Security Transition in Somalia – Africa Center for Strategic Studies



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Somalia's national security advisor talks about political will, security reforms in Somalia's transition plan and the commitment to build a national and international coalition to support the country's progress.

  Somali graduates from a three-month training program in police skills. (Photo: US Air Force / Benjamin Raughton)

Somali graduates from a three-month training program in police skills. (Photo: US Air Force / Benjamin Raughton)

Somali state building efforts, including initiatives to strengthen security and rebuild the political system, have continued since the inauguration from President Mohammed Abdullahi Farmajo in February 2017.. The African Center for Strategic Studies has maintained with Abdisaid Ali National Security Advisor to the President of the Federal Government of Somalia, to take stock of progress made.

What does the security landscape look like in Somalia, and what is the readiness of the Somali authorities to badume responsibility for security?

In the past 10 years, security in Somalia has not been provided by the state. We owe a debt of gratitude to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) whose forces of Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Djibouti and Burundi have been the main suppliers of since their deployment in 2007 and whose presence and sacrifice have made progress. date in Somalia. Other international partners have also made important contributions, including the United States and other bilateral partners who provided the security forces and equipment that allowed the government to be reinstated. Federal and State after the overthrow of the Union of Islamic Courts. The violent extremist Islamist group Al Shabaab has been and continues to be the biggest threat to security in Somalia and the region. The group remains committed to controlling parts of the country, imposing its radical ideology on Somalis and targeting the Somali government and security forces.

Security institutions and forces in Somalia are at an early stage of development and yet face a threat that would be daunting for most established security forces. After years of unfortunate investments, piecemeal reform attempts and lack of common vision of security in Somalia, an badessment of the state of readiness of the Somali National Army in 2017, led by the federal government, highlighted the need for reform

  Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo

Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo

One of the first acts of the Farmajo president after taking office in February 2017 was the adoption of a national security architecture. This historic agreement was the basis of the Security Pact signed between Somalia and international partners at the London Conference in May 2017 that laid the foundation for building a capable, accountable, affordable and secure security sector. acceptable. The architecture defines the composition, structure and scope of the security sector in Somalia, the size of the security forces, the role of civilian control institutions and the division of command and control between the federal government and the United States. Federal Member States. (FMS). It was the first time that Somalia formalized and accepted a vision for its security institutions.

In December 2017, the federal government, working closely with the FMS, AMISOM, troop-contributing countries and international partners, committed to developing a plan that would allow Somalia to Gradually badume responsibility for security. The plan provides for the gradual transfer of AMISOM responsibilities to Somali forces. It also covers parts of the country where AMISOM has never been present but where security institutions and capabilities need to be strengthened. The planning horizon extends over the next four years, up to the 2020/2021 elections, even though it is acknowledged that the reconstruction of the security sector in Somalia will be a process long-term

. , with the emergence of effective Somali institutions.

What is different from this plan?

This plan is different from previous security strategies because it takes a broad view of what contributes to security. We recognize that military operations alone will not support the transition process or build lasting peace. The emphasis we place on security aspects such as the rule of law, local governance and youth employment represents a new way of addressing security in Somalia. The transition plan also draws lessons from the obstacles of previous security strategies in Somalia. Ensuring that civilian-led approaches, including stabilization, are integrated into operational plans and sequenced by uniform operations is a significant change. Other differences include the emphasis on local consultation and engagement in the planning and implementation of the transition, as well as the need to address the policy issues that will underpin security. This includes the composition of security forces, the allocation of security resources between the federal government and the FMS, and the command relationships within security institutions

"This plan differs from previous strategies in the field of security. security […] Military operations alone will not support the transition process or build lasting peace. "

The National Security Council has become a regular part of the peacekeeping model. Engagement between the Federal Government and the SSF Chaired by the President and composed of the leaders of the FMS, the National Security Council has been and will continue to be the vehicle for political decisions related to security, which are then submitted to the Parliament for consideration: The decisions taken to date relate to the badessment and integration policy of regional forces, as well as the The role and support of regional security offices. These key policy decisions provide the framework for technical implementation. Corruption and old allegiances are deep and change the mentality to ensure that ordinary Somalis enjoy security is a major challenge. Despite this, there is a new generation of emerging politicians working to reverse the old ways of increasing transparency and bringing real change to Somalia.

These Somali factors combine with a desire among our international partners to see a return on their investment in security in Somalia. The troop-contributing countries to AMISOM said that they wanted to see a strategy of withdrawal of force, and our other international partners have made important contributions that can not be unlimited. We are now ready to gradually badume responsibility. Thanks to the transition plan, we have the combined political will of Somalia and its international partners to see the plan come to fruition.

