Stability in the Democratic Republic of Congo after the elections – African Center for Strategic Studies



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Joseph Kabila seeks to maintain the status quo as the Democratic Republic of Congo enters a period of transition in the face of growing instability.

Soldiers of the Congolese National Armed Forces. (Photo: MONUSCO)

Soldiers of the Congolese National Armed Forces. (Photo: MONUSCO)

Instability and uncertainty are looming as the Democratic Republic of Congo prepares for the December 23 presidential elections. The failure of President Joseph Kabila to resign at the end of his term in December 2016 has plunged the DRC into its worst political crisis since the second Congolese civil war from 1998 to 2003. Since then, at least 1,200 Citizens were killed, many in extrajudicial killings by Congolese security forces suspected of participating in protests. This development is accompanied by a 40% increase in the number of human rights violations attributable to the disproportionate use of force by security forces during anti-human rights protests. Kabila. The turmoil created by the political crisis has galvanized many of the 70-plus armed groups in the DRC, some of whom have openly declared that they would "free Congo" from an unjustified leader.

Even with Kabila's resignation after 18 years of power, the chances of the elections having a stabilizing effect are slim. The ruling People's Party for Reconstruction and Democracy (PPRD) continues to control the electoral commission, as well as all branches of government and security services. The submission of these institutions to the executive undermined the credibility of the last presidential elections of 2011. Their persistent partisanship suggests that the outcome of the December vote will not produce the legitimacy that free and fair elections are supposed to generate . Kabila's successor, Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary, is a loyal loyalist with close ties to the presidential family, who is seen by many as a leader on which Kabila will lead the business until 2023, when he will be eligible to run again. Disagreements in the opposition, meanwhile, have prevented it from presenting a unified candidate, thus risking a golden opportunity since only 16% of voters said they would vote for Shadary.

Congo's complicated security landscape will remain a major factor in post-election stabilization efforts, regardless of the future leader.

Short-term challenges

The lack of responsibility and professionalism in the security sector is at the heart of many problems in the Congo. The armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC), with 140,000 men, are poorly equipped and poorly trained, and their members often remain unpaid months. To fill the gap, they usually engage in predatory activities, a problem highlighted by the final report of the UN Panel of Experts on the DRC, published in June 2018, according to which the criminal networks of the United army continue to benefit from money laundering and mineral trafficking. . The practice of allowing military personnel to loot resources dates back to the era of strong man Mobutu Sese Seko. Mobutu has kept the army weak by allocating him a tiny budget while devoting considerable sums to the Presidential Guard, a real core of power over his 32 years of government. He encouraged his generals to exploit the resources and the citizens by telling them, "You have weapons, you do not need a salary." In return, the army remained loyal to her because she had Any interest in maintaining access to these illicit sites, revenues, etc. This type of predatory behavior on the part of the military still continues today.The corruption is widespread and compromises the operational effectiveness of the force. the UN in 2017 revealed that the FARDC were the main source of arms for several rebel groups, some because of the direct sale to these groups by FARDC officers. conflict zones regularly levy illegal taxes on civilians and force them to pay "protection fees" or the equivalent in food and property, and call this practice "lala salama" (sleep in peace), suggested managing that civilians must pay extortion in exchange for physical security. Another UN investigation in 2015 found that commanders deployed against the Democratic Allied Forces coordinated the sale of timber in the midst of the fighting. Similarly, in 2010, a United Nations investigation into the mass rape of more than 300 civilians in the mineral-rich but turbulent province of Walikale revealed that soldiers had abandoned their posts in order to embark on activities in the country. extraction nearby.

The continuing politicization of security sector leaders is a major concern as the DRC moves towards a transition.

As a result of such practices, the military has failed to ensure the safety of citizens, although it has received billions of dollars in security assistance to enhance its professionalism and his preparation for combat. The consequences are disastrous. Today, an estimated 5.2 million Congolese are forcibly displaced. Meanwhile, with 18,000 troops on the ground and a total investment of nearly $ 9 billion, the deployment of MONUSCO by the UN in eastern DRC continues to be one of the largest and most expensive peace in the world.

The continuing politicization of security sector leaders is a major concern as the DRC moves towards a transition. Kabila has appointed loyalist fervents to the top military, police and intelligence services during a reshuffle of leaders in July 2018. It is unclear how they might react to Shadary or to an opposition candidate take the reins. All these new officers are on various lists of sanctions for serious misconduct. In particular, the chief of the army, General John Numbi, his deputy, General Gabriel Amisi, the director of intelligence services Kalev Mutombo and the commander of the guard of the Republic, François Olenga, all make the case. subject to US, European and UK sanctions for human rights violations and other offenses, including money laundering. According to the UN, General Amisi operates a gold mine and has previously been involved in the distribution of arms to poachers and rebels.

The power structure

The president's office is at the top of a vast device of favoritism.

