[ad_1]
In a few minutes, US President Donald Trump will ask NATO allies why US interests in Europe's security are so important that they justify the cost of US forces deployed on the Old Continent. The Allies could respond by saying that America's home security depends on Europe's protection against threats that we can not face on their own, as has happened over the past two years. World Wars. However, if that was the case today, Russia should be considered Stalin and Hitler and all allies should consider it an existential threat. The theory of Euro-Atlantic solidarity on the Russian question is utopian because the concerns and perspectives of a group of countries will never become Alliance positions as a whole and accepted by all members.
Threat
The Baltic States, Poland and Romania regard Russia as an immediate existential threat. However, this perception is changing in southern Europe, where Russia does not represent an existential threat. It is worth mentioning the trade relations between Turkey (the powerful ally of NATO) and Moscow or the mbadive purchase of Russian gas by Germany. Is this the opposite of an opponent? In reality, France and Germany do not consider Russia as a direct threat, although they carefully observe the Kremlin's negative impact on the European order. At the same time, both offer a two-way approach, encompbading both deterrence and commitment to productive business relations with Russia. For Norway and the United Kingdom, Russia is a threat, but also an important economic partner. Russia is not a principle of central organization for US foreign policy, while much of the attention is rather episodic rather than a fundamental concern in security matters. The terms of the partnership must be renegotiated and the agreement ground redefined. If Russia is an enemy, NATO must prepare for and win the war. If Russia is not an adversary, NATO needs to change its posture, the same from the Cold War and shape its capabilities. Even before sharing the burden, NATO must identify its enemies unanimously and shape its defenses accordingly
If Russia is an existential threat, NATO must prepare for war
NATO's current forces on the Baltic territory do not pose a credible threat to Russia. Rand's war games have shown the inadequacy of the Alliance against a Russian offensive on the Baltic phases (which will not happen). In no simulated context, the current NATO forces have been able to keep capitals like Tallinn or Riga for more than 60 hours. In several simulations, NATO was defeated in 36 hours. A Russian offensive would leave few options in the United States (the use of nuclear would be inevitable), crushing the dominant strategic player in Central Europe. It would be a failure of nearly 75 years of bipartisan American efforts to support security in Europe. The minimum required for deterrence and denial along NATO's borders with Russia is to ensure permanent strategic actions
Seven independent brigades would be needed, three of which were heavy, supported by the United States. artillery and aviation. To be effective, the brigades should already be deployed in Europe: they must be able to stop the main Russian invasion force estimated at at least 50 tactical battalions. With seven brigades, NATO would be able to defend the Baltic countries for up to 28 days
Fortified Europe will have to win, because the strength of the seven brigades would not be enough to resist indefinitely against the forces Russian rulers. . NATO's counter-attack must therefore be based on the strength of 14 new independent brigades. It is thought that such forces are able to restore the lost ground and push the Russians back to their original lines. Let's talk about the brigades. The seven brigades of NATO will have to be deployed in Europe, because it is impossible to believe that they can be redistributed in wartime, considering that the current forces could not sustain an attack at the time of the war. is Oder, while the main units of the United States they are located in southwest Germany, more than 1000 miles from the probable combat zone. Any attempt at logistical support and revitalization of NATO forces at this distance would be impossible
NATO would not be able to move and support large combat formations along its eastern border and in particular in the three Baltic States. NATO should be reorganized and structured into 21 independent brigades, organized into three corps. According to current capabilities, the United States would be able to provide up to 12 independent brigades (at exorbitant costs).
The current strategy of the three NATO brigades is tactically absurd and unnecessary. The minimal deterrent to truly defend the Baltic States requires a force of seven brigades, three of which are armored. The fourteen additional brigades would be needed to counterattack and repel Russian forces.
Rand's erroneous badessment of the last war in Europe
"Fifty years ago, the streets of Leningrad taught me a rule: if the shock is inevitable, hit first". It is one of the most famous phrases of Russian President Vladimir Putin.
It also represents Putin's tactics. We translate these statements into a tactical context. In the wargames Rand, Russia invades Europe with heavy forces, easily conquering the Baltic countries. However, the question is only one: why? If in the absurd hypothesis Russia should declare war on Europe and therefore on NATO and the United States, why would Putin behave as in the Second World War?
"If the battle is inevitable, strike first". And to strike first, in military jargon, means to use the full range of available options to decapitate the enemy command line and prevent the latter from counterattacking. Since Russia will not invite Europe, if Moscow wants to declare war on NATO, it will not implement the tactics of the Second World War but will launch thousands of troops. thermonuclear warheads against US strategic sites and NATO. And anyway, even if Russia's pre-emptive strike managed to reduce NATO's capabilities to zero in Europe, US retaliation would be devastating with unimaginable damage. The US survey grid would allow a counterattack before being affected by the Russians
Designing a war with rules of honor would be stupid. So, it would be possible to get to the enemy. Conventional war is the prerogative of non-nuclear powers. If Putin wanted to declare war on NATO would launch a thousand thermo-nuclear warheads, he would not order tanks to violate the borders of the Baltic countries. It would always be Putin's last order. The superpowers will continue to wage proxy warfare in asymmetric scenarios
NATO must change its strategic position
Europe today is not struggling to recover of the Second World War, while his overall military capabilities should be like the United States. NATO's area of responsibility is mainly focused on Europe, but there is no war (in the strict sense of the term) in this area. Russia's intervention in Ukraine should have triggered a reversal of the trend for NATO, but the constant concerns expressed by Alliance member countries have not been reflected in defense spending. In reality, both Ukraine with the modern war, but conventional, and the Islamic State and its purely asymmetrical context that cyber defense represents real threats to European security and NATO. NATO can no longer define as reason to be protecting Europe against the Russian invasion. The Alliance is today poorly structured, poorly equipped and poorly funded to deal with the main security problems of the European region. However, it is imperative that NATO get rid of the corpse of the cold war. Even before burden-sharing (burden-sharing), NATO must unanimously identify existential threats. Then badyze not only the inputs (the amount of money spent) but also the outputs, the actual military capabilities that the allies can deploy. NATO must first be unanimous in its intentions and be structured on real specific capabilities, modeled on perceived existential threats and considered as such.
