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From the headquarters of "Barkhane" in N'Djamena, General Bruno Guibert led for a year the 4,500 French soldiers deployed in the Sahel. He was the first comanfor (force commander) of the Macron era. The President pleaded for the "rise" of the G5 Sahel joint force (Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad), while being part of the continuity of the operation decided by François Hollande.
The persistence of jihadist attacks (the last one took place on 1 and July in Gao), after four years of French military efforts, raises more and more questions about the relevance of the anti-terrorist strategy of Paris in the Sahel. "We are at the end of the exercise, the situation deteriorates seriously, has criticized former Defense Minister Hervé Morin Friday on France 2. We see more and more of armed actions by jihadist groups and there are very clearly forces of destabilization that are gaining ground. " General Guibert says" serene. " " One day or another, they will lose ", he says. A few weeks later, he goes back over the adjustments and innovations he brought to Barkhane.
How did Operation Barkhane evolve under your mandate?
The enemy was able to observe our strengths and our weaknesses. One of our major handicaps was predictability. He must never neglect his adversary: in the case of the Sahel, he watches us constantly, he has bells [des indicateurs] everywhere. I wanted, in agreement with the political and military authorities in Paris, to change our procedures. We must go far, long, and as lightly as possible. We now prefer long operations on the ground, in bivouac, often for a month or more. We are also looking to reduce our logistic footprint, to get closer to the velocity of the enemy. Barkhane begins to equip himself with pickups, for example. Thanks to this approach, we often come to surprise terrorist armed groups (GAT).
In the long run, are these rethought operations more effective?
There is no military solution in the Sahel. What will eradicate terrorists is to cut the link between them and the population. For this, it will require the return of the state, military, justice, security in abandoned areas. When the inhabitants are no longer afraid of their army, when they have confidence in their administration, this link will no longer be necessary. Barkhane is here to create the conditions for this return. For this, our activity must be in the long term, the population must get in the habit of seeing us. We can not abandon it after our visit. We therefore seek to alternate the heavy operation phases with the "low water" periods, where we maintain a lighter presence. But beware, we do not go out for nothing, just to show us. The notion of "area control" [en vigueur au début de Barkhane] can not be applied to GATs in a huge space like the Sahel. I call these operations "big red nose" because they attract attention without being effective. Our outings are increasingly led by or for intelligence. And we got results: 120 terrorists were put out of action since the beginning of the year, half were killed, the rest were handed over to the Malian or Nigerian authorities.
You also sent forces into the Menaka area, where Barkhane was little present …
Last year, the RN20 between Ansongo and Menaka was under constant attack, the IEDs [engins explosifs improvisés] were beating the supply convoys of the United Nations Mission in Mali, the Malian armed forces (Fama), civilian carriers, and authorities were leaving the area. A system of predation against the population had been set up. I made the decision to deploy Barkhane in this endangered area, in agreement with the strategic authorities. Today, the Islamic State in the Great Sahara [présent dans cette zone dite des trois frontières] is no longer able to perform coordinated maneuvers, it is obliged to seek allies like Ansar Dine to commit attacks. Desertions of its fighters have even been noted.
After four years of operation, and with this new rhythm, does the French army begin to tire?
A soldier is made to go on the field : the military do not come in opex [opération extérieure] to remain in their base. We have no problem with motivation. The men and women of Barkhane are admirable. The material, on the other hand, suffers, yes. I do not need extra guns, I have everything I need to hit. But I need equipment adapted to bring the contradiction to the enemy, to gain mobility. Biometrics could help us. The strength of the enemy is disillusionment: a jihadist fighter in the morning can be a trafficker in the evening, a shepherd the next day, and a member of the armed group signatory [de l’accord de paix d’Alger] the next day. Biometric identification tools would allow us to know who we are dealing with. Second, the electronic intelligence device is indispensable, of course, but what I miss is human intelligence. Since a year ago, we have considerably expanded our network of sources in the population, it is a good sign.
On June 19, Bamako recognized "serious violations involving certain Fama personnel" after the discovery of mass graves in the region of Mopti. Is not the behavior of Malian soldiers an obstacle to peace?
Care must be taken not to generalize particular cases. Black sheep, there are always some. The war is not pretty, it's never perfect. I do not try to minimize or excuse, but it must be remembered that the enemy does not respect any rule. You have to be strong to apply yourself to rules against barbaric practices. The Malian army is progressing. Unlike what we hear here or there, she holds the road. On the field with Barkhane, his behavior is remarkable. But it takes at least fifteen years to repyramid an entire army. I do not have a blissful optimism: the abuses committed have a very negative impact in terms of image. But I salute the courage of the Malian authorities who immediately launched an investigation, then to have recognized and denounced the facts.
In the region of Menaka, you chose to work with a Tuareg armed group, the Movement for the Salvation of Azawad (MSA), of Moussa Ag Acharatoumane. By privileging a community, you play a dangerous game …
I am satisfied with this cooperation. It is very punctual, based on exchanges or information sharing, but there is no common planning. I put three criteria to work with groups. Their loyalty to the Malian State, the sincerity of their commitment to the fight against terrorism, and respect for the law of armed conflict. The MSA meets these criteria. But this choice is not exclusive, I do not favor anyone! If other groups are ready to go to fight alongside the Fama, whether Fulani, Tuareg, or others, we will also extend their hand. I met Moussa several times. He is more of a political leader than a military leader. I am not naive: he has his interests. He is courageous because he is waging a determined struggle for his community [les touaregs Daoussak] in the Malian state, and he is fully convinced of the need to advance the peace process. He knows that the movements are destined to be disarmed, and he has already accepted the principle of the eventual demobilization of his troops.
Barkhane was targeted by a bomb attack on the Gao market, 1 er July, which killed five civilians. Several French soldiers were hit. What is their state of health?
Four soldiers were seriously injured. None should suffer serious consequences. The attack was particularly devious. A fighter, even a jihadist, who takes up arms against us, soldiers, I can understand. But when one comes to commit indiscriminate strikes against civilians, it is because one has lost one's soul.
The Support Group for Islam and Muslims (GSIM) claimed responsibility for the coordinated assault on the Timbuktu military base on April 14, followed by the attack on the headquarters of the G5 Sahel joint force in Sévaré on June 29 … Are you worried about these spectacular attacks?
No, I am very serene. In reality, the attacks are not increasing, they are very violent, but episodic. These attacks are the testimony of their weakness, their last resort. It is not by demolishing the HQ of the joint G5 Sahel force that they will stop it. It's not by blowing up a mine under an armored Barkhane that they will stop us. On the contrary. One day or another, they will lose.
You will soon pass the baton of commander of the force Barkhane to your successor. What strategic advice will you give him?
First, do not reproduce patterns of the past, remain attentive and responsive to changing circumstances. Then, to understand intimately the mechanisms of functioning of Malian society, particularly in the North. For Barkhane to be effective, we must make the effort of this understanding in depth. We must be able to act in the right place, at the right time, and avoid being actors ourselves, who will poison a situation. Finally, surround yourself well and maintain a dialogue of trust with the partners. Last key point: the France team must be united in this fight. This is not just a military affair, there is a whole development environment, diplomatic, political … To defeat terrorism, we must not neglect any of these levers.
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