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The following is the September 8, 2021 Congressional Research Service report on Strategic Competition Between the United States and China in the South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress.
From the report
In recent years, the South China Sea (SCS) has become an arena of strategic competition between the United States and China. China’s actions in the SCS, including the extensive island-building and base-building activities at sites it occupies in the Spratly Islands, as well as the actions of its maritime forces to assert the claims of China against competing claims from regional neighbors such as the Philippines and Vietnam – have heightened concerns among U.S. observers that China is taking effective control of the SCS, an area of strategic, political importance and economic for the United States and its allies and partners. Another concern for US observers is the actions of Chinese maritime forces in the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea (ECS). Chinese domination of the region close to the seas of China, i.e. the SCS and ECS, as well as the Yellow Sea, could significantly affect the strategic, political and economic interests of the United States in the region. Indo-Pacific and elsewhere.
Potential general objectives of the United States for strategic competition between the United States and China in the SCS and the ECS include, but are not limited to, the following: to meet the United States’ security commitments in the Western Pacific, including treaty commitments with Japan and the Philippines; maintaining and enhancing the US-led security architecture in the Western Pacific, including US security relationships with Treaty Allies and Partner States; maintaining a regional balance of power favorable to the United States and its allies and partners; defend the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes and resist the emergence of an alternative “can-do-good” approach in international affairs; defend the principle of the freedom of the sea, also sometimes called freedom of navigation; prevent China from becoming a regional hegemony in East Asia; and pursue these objectives as part of a broader US strategy of strategic competition and management of relations with China.
The potential specific US objectives for US-China strategic competition in the SCS and ECS include, but are not limited to, the following: deter China from carrying out additional base building activities in the SCS, move additional military personnel, equipment and supplies to bases at sites it occupies in SCS, initiating island or base construction activities at Scarborough Shoal in SCS, declaring lines base lines around the ground elements it claims in the SCS, or by declaring an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) above the SCS; and encourage China to reduce or end the operations of its maritime forces in the Senkaku Islands in the ECS, to stop the actions to pressure against the Philippine-occupied sites in the Spratly Islands, to provide better access to the Filipino fishermen in the waters surrounding Scarborough Shoal or in the Spratly Islands, adopt the US / Western definition of the freedom of the seas, and accept and abide by the July 2016 court award in the SCS arbitration case involving the Philippines and the China.
The question for Congress is whether the Administration’s strategy to strategically compete with China in the SCS and ECS is appropriate and properly funded, and whether Congress should approve, reject, or change the strategy, the level of resources to implement it, or both. The decisions Congress makes on these matters could significantly affect the strategic, political, and economic interests of the United States in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere.
Download the report here
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