  A Ugandan police officer from AMISOM on patrol

A Ugandan police officer from AMISOM on patrol. has the government done so far to define the strategic direction in practice?

The transition plan represents a significant change in the planning and delivery of security in Somalia. Under President Farmajo, Somalia is ready to begin taking responsibility for security in a sustainable, gradual and coordinated manner.

The federal government's strategy is to develop and implement a comprehensive approach to safety. a transition not only military, but also focused on the political roadmap, constitutional reform, stabilization, local governance, policy and state-building activities that include the institutional expansion of the local police and justice.

and inclusive politics is at the root of all the other reforms and capacity building that we are doing at the government and country level. Without meaningful political representation and access to justice, we can not build trust in the security institutions of Somalia or provide the basic services needed to counter the shadow administrations of Al Shabaab. Constitutional reform will be essential to formalize the allocation of responsibilities, including security, between institutions at the federal level and between federal and regional levels of government. At the same time, we will pursue our economic reforms to generate revenue and institutional accountability to enable regular payment of salaries and sustainment.

"Legitimate governance and inclusive politics are the foundation of all other reforms and capacity building. The transition is meant to be an organized, gradual and systematic transfer of security responsibilities to forces aligned within the framework of the Somali National Security Architecture by 2021, while at the same time instituting broad-based policies. and the economy. measures to support and support the transition at the federal, state and community levels.

SGF's views on the priorities and elements of the transition plan were central to the localized approach to planning. The main drafting group conducted field visits to allow federal government representatives to consult local security actors, including FMS presidents, representatives of the Regional Security Council, the Somali National Army. , AMISOM troop-contributing countries and international partners. . This consultation process allowed each FMS to establish its security priorities, report on their current capabilities and highlight the capacity gaps identified by each state as the most important. As with the transition plan itself, the consultation examined not only the military and police security requirements, but also the factors necessary for human security to stabilize, prevent and counter violent extremism and terrorism. access to justice. Once a "zero project" was distributed, the core group tweaked the plan and gave its approval. This was followed by the endorsement of the National Security Council (including the Federal Government and the FMS) and the African Union Peace and Security Council. He was then welcomed by the United Nations Security Council and the high-level meeting on international donor security in Brussels on 2 May.

The transition plan defines the strategic direction in three areas of activity:

  1. : The identification and prioritization of locations under the full responsibility of the Somali security forces, including the transfer of positions of AMISOM, and the deployment of forces agreed in the national security architecture. This will mean that cities, main roads and national infrastructure can be gradually transferred to Somali property, allowing Somali security forces to conduct operations and AMISOM to reduce its presence
      Institutional Capacity Building : Implementation of institutional capacity-building programs and plans, including the implementation of the National Security Architecture, the recommendations of the evaluation of the l & # 39; operational readiness, police, justice and civil service reform. This includes payroll reform, policy and doctrinal development, civil service restructuring, force creation, training and the enactment of key legislation. sustainable peace, including stabilization, strengthening of local governance, reconciliation, mediation, the rule of law, socio-economic activities and the prevention / fight against violent extremism activities. Activities will be well-consulted with local communities to meet their needs, but could include road rehabilitation, provision of health or education services, formation of district councils and job creation. .

What progress has been made?

We undertook key reforms to implement the National Security Architecture and put Somalia on the path to an affordable, acceptable security sector, responsible and capable. These include the biometric registration of Somali National Army (SNA) personnel to reform the payroll, reduce the number of SNA departments from 23 to 13, and reallocate number of inefficient generals to replace them with younger and less qualified officers.

In December 2017, we developed a comprehensive plan that defines the strategic direction of the transition process and identified some initial areas in which to target technical planning. This is a very different way of working from the previous engagement in Somalia. This represents a new state of mind, not only that priorities and decision-making are led by Somalis, but also a new comprehensive approach to security.

"We call on donors to align their existing activities with the priorities set out in the transition plan in order to have a multiplier effect on their contributions."

The inclusive nature of the process is also an important element of Transition Planning The federal government has developed the plan with the FMS and established national priorities in consultation with them, and we have worked closely with AMISOM, troop-contributing countries and international partners. and we will continue to do so as we move into the implementation phase.

Somalia has enjoyed generous donor support for many years. However, projects have often been unequally distributed across the country and are not anchored in a broader Somali-led strategy. This is changing as we ask donors to align their existing activities with the priorities set out in the Transition Plan in order to have a multiplier effect of their contributions.

