ally to ensure that both countries & nbsp;"stay& nbsp;the& nbsp;course"& nbsp; with their strategy of maximum pressure towards North Korea. The United States still has not reached the maximum pressure. For example, he& nbsp; has not yet designated a single Chinese bank for its role in money laundering for the Kim regime's rogue missile and nuclear weapons programs. & nbsp;

& nbsp;New promises made by President Moon during his last trip to Pyongyangviolate United Nations and US sanctions& nbsp; to North Korea, and the promises made by South Korea will be hard to keep. OF& nbsp; particular& nbsp; worry& nbsp;Is Moon's & nbsp;to promise& nbsp; to support the reopening of the Kaesong Industrial Complex. Ais as disturbing as Moon& nbsp; suggestion that South Korea support the development of an east-west rail link. & nbsp;

& nbsp;Before accepting a second summit or signing a peace declaration, the United States and South Korea could request that North Korea allow nuclear experts to inspect their nuclear facilities or to make a declaration of complete data. current capabilities. & nbsp;

& nbsp;Negotiations, byINature, must involve& nbsp; give and take.& nbsp;BUtah& nbsp; a second vertex & nbsp;now promises to produce nothing but& nbsp; another photo-op& nbsp; and& nbsp;a second chance & nbsp;for the human & nbsp;abuse of rights and nuclear weapons & nbsp;Kim & nbsp;to disinfect & nbsp;his& nbsp; picture. And a & nbsp;declaration of peace & nbsp;today, wit is so& nbsp; small& nbsp;amended& nbsp;since& nbsp; the & nbsp;Singapore Summit, would sacrifice& nbsp; Too much leverage too early for few promises of return on investment. & nbsp;

& nbsp;President Trump should be wary of every proposal. & Nbsp;

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President Trump and South Korean President Moon Jae-iWe will meet on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly today to discuss next not In regards to North Korea. Moon has just concluded the third inter-Korean summit, where he and Kim Jong Un inked on Pyongyang Declaration. Moon likely brings word about the future direction of the stalemate WE. negotiations more than North Korean denuclearization.

Moon should reiterate KimDesire to Trump-Kim Summit 2.0, a follow-up meeting at the June 12 Singapore suMMIT-The first-the encounter between a sitting American president and a North Korean leader. Athe catalysts also anticipatee this The moon will transmit, approving, Kim"S calls for the United States to sign a peace declaration.

A second summit and a declaration of peace, at that time, would be a mistake.

Since the Singapore summit, Kim at not much moved to denuclearization. Dismantling Sohae missile test site and promises to dismantle the Yongbyon nuclear installation do nothing to contain the NorthNuclear and missile programs. Rather than sacrificing significant abilities, both actions are like a child getting rid of old toys to make new ones. A simple withdrawal of capabilities of little use to North Korea now that they have more advanced weapons capabilities.

Since Singapore, North Korea and the United States are no closer to denuclearization than they were before. ThThe Singapore Communiqué was a weak document that was short of details, and what th detailsthere was understandd some terms that should be unacceptable. Take, for example, the definition of denuclearization. Ccomplete denuclearization, in North Korea, denotes the denuclearization of the entire Korean peninsula, including US nuclear assets that serve as a nuclear umbrella to the US ally, South Korea. United States and North Korea are no closer to accepting the UN legally-restrictive definition of denuclearization – complete, verifiablee, irreversible dismantling of North Korea's nuclear program – than they were June 11th.

These key terms need be notegotiateto go out. Again thus away, North Korea refuses cooperate with closed meetings led by Secretary Pompeo. Insteadthey insist on the negotiation with President Trump himself. This can be an attempt to create divisions within the admiadministration. And it can work. A A few weeks ago, President Trump canceled a planned trip tomake volte Secretary Pompeo and the new Special Representative for North Korea's Politics Stephen Biegun 24 hours only after the announcement.

The signing of a peace declaration now has the potential to weaken the American hand in nuclear negotiations with North Korea. As a Senior Fellow of the Heritage Foundation for Northeast Asia Bruce Klingner argues, a declaration of peace has the potential to harm the security of the alliance, reduce presence of American troops on the Korean peninsula, and curb efforts to increase pressure sure North Korea.

It's not clear either what would be won by such a declaration. As Klingner points out:

The United States has already repeatedly provided declarations of non-hostility and promised not to attack North Korea with conventional or nuclear weapons. These documents have no impact on the continued production of nuclear weapons by North Korea.

Why would this piece of paper be expected have a greater impact than the promises already provided?

Rather than sign a peace declaration, the United States should coordinate closelyKorean ally to ensure that both countries "stay the course" with their maximum pressure strategy towards North Korea. The United States still has not reached the maximum pressure. For example, he has not yet designated a single Chinese bank for its role in money laundering for the Kim regime's rogue missile and nuclear weapons programs.

New promises made by President Moon during his last trip to Pyongyang violate United Nations and US sanctions to North Korea, and these are promises that South Korea will have trouble keeping. OF particular concern Is Moon's to promise to support the reopening of the Kaesong Industrial Complex. Ais as disturbing as Moon the suggestion that South Korea will support the development of an east-west rail link.

Before accepting a second summit or signing a peace declaration, the United States and South Korea could request that North Korea allow nuclear experts to inspect their nuclear facilities or to make a declaration of complete data. current capabilities

Negotiations, byINature, must involve give and take. BUtah a second summit now promises to produce nothing but another photo-op and a second chance for the human abuse of rights and nuclear weapons Kim to disinfect his picture. And a declaration of peace today, wit is so little amended since the Singapore Summit, would sacrifice too much leverage too early to promise a return on investment.

President Trump should be wary of every proposal.

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