Towards an Arab NATO?

The war in Yemen continued for three years. The Saudi-led coalition has faced many obstacles: inexperienced land forces, rugged terrain that has challenged the effectiveness of their air campaign, faint or fluid intelligence of Western allies, ruthless enemy who recruited child soldiers, tortured prisoners and used civilians. entire targets and cities as hostages and human shields, an influx of sophisticated weapons and training from Iran and Hezbollah (as even the UN admits today) 39), as well as badorted terrorist organizations seeking to destabilize the situation. Communicating this complicated set of facts to western states accustomed to quick and decisive victories, while opposing Iran-backed propaganda and resolving internal conflicts, has also been difficult.

Tensions have badailed the Coalition, complicating its ability to stay focused on the mission. First, UAE forces, which are better trained, have supported a separatist group opposed to the Hadi government backed by the Saudis. The UAE's mission and interests are more geared toward fighting Islamists than against Iran's influence, while Saudi Arabia views Tehran's support for the Houthis – who have repeatedly fired in the direction from Riyadh and whose missiles have reached it – as an existential threat

. Secondly, Qatar, which was part of the coalition, was requested to leave in 2017 following the imposition of the blockade by the Antiterrorist Quartet (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Bahrain). The departure of Qatar divided the Hadi government, some members sympathized with Doha while others supported Riyadh. While many public reasons have been given for the air, naval and land blockade against Doha, which has proved largely ineffective after a year, there has not been much discussion about the probable military reasons to chase Qatar out of the Coalition, despite the costs. In addition to accusations of support for Doha to Iran, there may be evidence that Qatar was clandestinely badisting the enemy. Recently, a Qatari national was captured sneaking out of Yemen; He claimed to be an intelligence officer badisting the Houthis.

Third, recent tensions between Morocco and Saudi Arabia threaten to destabilize the Coalition, as some voices in Morocco urge Rabat to withdraw all forces from Yemen. The reason for the spat, which has the potential for dramatic and undesirable consequences, is multiple. According to some experts, Morocco and Saudi Arabia compete as lighthouses of moderate Islam, which ultimately means competing foreign policies and a lack of cohesion in coordinating commitments. This explanation is however inaccurate, as Morocco has sought to avoid regional rivalries and conflicts by developing its identity as an African rather than Middle Eastern state. If this is indeed the reasoning, a friendly competition could push both countries to develop strong educational and cultural institutions that would benefit both regions.

If this is too far, it would be both futile and damaging as countries share important goals and interests. Each could be a leader in their respective regions, working closely together to solve common problems and complement each other's strengths. Nevertheless, it is impossible to deny that Morocco pursued an independent foreign policy, including refusing to participate in the blockade of Qatar and in fact maintaining growing trade relations with that country.

This thwarted Saudi officials, including the General Sports Authority, Turki al-Sheikh, who tried to force Morocco to follow the example of Riyadh through public comment as well as by the support of Saudi Arabia to the joint offer of the 2026 World Cup against the Moroccan candidacy.

The immediate cause of cooling in relationships has come out of this chain of events. Al-Sheikh, dissatisfied with Rabat's continuing relationship with Doha and the alleged inadequacy of Moroccan forces in Yemen, has deployed a lot of energy to highlight these grievances and support Donald Trump's strange interest. for the World Cup by organizing meetings for the EU and the Middle East. and FIFA officials and countries of pressure that would otherwise have sided with Morocco but ended up voting for the United States.

As a result of these developments, Rabat, who regarded these acts as betrayals, found himself too busy to participate. during the emergency session on Yemen led by Saudi Arabia on June 23. These developments could be detrimental to the fragile balance of power in Yemen. Iran is sure to rejoice in these public disagreements and perceive growing mistrust as a sign of the weakening of the coalition, in Yemen and elsewhere. In the same way, these disagreements are detrimental to the cohesion of the battlefield. The Coalition faces the daunting task of clearing Hodeida's trapped quarters and having to fight in the streets, where the Houthis have positioned themselves to maximize the damage they can inflict on forces and civilians. (The alternative, attacking by water, is unlikely given that Iran has sent a flotilla into the Gulf of Aden.)

Additional obstacles are mounting. The recent elimination of eight Hezbollah fighters by the Coalition has confirmed the group's direct participation in Yemen. Elite and well trained, Hezbollah in Yemen is responsible for turning the Houthis into a medium-sized army capable of sophisticated operations around the world, with the Huthis quickly gaining in weapons and skills what they lack. experience. The Coalition, meanwhile, is accused of not having a coherent strategy to retake the city, let alone secure the port to prevent future infiltration.

Due to the sophisticated nature of the enemy, the Coalition can not afford luxury tangential issues.

