How many suppliers of Chinese modules can complete with JinkoSolar, outside of China?

Since Chinese investments in major cellular and modular installations began more than 10 years ago, success has been boosted by gains in market share abroad, above other technical or financial references. However, despite the efforts of more than 50 Chinese cell / module manufacturers (whose cut-off includes those with a capacity> 500 MW), only 5 to 6 Chinese companies have successfully established global brand-name operations, and can [19659004] However, only one of them has evolved into a company that, in many ways, operates as a non-Chinese corporation outside of China – JinkoSolar.

This article looks at the location of JinkoSolar. today in the photovoltaic sector, both from the Chinese and global point of view, and asks the question: can other Chinese companies do what JinkoSolar did, and if so, can they do it before their Chinese supply pipeline? In addition, is JinkoSolar now deploying global module delivery operations that set benchmarks for Western module providers that rely on non-Chinese demand?

Several of the themes presented in the narrative below are set out for further presentation at the next 2018 ModuleTech PV event on October 23 and 24, 2018 in Penang, Malaysia, where the top five or six module vendors will describe the technology, quality and reliability of their modules.

The resumption of supply of overseas modules is much more difficult than before for Chinese companies

At the last big rush to export to China (mainly in Europe before 2012), the requirement of a global presence was minimal. Chinese operations were replicas of commercial-sized domestic personnel, and sales to intermediaries (distributors, installers, EPCs) were largely sufficient.

Presence (Yingli Green, Suntech, Sharp, Kyocera, etc.) found themselves facing ASP declines and a lack of product differentiation, and global operations largely based on copying aside from the occasional frenzy (Yingli Green and the FIFA World Cup 2014 in Brazil, for example)

While trade barriers have crept in (US and Europe), about 90% of companies Chinese fell back part due to the impending attraction of the local demand market, but also arising from a lack of desire / money to have a manufacturing in Southeast Asia.

Indeed, the 2012-2016 period saw the second major phase of the supply-chan consolidation of nel (the first being the eradication of European and Japanese majors on the world stage), and left the world's only significant suppliers, with Chinese headquarters operations, JinkoSolar, JA Solar, Canadian Solar and Trina Solar. By the end of this period, Hanwha Q-Cells had effectively become a South Korea-led operation, while Chinese manufacturing was born days of Solarfun.

Together, these four Chinese companies (Jinko, JA, Canadian, Trina) have many similarities with respect to manufacturing operations (China plus Southeast Asia), technologies (p-mono and / or p -Multi, PERC migration plans) and business models (outside downstream activities). 19659004] The other feature that sets them apart from the remaining 100+ manufacturers of cells / modules in China, is related to sales / marketing outside of China, and to understand the difference between a Chinese company doing business in China and on the outside. This remains the key factor determining the success rates of other Chinese companies abroad, regardless of the RMB levels allocated to be on the world stage.

However, in the past 5-6 years, no Asian company (and very few) has been able to move closer to JinkoSolar's global module sourcing strategy. Unlike other Asian companies that have taken the lead in the global market in the past, JinkoSolar has simply served as a stepping stone to move to another level, and in largely unexplored waters when it is a solar module company. 19659009] Why JinkoSolar?

This is a question asked by many people around the world in recent years. Indeed, if the answer was simple and prescriptive, others would have done well before long, or would be putting in place plans of 2-3 years to get them by 2020/2021.

Of course, some is in the right place at the right time (read entering into long-term polysilicon contracts crippling the industry's margin) and being able to juggle tactics and strategy effectively (Internal flexible, OEM, balancing of contract supply). But if we try to determine the main reasons for the success of JinkoSolar, it may be that it boils down to these three points:

• Creation of non-Chinese operations (sales and marketing) which were from geography, culture and sales-pipeline savvy, in exactly the correct global locations at one time. What we see now with the company's portfolio of multi-GW contract deliveries is probably a direct result of this implementation. This is the closest thing to a Chinese company operating outside of China, outside of China.

• Set up a (real) technology roadmap with R & D expenditures and upgrades. -GW level. This is one of the reasons why market leaders fought, as many of them ruined themselves by becoming number one with a product of too much, and no one. had no plan that should have been a market leader as well. as a technology leader

• To regard the Chinese market (particularly in the last 2-3 years) as a low priority and focused on being number one or number two in all Other major end markets (regional or country-specific)
The first point above can not be represented as a reference metric (its approach is more subtle and strategic), but others can, so let's look here to emphasize these two points. The graphs below clearly illustrate these points.

China has ended the financial market crisis

Ironically, the dilemma facing most China-based module providers today is born out of the Chinese domestic market. Almost all companies have increased capacity, production and supply modules only in the expectation of local supply.

Indeed, many have done so, without trading abroad, or at best have stopped focusing on export earnings. Therefore, in the absence of local sourcing options, these companies must export, or effectively stop operating efficiently with adequate utilization rates.

This largely sums up the situation many Chinese companies are facing today: how do they work quickly? markets to focus on the overseas; how can they convince module buyers that they have the quality and reliability of products to be bankable?

For many suppliers of Chinese modules that depended solely on domestic demand, the problem is even greater, especially for companies providing modules to parents. EPC, themselves in charge of building the same parent entity. The requirement to have a factory audit by a third party, a module inspection and a risk badessment is clearly not at the level here, compared to the shipping to the On the other side of the world to a non-Chinese investor.

These questions will form a key part of the next PV ModuleTech 2018 meeting in Penang in October. For this, we have completed last year's agenda with a new session where leading badysts / developers from all major markets outside China will present demand for utilities in these regions over the coming years and what it means for the module.

Not only module suppliers in China, others will quickly change tactics

The module supply landscape of 2019 is also impacting other module vendors headquartered in China. Japan and South Korea. Thailand. For many modular companies based in these countries, the challenge is not so much to meet the demand in their home country (for example, for markets such as Taiwan and South Korea created by the government to support the domestic sectors). But perhaps in all these countries, the future of Neo Solar Power (NSP) in Taiwan could be the most interesting to see in 2019. Assuming NSP emerges as the dominant partner of the newly created NSP consortium, Gintech and Solartech (with modules renamed URE), then NSP can finally make the transition from cell manufacturer to module-provider / developer, on the world stage. 19659004] Of course, NSP would face exactly the same problems in terms of global sales and marketing creation, and branding. The advantage of NSP would however be to make this transition, starting from a technology-based (and cell-based) legacy. This is reminiscent of the path taken by JA Solar and Hanwha Q-Cells in recent years, and having the credibility of technology is never a bad starting point when we change direction. Operational

PV ModuleTech 2018 Last year, on the occasion of PV ModuleTech 2017, most of the top 10 module vendors in the PV industry have been looking at voltages. supply of modules over the last 12 months, including in China and abroad

. ModuleTech 2018, module vendor contributions are moving primarily to major module vendors in the non-Chinese PV industry sector, including companies such as First Solar, SunPower and other existing vendors ( or potential) the next 12 to 18 months (and the major Chinese companies are expected to survive the impending shakeout).

This select group of companies is likely to form the basis of many proposals that will be seen by developers and EPCs over the next few years. Therefore, it is vital to understand who these companies are, what types of module technology they provide recently, what their supply road maps look like and how their panels have performed up to now (from third-party verification views). ] To participate in PV ModuleTech 2018, October 23-24, in Penang, Malaysia, please follow the links on the event website here

Tags:
pv moduletech, jinkosolar, solar ja, solar trina, wuxi suntech, yingli green energy, c-si manufacturing, pv modules, porcelain, malaysia, hanwha q cells, neo solar energy, gintech, solartech energy