The Congolese political system operates in much the same way as under the Mobutu regime and that of Joseph Kabila's late father, Laurent. The president's office is at the top of a vast patronage apparatus built on formal and informal networks ranging from the federal level to provincial and local governments. The office would be involved in the widespread search for annuities and embezzlement of state resources. About 4 billion dollars were looted under Mobutu – a cycle pursued by the Kabila. In 2015, Luzolo Bambi, then Kabila's advisor in the fight against corruption, said that $ 15 billion was lost each year because of fraud. In his previous role as Minister of Justice, he has put in place several far-reaching measures to eliminate conflict and incompetence in the justice system, but uncooperative prosecutors have prevented them from paying off. A study by the Pulitzer Center revealed that the president's family and his allies controlled up to 80 companies holding stakes in almost every sector – from banks and real estate to mining, telecommunications and agriculture – bringing in hundreds of millions of dollars a year.

Access to these revenues has allowed members of the regime's narrow circle to convince opponents and officials of the judiciary, the legislature and other key institutions such as the electoral commission.

Similar human rights abuses and patronage behaviors are observed among senior civilian officials of the Kabila government. Shadary is on the US and European sanctions list for ordering the violent crackdown on protests while overseeing the roles of security and home affairs. The governors of Kasai Central and Upper Katanga and Deputy Prime Minister Gideon Mutanga are under EU sanctions for planning, directing or committing human rights violations.

The way in which these well-established players will respond to a change in leadership adds to the degree of uncertainty of this transition. Several months before Kabila appointed Shadary as his successor, many members of his inner circle pressed him, including the Speaker of the National Assembly Aubin Minaku, former Prime Minister Augustine Ponyo and the chief of staff of President Nehemie Wilonga, also known as "Mr. Vice President." In the end, Kabila chose the relatively unknown Shadary, whose limited power base and meager finances would probably have played to his advantage because he is likely to be more beholden to Kabila than other more ambitious heavyweights.

For the moment, Kabila seems to have contained the slightest challenge to his appointed successor by tightening his grip on the government apparatus. He obtained the new position of party president, which gives him a significant influence on the government's decisions under the administration of the PPRD. He also placed three loyal allies in the nine-member Constitutional Court to replace the judges who had retired. The Supreme Court, made up of 27 judges, is also full of loyalists. During the July reshuffle, parliament, with a PPRD majority, passed a law granting immunity from prosecution of Kabila, a state pavilion, a diplomatic passport, life guards and 50% of his presidential salary.

Beyond the elections

Kabila's careful planning to maintain his influence after the December elections shows his interest in preserving the status quo. This poses a problem for the DRC, as most Congolese believe that fundamental reforms of government authority are needed to reverse the country's growing instability.

Senior Magistrates and Judges of the Constitutional Court

Senior Magistrates and Judges of the Constitutional Court. (Photo: Radio Okapi / John Bompengo)

Institutions that should preserve Congo's resources and control the executive, particularly the courts and parliament, are themselves seriously compromised and unable to fulfill their mandate. It is imperative to restore their independence if the next government wants to break with the current trajectory and bring real change to the country.

The period of institutional strengthening between 2006 and 2009, when the legislature became an important control of the executive, is a relevant precedent. During this period, the National Assembly conducted 43 independent investigations leading to the sanction of ministers and the reallocation of expenditures. For its part, the Senate oversaw 28 independent investigations providing for reparations for many cases of executive misconduct. Although the parliament eventually lost its independence due to the interference of the executive, the case shows that it is possible to create autonomous branches of government in the DRC.

Regional organizations, in particular the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU), will also have to fulfill their obligation to respect the principles of the African Union (AU). balance of power in the DRC if we want to reverse instability. SADC was the guarantor of the Sun City peace process that led to the establishment of nascent independent institutions in the DRC in 2003. The role played by SADC in its subsequent implementation is testament to the value that A consistent and principled commitment from outside actors can help keep reforms on track. This will undoubtedly be crucial in the future, because a major change is necessary if the DRC wants to change course and achieve the security and responsibility that will allow Congo to channel its immense wealth towards a significant development.

Africa Center Experts

Additional Resources

  • Hans Hoebeke, "Kabila shows his place in the electoral poker of DR Congo", International Crisis Group, CommentAugust 16, 2018.
  • Michelle D. Gavin, "Kabila will not stand for election, but Congo will really change?", Council of Foreign Relations, Blog Post, August 15, 2018.
  • Paul Nantulya, "A mixture of armed groups plays on the Congolese crisis", African Center for Strategic Studies, Projector, September 25, 2017.
  • Pulitzer Research Center on Crisis Reporting and the Congo Research Group, "All the Wealth of the President: The Kabila Family Business," Special Report, July 2017.
  • Center for Strategic Studies for Africa, "Interview: prospects for peace in the DRC", Projector, February 17, 2017.
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