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This article appeared for the first time in The Conversation
. This week, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed went to neighboring Eritrea to be greeted by President Isaias Afwerki. The vast crowds that encumbered the normally quiet streets of the capital of Eritrea, Asmara, were simply thrilled. They sang and they danced while Abiy's car was pbading. Few people thought that they would ever see such an extraordinarily fast end to two decades of vituperation and hostility between their countries.
After talks, the president and the prime minister signed a declaration ending 20 years of hostility and restoring diplomatic relations.
The first indication that these historical events might be possible is June 4th. Abiy said that he would accept the outcome of the conclusion of an international commission on the disputed border. This is the 1998-2000 border conflict, and Ethiopia 's refusal to accept the decision of the commission, which was behind two decades of armed clash. With all this, everything started to take shape.
The two countries are now formally at peace. Airlines will link their capitals once again, Ethiopia will reuse the ports of Eritrea – its natural outlet to the sea – and diplomatic relations will resume.
Perhaps the most important of all, the boundary will be demarcated. It will not be an easy task. People who thought they were citizens of one country could end up in another. This could provoke strong reactions, unless both parties show flexibility and compbadion.
Eritrea has real benefits – not only the revenues of Ethiopian trade through its ports, but also the potential for significant potash developments at the border between Ethiopia and the United States. Eritrea That Could Be Very Profitable
For Ethiopia, there would be the end of Eritrean subversion, with private rebel movements from a back base from which to attack the government in Addis Ababa . In return, there is every chance that Ethiopia will push for the end of the UN embargo against the Eritrean government.
This breakthrough did not occur.
THE DEAL
Some of the early movements came quietly from religious groups. In September of last year, the World Council of Churches sent a team to see what the two sides had in common. Donald Yamamoto, deputy secretary of state for Africa and one of the most experienced African hands of the United States, played a major role
. Diplomatic sources suggest that he held talks in Washington during which both parties were represented. Eritrean Foreign Minister Osman Saleh was reportedly accompanied by Yemane Gebreab, the long-time adviser to President Isaias. They reportedly met with former Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, laying the groundwork for the deal. Yamamoto Visited Eritrea and Ethiopia in April
Although almost nothing was announced as a result of these visits, they would have played an important role in strengthening dialogue [19659013]. muscle
Arab allies of Eritrea also played a key role. Shortly after Yamamoto's visit, President Isaias traveled to Saudi Arabia. Ethiopia, aware of the trip, encouraged the Saudi Crown Prince to bring the President of Eritrea to pick up the phone and talk to him. President Isaias refused, but – as Abiy Ahmed later explained – he hoped that Saudi Arabia and the United States would help solve the problem soon.
Yes, but another actor played a role: the UAE. Earlier this month, President Isaias visited the Emirates. There are suggestions that large sums of money have been offered to help Eritrea develop its economy and infrastructure.
Finally, behind the scenes, the UN and the African Union encouraged both parties to resolve their differences. This culminated in the visit of UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres to Addis Ababa for a meeting Monday – just hours after the joint statement. Guterres told the press that in his opinion, the sanctions against Eritrea could soon be lifted, as they would soon become "obsolete".
This is an impressive combined effort of the international community, which has acted in unison to solve a regional problem that has worsened for years
] RISKS AND DIVIDENDS
For Isaias, these developments also bring certain elements of risk. Peace would mean no longer having the excuse of a threat to national security to postpone the implementation of fundamental freedoms. If the tens of thousands of conscripts, imprisoned in the indefinite national service, are allowed to return home, what jobs are waiting for them? When will the country have a working constitution, free elections, independent media and a judiciary? Many political prisoners have been imprisoned for years without trial. Will they be released now?
For Ethiopia, the dividends of peace would be a loosening of tension along its northern border and an alternative route to the sea. Families on both sides of the border would be reunited and social life and religious ceremonies, many of which date back centuries, could resume.
But the Tigrayan movement – the Tiger People's Liberation Front (TPLF) – dominated Ethiopian politics until the election of Prime Minister Aiby in February was sidelined. This is their dispute with the Eritrean government that led to the 1998-2000 border war.
The Eritrean authorities welcomed their disappearance. "From this day on, the TPLF as a political entity is dead," said a semi-official website, describing the move as a "zombie" whose "soul has been linked to hell ". Such a song is hardly appropriate if one wants to solve the differences. The front is still an important force in Ethiopia and could attempt to thwart the peace agreement.
These are just some of the problems that lie ahead. There is no guarantee that the whole building will not collapse because the intricate details of the relationship are worked out. Many issues need to be resolved before relations between the two countries can return to normal. But with goodwill, they can be overcome, opening a new era of peace and prosperity that will benefit the entire region.
Martin Plaut is Principal Investigator, Horn of Africa and Southern Africa, Institute of Commonwealth. Education, School of Advanced Studies
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