The 2% threshold should be reviewed
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is designed to logistically support the US presence in Europe. We are talking about a strategy that comes directly from the cold war. NATO was an alliance with one goal: to protect Western Europe against a Soviet invasion. The basic structure of NATO has not changed since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. It has simply expanded to the former Soviet satellite states and the Baltic states . The reason for the expansion was to incorporate these countries as part of the Western defense system, to give them confidence in their independence, to help support the development of democracies.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union The United States, the United Kingdom and France encouraged European countries to build forces geared towards projection missions as in Afghanistan, sending troops far from national borders. By channeling funds in this direction, domestic military expenditures became optional
From 1985 to 1989, European members of the Alliance invested an average of 3.3% of GDP for Defense. From 1990 to 1994, expenditures were reduced to 2.7%. Between 1995 and 1999, spending dropped to 2.2%, reaching 1.9% between 2000 and 2004. In 2009, the average fell to 1.7% to reach the low of 1.45% in 2015.
At the 2014 NATO summit in Wales, after years of decline, leaders decided to invest 2% of GDP in defense. In 2014, only the United States (which alone accounted for more than half of NATO's military spending), the United Kingdom and Greece spent 2% or more on defense. This year, eight allies will reach the goal. By 2024, at least 15 allies are expected to spend 2% of GDP or more on defense. Over the last three years, European allies and Canada have added $ 46 billion to defense budgets and invested $ 19 billion more in major military equipment. By 2024, 22 of the 29 allies are expected to invest 20% of their defense budget in major military equipment to improve our strength and readiness.
Calculate the 2% threshold
100 billion dollars a year. That's the scale of the investment if all the NATO countries (excluding the US of course) reach 2% of their gross national defense product . All members of the Alliance will have to achieve this goal. Spending levels are a direct result of policy decisions and the process of converting tax revenues to military spending. If, for example, Germany, Italy, Canada, Spain and the Netherlands reached 2% of GDP for defense, NATO would have a level of expenditure of $ 80 billion. If Berlin pledged to invest 2% of GDP, it would add $ 30 billion to European defense, a significant part of the target set. Germany only allocates 1.2% of GDP to defense and most of its budget is allocated to staff. Despite badurances, the goal of one hundred billion dollars is still a mirage. The most important and richest countries of NATO are too small or economically weak to have an effect on the final balance of European defense, whereas it will be precisely the choices of Germany which will be decisive for understanding the future capacity of the Alliance.
In 2016, Italy invested 1.11% of GDP in military spending
Each NATO member country should have invested 2% of GDP for the defense. The 2% of GDP was established by badyzing the average level of spending by the Alliance between the end of the cold war and 2003. 2% represented the average level of allies, so easily manageable. A target that in 2016 was only achieved by five allies: the United States (3.61%), Greece (2.38%), the United Kingdom (2.21%), Estonia (2.16%) and Poland (2%). In 2016, Italy invested 1.11% of GDP in military spending
In 2016, France was the sixth country in the Alliance to have invested more than 1.78% of GDP. GDP. Next come Turkey (1.56%), Norway (1.54%), Lithuania (1.49%), Romania (1.48), Latvia (1.45%), Portugal (1 , 38%) and Bulgaria (1.35), Croatia (1.23%), Albania (1.21%), Germany (1.19%), Denmark (1%), , 17%), the Netherlands (1.17%), Slovakia (1.16%), Italy (1.11%), the Czech Republic (1.04%), Hungary (1.01%), Canada (0.99%), Slovenia (0.94%), Spain (0.91%), Belgium (0.85%), Luxembourg (0.44%)
NATO should abandon its obligation to devote 2% of its GDP to the defense because it is no longer realistic. Identifying existential threats, NATO should demand that all members commit to spending the resources necessary to meet identified defense responsibilities. Based on the existential threat identified, the expense requirement could be greater than 2%. It would always be a targeted expenditure against a certain existential threat and shared
NATO seen by Trump (and by the Americans)
Currently the United States maintains a permanent force of 32 thousand soldiers in Germany. It is not just NATO forces deployed in Europe (irrelevant without the United States), but the cost if a conflict with Russia (which will not exist) breaks out. . Burden-sharing, ie the fair distribution of burdens among allies, will be one of the main issues discussed in Brussels. The cost of a conventional war in Europe would be immense (broad concept). The cost of an unimaginable nuclear war because Russian thermonuclear warheads would strike American cities with absolute certainty. During the Cold War, the United States recognized that they accepted the cost of the huge military system set up in Europe, ready to cushion the invasion of the Soviet Union. After the end of the cold war, the Allies took for granted that the United States maintained the same strategic commitments. Today, the United States is facing other priority areas, especially in the Western Pacific. US public opinion expects the wealthy countries of Europe to defend themselves, with the United States in the role of strategic support based on the needs.
In Trump Doctrine (Nixon Doctrine 2.0) the future commitment of the United States in accordance with Article 5, is subject to European performance. These capabilities provided by the United States should be specifically tailored to strengthen NATO's plans. According to the new global distribution of responsibilities, European states would focus on the threat of the South. To deal with the Russian threat in northeastern Europe, the United States should orient and develop the need for forces capable of deterring and, if necessary, defeating irregular and conventional Russian aggression . For Trump and the Americans, NATO members in Europe are perfectly capable of providing their own defense.
Source link
