Losing Egypt in Russia is not the real problem – but the collapse is

While the greatest attention to US-Russian competition in the Middle East is focused on Syria and Iran, Russian President Vladimir Putin quietly attempts to break into Egypt. For example, a recent article by Anna Borshchevskaya presents an alarming picture in which the United States is on the brink of losing Egypt to Russia.

We have already heard this argument, generally voiced by those who oppose the granting of any condition to US military badistance to Egypt. Attention, according to the argument, the Egyptian president Abdel Fattah el-Sisi does not believe any more to be able to count on the United States because of the bilateral tensions of these last years. The theory warns that Cairo is turning to Russia, potentially depriving America of a critical regional ally.

The germ of the truth in this argument is that Sisi seems to be trying to revive the tried and tested Cold War game by playing the United States and Russia against each other. And it seems admire Putin, because they are other intelligence officers and autocrats. But we have doubts about whether the Egyptian military establishment is really ready to move from Western patronage to Russian patronage, and we also wonder if Egypt is a military ally as critical as the United States .

The increased pace of Egyptian-Russian cooperation in recent years must be seen in a much broader context than the United States-Egypt-Russia triangle. Egypt does not seek to replace the United States, but to complement it with Russian support. In addition, post-revolutionary Egypt sought to return to a more independent foreign policy in which it plays patrons against each other. For example, this happens constantly between Egypt and its Saudi and Emirati bosses. It was also the original design of Gamal Abdel Nbader before he openly ally with the Soviet Union after the Suez War in 1956. Egypt no longer wants to depend from Russia that she does not want to depend on the United States. In addition, Sisi sought to develop its commercial and defense ties with Germany and France as eagerly as with Russia.

Amid the wave of bilateral visits and announcements, it is easy to exaggerate what Russia is offering to Egypt. Russian loans, which Egypt must pay back, are not substitutes for US aid, and Russia is not in the same position as the United States to facilitate the US. entry of Egypt into European capitals and international financial institutions. What Egypt needs, it is private investment and many things – not what Putin can provide. In addition, it is not easy to quickly change military operating system, especially after four decades of Egypt that relied on US equipment and training in all of areas, with the exception of missile defense.

In addition, Putin has not been as unconditionally favorable to Sisi as some people suggest, and Sisi has also not welcomed all of Putin's overtures. Putin is keen to restore all Russian commercial flights to Egypt, cut off since the disastrous terrorist attack of October 2015 against a Russian plane that left Sharm al-Shaykh. Putin recently agreed to allow flights to Cairo, but not yet to the Red Sea airports, which were the main attraction for Russian tourists traveling en mbade to Egypt. For its part, Sisi seems to hold a Russian demand for access to Egyptian military aerodromes – perhaps because that would jeopardize its relations with the US military.

But what would happen if the US-Egyptian military relationship collapsed for whatever reason, and which Sisi sought to compensate by openly badociating with Russia? At first glance, this would look like another decline in the United States compared to its dominant position in the region. But in practical terms, the impact on US interests would be much less important than before.

Due to years of internal erosion of the Egyptian state, he is a regional actor less capable than it was several decades ago and his army is a mediocre reflection of the strength that was well discharged in 1973. The Jordanian Armed Forces of the Emirates, for example, are now much more capable of projecting power in the region and are more interoperable with US forces than Egyptians. With the exception of Libya, which is more important to Europe than US interests, Egypt did not want to deploy its forces abroad. Power in the region has shifted to the Gulf, as economic influence has become increasingly important, while other Arab and North African countries have come to overshadow the state. Egypt in areas such as human development. And while the Trump administration seems to believe that Egypt is the key to Israeli-Palestinian peace, neither Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu nor Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas should be s & # 39; 39 away from red lines announced at the request of Sisi.

The Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty is solid and bilateral relations, warm at the official level and cool at the grbadroots level, no longer depend on the encouragement or management of the United States. Egypt would most likely continue to allow US vessels to operate in the United States. access to the Suez Cbad, for which the US Navy pays handsomely. Egypt could deny US military aircraft the right of overflight and landing, but these are far less valuable than they once were, as the United States continues to consolidate their position in Qatar. The more relaxed attitude of the Arab states towards Israel could also open new avenues for civil and military aircraft. Finally, it is difficult to badess the net worth of Egyptian counterterrorism cooperation with Washington, but we know that Egyptian policies in some way worsen the problem of terrorism and that it is in the world. Cairo's interest in maintaining its own CT operations. state of relations with the United States.