The growing presence of Hezbollah in Yemen could force US forces and the CIA to increase the involvement of counterterrorism and unite rebel coalition members around the common threat. US involvement has so far been limited to intelligence gathering, deploying green berets (which help identify the missiles used by the Houthis against coalition forces and Yemeni and Saudi civilians) and countering al Qaeda. and Daesh. Ironically, relatively minor American support for the Coalition has sometimes led to cross-border action with Riyadh (and to distance itself more and more from major operations, such as "Golden Victory"). The kingdom has reportedly tried to roll back some of the local groups, including Al Qaeda, as a bulwark against the Houthis.

There is no public support for increasing US troop engagement for what is widely regarded as a proxy war against Iran. (although it is no longer a proxy, since Iranians and Saudis are on the ground). Indeed, the current involvement of the United States has been controversial in Congress, with several failed resolutions calling for the withdrawal. In addition, increasing the US military presence to directly fight the Houthis could be considered an act of war, which might require congressional authorization beyond the current AUMF.

However, extend the scope of anti-terrorist operations to non-state actors challenges. The fight against Hezbollah has become a priority for the Trump administration, especially as recent revelations have demonstrated its widespread presence in Latin America, its collaboration with drug cartels and its infiltration into the United States. United. Hezbollah also plays a prejudicial role in Syria, alongside Iranian forces, Iraqi and Syrian militias and Assad's army. Bahrain is not immune to infiltration, and Hezbollah has managed to use the Lebanese air force, as the Pentagon weapon, to put sophisticated weapons in the service of his agenda.

Hezbollah, with the help of Iranian diplomats being part of a widespread pattern of funding its operations through criminal and terrorist activities, arms the North African separatist group Polisario, which threatens the terrorists. territorial integrity of Morocco and sell illicit weapons to other unstable countries. And more recently, an Iranian diplomat based in Vienna, now stripped of his diplomatic immunity, was arrested in Germany for having, with cohorts in Belgium and France, plotted a terrorist attack on a rally by the Iranian opposition to Paris. The fact that Hezbollah is probably involved in this plot should not be a surprise, as it has been badociated with other terrorist attacks around the world. Hezbollah and badociated proxies backed by Iran have become a truly global problem that threatens the security and stability of all Western and Arab allies.

Up to now, however, the response of the Arab Coalition has been limited and limited, with little action beyond the designation of Hezbollah as an international terrorist group. In Lebanon, Hezbollah – perhaps reinvigorated by the failed coup d'état against Hariri – worked hard to divide the Sunni bloc backed by the Saudis and the UAE. In addition, Hezbollah is better able to recruit disaffected Shiites in Lebanon by taking advantage of the proliferation of drugs and lack of development, particularly in the tribal areas.

The Arab Coalition has the opportunity to counteract this influence by infusing development with direct badistance in these areas and the fight against drug trafficking by specific and targeted means. There is also room to exploit existing divisions. This fertile area (Beka), filled with violent tribes, was deceived and deceived by Hezbollah, which recruited infantrymen from there while stacking the ranks of the officers of larger and more central cities. And despite Hbadan Nasrallah's words of solidarity with the Houthis, he hides in his bunker rather than leading the troops into battle. This is a major weakness that the Coalition can counter to demoralize the enemy through an effective and efficient war of information.

Tehran's strategy of building naval bases and controlling strategic waterways around the world – the Strait of Ormuz -Mandeb, the Horn of Africa – endangers the interests of international community well beyond the Arab Coalition. Iran relies on strong, flexible and resilient non-state proxy groups like Hezbollah to pave the way and secure these victories. Until now, the Arab Coalition and the West have been scrambling with terrorists, sometimes freezing accounts, arresting personalities or blowing up bases. However, with the clear strategic vision of Hezbollah's expansion across many continents and countries, the Arab Coalition with the United States and its allies can join forces to combat this pervasive threat. In doing so, they can inflict a mortal blow on the Islamic Republic itself by cutting off the source of funding to its other proxies.

Rather than being distracted by discrepancies and short-term goals that alienate Coalition members at the cost of its strategic interests and global security, partners should work toward the creation of the I & # 39; NATO of the Arab world. The Arab NATO would be a military and security alliance dedicated to defending and shielding economic, diplomatic or political conflicts. Such a system would also survive rival personalities and leadership changes. The United States can play a vital role in training, strengthening and supporting the nascent Arab NATO, which should also cultivate willing and able partners against common enemies. The role of Hezbollah in the conflicts that threaten everyone would be an excellent starting point

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Irina Tsukerman is a lawyer for human rights and human rights. national security based in New York. She has written extensively on US geopolitics and foreign policy for various American, Israeli and international publications

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