Democrats put their party first by exaggerating Putin's threat to the United States

Perceptions of foreign threats are socially constructed. In US domestic politics, this means that the threats are largely built by the two main political parties. At one point, a party holds the broad national security powers of the executive branch and conducts conversations about how foreign threats are formulated. Meanwhile, the other party is encouraged to challenge how the ruling administration portrays – and responds to – foreign threats, raising questions about the overall judgment and executive power to ensure the security of United States.

These traditional roles have been strengthened because of US President Donald Trump's stance on Russia. Its policies are inexplicable with respect to recent American history, the explicit strategy of its own government, or any objective badessment of current relations between the United States and Russia. Trump downplays accusations of Russian interference in the 2016 election cycle, rejects the consensus of the US intelligence community that Russia is involved, remains indifferent to the multi-Syrian blind bombings in Syria and to the intervention in Ukraine, and does not seem to want to criticize President Vladimir Putin. great power competitor according to most other US government employees.

This unusual behavior created an opening for the Democratic Party to elevate the Americans' perception of the threat of Russia. It's an opening that many Democratic leaders have been happy to take. The impetus is understandable given that recent polls show that 47% of US Democrats and Democrats believe that Russia represents the "greatest immediate threat" to the United States, compared to only 10% of Republicans and Republicans . The Democrats, however, may regret their more and more vehement interest in Russia.

When a political party increases its animosity toward a foreign country – believing that it will increase its own popularity – it introduces second-rate effects that may manifest years later . It creates a voting block of Americans who become socialized to hate a foreign government and, by extension, its citizens. It reduces the motives and complexities of this government to a simplified caricature of anti-Americanism or simply to evil. More broadly, this engenders hostility between the United States and foreign countries, making cooperation on common problems more difficult and unimaginable rapprochement.

Moreover, the political parties that try to outdo each other have produced thorny foreign policy results. The Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, which declared "US policy to support efforts to eliminate Saddam Hussein's rule of Iraqi power," was pbaded in the House by an overwhelming majority in the Senate, and signed by President Bill Clinton in just 32 days. This legislation was preceded, and followed, by both parties wildly exaggerating the threat that Saddam posed to the United States and its regional interests. Similarly, Trump's confused withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear deal of 2015 – to which Iran adhered – was politically free for the president because Democrats and Republicans had demonized Iran to the point of simplistic malevolence for decades.

The special emphasis on Russia in foreign policy also comes with opportunity costs, particularly with regard to China. On a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being the most potentially threatening and therefore, Russia is a 3, China a 9. In conversations I've had with government officials and foreign diplomats since Trump won the elections, the most commonly expressed concern being the lack of a coordinated or sustained response to China's accelerated efforts to shape and influence results in areas where the United States claims to have vital national interests.

America's bitter domestic partisanship and dysfunction help Beijing. Last month, a former Chinese civil servant and diplomat told me, "Every country thinks that America has gone crazy, we have nothing to do, if it does not sound healthy. d & # 39; mind. Democrats endorse a committed foreign policy that protects American interests and supports universalist values, such as free markets, democracy and human rights. If the Democratic Party still believes in this global vision, it should seriously understand how China could upset it and introduce its own contrasting vision.

There is also a delicate domestic issue that comes with discussions about presumed electoral interference from Russia. The Democrats correctly focus the blame on Moscow, but refrain from considering why American society is so prone and open to such foreign interference. In reviewing media reports and statements from the US government about what happened in 2015 and 2016, what Russia has achieved was less sneaky and stealthy than obvious and sloppy. Tens of millions of Americans of varied ideological tendencies were fully receptive to the campaign of information operations conducted by Russian agents. No politician will say that what Russia did was relatively easy. It's as if the Germans had cleared the Normandy beaches of all barbed wire, tank traps and machine gun bunkers before D-Day. But Democrats (and Republicans) prefer to point out the actions that the adoption by the Americans of these actions.

Finally, to repeat, Trump's portrayal of Russia is singularly his and does not represent current American politics. If intelligence officials suddenly begin to describe Russia's foreign policy in mild terms or defame the allies in Western and Central Europe, worry. If Russia's rough parts of the National Security Strategy or the National Defense Strategy are disappearing from White House or Pentagon websites, worry. Or, if US foreign and defense policy priorities for Russia or the regions where the United States and Russia compete suddenly and inexplicably, are worried. Until then, Democrats should appreciate how the foreign policy instincts of an individual – although the most powerful individual on earth – have been largely ignored by those who develop and implement US foreign policy .

The inflation of the foreign threat emanates from many motivations – financial, professional, reputational, patriotic and certainly political. The Democratic Party can inflate the threat posed by Russia and Vladimir Putin for a short-term political gain, but it does so in the long-term danger of the United States. At a time when "putting the party over the country" is a common affront to Washington, the Democrats should refrain from doing exactly that with regard to Russia.