The active coordination and joint planning of Somali and international stakeholders demonstrates the clear political will of Somalia and its partners to deliver on ambitious deadlines.

What factors will determine the success or failure of the transition process, what are the barriers to progress, which could slow down or derail the process to be overcome?

The unity and political will of all stakeholders will be critical to the success of the transition plan. The federal government, the FMS, AMISOM, troop-contributing countries and international partners will need to remain committed and committed to implementing the plan.

As implementation proceeds, many challenges will arise. capacity and political divisions. There will be those who will seek to undermine our work, those who have benefited from the status quo or who do not wish to see a peaceful, stable and united Somalia. But if all stakeholders are committed to the vision set out in the transition plan, we can overcome these factors.

We must also be aware that to be realistic, the transition will take many years to fully realize. We work hard to maintain the momentum of the business, but many of the key elements that underlie the site-specific activity are long-term initiatives. Some will take generations to integrate and progress will not be linear. We should not rush to meet the deadlines imposed by donors, but we must maintain a steady pace of activity

What are the immediate priorities and activities in the short and medium term and milestones?

The Transition Plan is divided into three phases up to 2021:

  • Phase 1 – Present to June 2019
  • Phase 2 – July 2019 to December 2020
  • Phase 3 – January 2021 to December 2021

Although the transition takes many years, this horizon allows for detailed planning within a realistic timeframe and allows us to track progress and adjust the plan as needed. In addition to initiating implementation in the priority locations identified in the plan, Phase 1 lays the foundation for long-term capacity building over the next few years. Other tasks include strengthening support to regional security councils, rewriting the Somali Military Code of Discipline, reorganizing the Somali National Army in line with FMS limits, and strengthening community policing in some population centers [19659043]. The 7th Ugandan People's Defense Force Battalion, Somali National Stadium, Mogadishu. (Photo: AMISOM) ” width=”300″ height=”200″ srcset=”https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/UPDF-in-Mogadishu-Stadium.jpg 900w, https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/UPDF-in-Mogadishu-Stadium-300×200.jpg 300w, https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/UPDF-in-Mogadishu-Stadium-600×400.jpg 600w, https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/UPDF-in-Mogadishu-Stadium-253×169.jpg 253w” sizes=”(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px”/>

The 7th Ugandan People's Defense Force Battalion, Somali National Stadium, Mogadishu. (Photo: AMISOM)

One of the first priority locations is the Mogadishu Stadium. The stadium is the largest sports complex in Mogadishu and was built in 1978. More recently, it has been used by national and international security forces as a base of operations. The intention of the federal government is to restore the stadium and use it for national and international football tournaments as this would have enormous symbolic significance for the entire Somali population while strengthening national unity. For the federal government, as well as for the regional administration of Banadir, the reopening of the stadium would be a source of entertainment for young people and generate revenue through the organization of football matches. The people of Mogadishu, especially the youth community, are eager to see the stadium reopen to watch and play football, a popular pastime in Mogadishu. It is also in the business community's interest for sports tournaments to return to the stadium, which would include important commercial activities. We plan to organize a football tournament in the stadium by the end of 2018.

What does success look like?

Eventually, success is for Somalia to badume responsibility for security. However, security is not an end in itself. By providing security, we hope to see the return to normal for the people of Somalia with the freedom to move without the threat of Al Shabaab, to open business, to do sports, to 39 go to school and engage in politics under the protection of This will require the establishment of legal and administrative frameworks, including through processes such as the process of revision of the Constitution , an operational judicial system and the creation of a Constitutional Court. These are long-term efforts at the national level. In the meantime, significant progress can be made at the local level to bring communities closer together to resolve conflicts, promote reconciliation and dissolve some of the underlying causes of conflict. Efforts at all levels, from local communities to the country's highest institutions, will be needed to rebuild the country and enable the security sector to play its role in protecting the lives of Somali citizens.

Therefore, our view of normality includes appropriate security forces, such as community policing, as the primary provider of security and the progressive demilitarization of the country.

These goals will not be achieved overnight, but there are indicators of success that we are looking for. These include the transfer of major national institutions such as the stadium, the opening of major supply routes, the adoption of key laws to reform our security institutions, the reconfiguration of AMISOM military support to the police for our security forces and implementation As we move forward on this ambitious project, our goal is to ensure that the people of Somalia benefit from it. and that its security is ensured by the Somali State.

About: Fighting Violent Extremism Reforming the Police Sector Regional and International Security Cooperation Stabilizing Fragile States ] AMISOM National Security Strategy Somalia

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