Boeing 737 breakdowns raise difficult questions about automation



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Tom Enders just could not resist the kickoff of the competition. It was June 2011, and the President and CEO of Airbus SE was on the scene at the Paris Air Show. In just a few days, the aircraft manufacturer had won 600 unprecedented orders for its modernized A320neo aircraft, while Boeing co was on the sidelines.

"If our colleagues in Seattle continue to argue that we are just catching up on their 737, I have to wonder what these guys are doing," Enders said, much to the public's amusement, while Boeing's representatives were at the table. background of the room. looked.

Boeing had hesitated between his decision to follow the Airbus initiative and reshape the 737 or leave with a brand new plane. Customers were ready to wait for "something more revolutionary," as Jim Albaugh, then director of Boeing commercial aircraft, said.

But the resounding success of the European manufacturer with the A320neo, which is essentially a re-injected version of its famous family with narrow body, will soon force the hand to Boeing.

While the Airbus A320neo became the best-selling aircraft in the history of civil aviation, while Airbus was recruiting loyal customers to Boeing as American Airlines Group Inc., the American company abandoned the search for a brand new aircraft and reacted in July 2011 with its own redesign, the 737 Max.

"The program was launched in panic," said Sash Tusa, an analyst at Agency Partners, a London-based equity research firm. "What frightened Boeing especially, was to lose his most important and important client. American Airlines has been the catalyst. "

It turned out that Boeing, based in Chicago, was quick to be heard: even if the Max did not really reproduce the order book of the A320neo, he became the fastest seller in the company as airlines strove to reduce their fuel bills. engines that promised savings of 20% or more. In total, the Max has recorded about 5,000 orders, which has kept the playing field in the global duopoly between Airbus and Boeing.

Meticulous examination

Now, the 737 Max is immobilized around the world, after two almost new jets crashed quickly. As a result, the consequences of Boeing's reaction to the Airbus incursion are under the microscope. The use of more powerful and more fuel-efficient engines and automated tools to help pilots control aircraft is a particular focus.

After the grounding, Boeing stated that he "continued to have full confidence in the safety of the 737 Max and that he supported the decision to idle the engines" as a precaution. " The company declined to comment outside its public statements.

At the end of October, a plane operated by Lion Air sank a few minutes after taking off from Jakarta, killing the 189 people on board. Then on March 10, another 737 Max crashed, this time in Ethiopia en route to Kenya. Again, none of the 157 people on board survived the impact.

There are other similarities that have alarmed the airlines and regulators and sparked public opinion, resulting in the grounding of the 737 Max fleet of more than 350 aircraft. . According to the Federal Aviation Administration, "the Ethiopian Airlines flight track was very close and behaved very similar to the Lion Air flight".

After decades of steadily declining aircraft accidents, the question of how two identical new aircraft could simply drop from the sky a few minutes after take-off has led to a close examination of the 737 Max's systems. US President Donald Trump lamented the complexities of modern aviation, adding that people in the cockpit had to look more like nuclear physicists than pilots to order a plane with automated.

"Airplanes are becoming far too complex to fly. Pilots are no longer needed, but rather computer scientists at MIT, "said the president in the first of a pair of tweets on March 12, darkly warning that" complexity creates danger. "

Analog machine

Automation plays a limited role in the 737 Max. This is because the device still has essential analog design and layout features dating back to the 1960s when it was designed. It's a much older concept than the A320, which was marketed in the late 80's and boasted of innovations such as electric flight controls, which handle surfaces such as flaps and horizontal tail stabilizers with electrical pulses and transducers rather than heavier hydraulic links. .

Upgrading the 737 to create the Max came with its own set of problems. For example, the 737 rests much lower than the ground. It was therefore difficult for new, larger engines to fit under the wings (even with the crushed lower belly of the engine crankcase). In response, Boeing lifted the landing gear by a few inches, but this and the size of the engines can change the center of gravity of the aircraft and its lift in some maneuvers.

Boeing's technical magic for the Max, with a capacity of 138 to 230 seats, was a software known as Maneuvering Characteristic Augmentation System (MCA). It intervenes automatically when only one sensor indicates that the aircraft can approach a stall. However, some pilots complained that training on the new system was not sufficient and was not well documented.

"The benefits of automation are great, but they require a different level of discipline and training," said Thomas Anthony, director of the Aviation Safety and Security Program at the university. from Southern California. Pilots must make a conscious effort to monitor the behavior of the aircraft. And the use of automation means they will only regain control in the worst situations, he said.

Stray sensor

With the Lion Air crash, the data from the recovered flight recorders indicates a battle in the cockpit between the software and the pilots who were struggling to keep control. The data showed that a stray sensor reported that the aircraft could stall and prompted the MCAS to compensate by repeatedly launching a dive. The pilots reacted by repeatedly operating a switch to lift the nose manually, temporarily disabling the MCAS. The cycle was repeated more than two dozen times before the aircraft enters its last lethal dive, according to the flight data.

With the flight and cockpit voice recorders from the Ethiopian aircraft now in France for analysis, the interaction between the MCAS system and the pilots will again be examined closely, which will probably boost the debate more wide on cockpit control.

This human-machine riddle has been at the heart of civil aviation for years. Automation has undoubtedly made commercial flights much safer, as aircraft manufacturers have added systems that allow pilots to define engine thrust, navigate with greater accuracy, and even better control. 39, avoid human error in the cockpit.

For example, the automation of modern aircraft keeps pilots in a flight envelope to avoid erratic maneuvers that could destabilize the aircraft. Flight data analyzes show that aircraft landings are more stable during stormy weather and low visibility when automation is in charge than on a clear day when they land on sight.

The miracle of Sully

The most daring descent of recent memory, the landing of US flight 1549 in the Hudson River by Chesley "Sully" Sullenberger in early 2009, is Exhibit A of an interconnected cockpit operation with an experienced pilot . The automatic pitch and rudder coordination adjustments facilitated manual entry and allowed the Airbus A320 to remain stable when it slipped into icy water. The drama showed that automation can play a crucial supporting role, provided the pilot is fully trained and the aircraft is properly maintained.

"Some people say that modern planes such as the 737 Max are too complex," said Dave Wallsworth, captain of British Airways aboard the Airbus A380. "I do not agree that the A380 is a much more complex aircraft that we fly safely every day, and pilots are able to understand the on-board systems as long as the manuals contain the information we have. need. "

Traditionally, Airbus has pushed the limits in terms of automation and more modern cockpit design, with larger screens and joystick steering rather than a central yoke, thus turning pilots into system operators. Boeing's philosophy, on the other hand, was to leave more power to the pilots, although the new designs also include some computerized limits. Like Airbus aircraft, the latest aircraft in Seattle – where Boeing manufactures most of its airliners – are equipped with sophisticated autopilots, electric flight controls, and systems for adjusting speed during landings. .

"The milestones of automation were achieved in the 1980s with the introduction of the Airbus A320 and the entire ethics of flying," said John Strickland, independent industry analyst. 'aviation. "I do not think automation itself is a problem, we see it in a large-scale use in the industry, and as long as it's designed to work hand-in-hand with pilots and pilots understand how to use it, should not be a problem. "

Erratic movements

But the counter-argument is that increasingly complex systems have led computers to take over and that many pilots may have forgotten how to manually control a jet plane – especially in times of crisis. Airbus, for example, has been criticized following the crash of Air France Flight 447 in the middle of the Atlantic in 2009, which claimed the lives of 228 people. Analysis of the flight recorders showed that the crew was disoriented by stall warnings and unreliable speed readings, which resulted in erratic maneuvers that resulted in a disaster.

"I have grown up with the steam gauges and the analog, and the modern generation with digital and automation," said Jon Weaks, president of the Southwest Airlines Pilots Association and Boeing captain 737 for the Dallas-based airline. "No matter what you grew up on, you have to fly the plane. If automation does something you do not want or understand, you must disconnect it and fly the plane. "

A report released in 2013 by the FAA revealed that more than 60% of the 26 accidents that occurred over a decade involved errors made by pilots after the sudden shutdown of automated systems or their unexpected behavior. And the 2016 Inspector General's report to the FAA indicated that, as the use of automation increased, "pilots have fewer opportunities to use the manual flight skills ".

"As a result, the opportunities that airline pilots have to maintain control of manual flight during live operations are limited and may decline," the report says.

The grounding of the 737 Max's fleet left Boeing in crisis. The company was unable to convey the message that the aircraft was safe to fly because the group of regulators and idling airlines was continuing to expand. The 737 program is Boeing's cash cow, accounting for a third of its profits, and Boeing's shares fell sharply in the days following the disaster.

Get in line

The Max gave Boeing a relatively inexpensive way to get back into the tight body game she was likely to lose to Airbus. At that time, Boeing had to make a quick decision because the 787 Dreamliner, which was over budget and on time, was still struggling financially.

The two manufacturers have announced that they will not offer a brand new one-aisle model until the end of the next decade, preferring to wait for further technological advances before committing to massive spending. The success of neo and Max has saved companies time with order books stretched in the years to come.

Half a century after being launched almost immediately, the 737 program has become the lifeblood of Boeing, which helps finance the rest of society – the largest US exporter. It's the only plane that Boeing can afford to abandon.

"The Max was the right decision at the moment," said Richard Aboulafia, an aviation analyst at Teal Group. "Yes, there may be a problem with MCAS requiring a hotfix. Yes, you may need additional training. But these are not problems that cause people to skip other guys. The other guys have a queue, and when you get to the back of that line, you consume more fuel. "

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