NDEGE: Ruto's hidden trump

After the defeat of Mau Mau in 1956, the British used their elaborate bureaucracy, intelligence agencies, and their long experience with the Empire to negotiate the terms of Kenya's independence. 19659004] The critical issues included the fate of European settler farms in Central Province and the Rift Valley, British foreign military and military bases in the country.

African leaders who would ensure that Kenya's post-independence State guaranteed continuity.

After a thorough search, Jomo Kenyatta was the British choice. Mau Mau, his long years of leadership of the nationalist struggle, his admiration of British capitalism, his conservatism, his readiness to forgive and cooperate with Britain influenced his choice.

At the three Lancaster Conferences, it has been agreed that the government of the United States of America is buying from the United States.

The tracts were then sold to Kenyans; the ones in Central to the Kikuyu, and those in the Rift Valley to the local Kalenjin and other Kenyans, including many Kikuyu who had lived there as squatters since the 1920s. Individuals in Kenyatta's Cabinet and in the civil service.

This happened, ounce in power, Kenyatta adopted an ethno-patrimonial style of governance. He ruled the country as unquestioned head of a family and rewarded with landlords close and loyal to him. These individuals included Mbiyu Koinange, Njoroge Mungai, James Gichuru and Bruce Mackenzie (who was a spy and key link with Britain and Israel), and Daniel arap Moi.

The latter became vice-president as Kenyatta's counterpoise against the radicals in Kanu including Oginga Odinga and Bildad Kaggia, who were opposed to Kenyatta's land policy.

But I was also willing, as the most powerful leader in the Rift Valley, to allow many landless Kikuyu to settle there. The British tolerated Kenyatta's ethno-patrimonialism so long as it served their country's economic and foreign interests. Kenyatta, Kenyatta, Kenyatta, Kenyatta, Kenyatta, Kenyatta, Kenyatta, Kenyatta, and Kenyatta. But even as internal intrigues were going on in Kenyatta 's inner circle, Britain and the US were once again still engaged in influencing his succession.

Some of the possible candidates were sidelined. Odinga Odinga, for instance, lost his position in the national and Kanu vice president in 1966 primarily because of his radicalism and opposition to Kenyatta's land policy. I was the ultimate choice, simply because of his dominant position in the Rift Valley, his conservatism and loyalty to Kenyatta.

Ultimately, he benefitted from the Constitution, which provided that the vice-president succeeds in the president's case or is otherwise incapacitated. I became president when Kenyatta died in 1978.

Me appointed Mwai Kibaki, his vice-president, said he wanted to ensure that the Kikuyu, the most economically powerful community in Kenya, supported his regime.

He also pledged to continue with Kenyatta's land and other policies. During his beleaguered diet, I relegated Kibaki to the less prestigious Health Ministry, but appointed other Kikuyus, including Josephat Karanja and George Kinuthia Saitoti, respectively, as VP. I am also a lieutenant, and did so, "foreigners" from their lands in many parts of the Rift Valley so they voted for him in the 1992 and 1997 elections.

Later in the run-up to the 2002 presidential election, Me unsuccessfully declared Uhuru Kenyatta, a political novice at the time, his preferred successor, possibly to the Kikuyu.

Kibaki won because he had joined other opposition leaders who were struggling for Kenya's second release.

Also, at the time, most Kenyans and external donors considered to the country and to the country.

In the race of time, however, Kibaki relapsed into Kenyatta's and Moi's ethno-patrimonialism.

Widespread violence followed in the 2007 elections, which were allegedly rigged in his favor.

The epicenter of violence in the Rift Valley where many Kikuyu were either evicted or killed.

The Kikuyu retaliated in kind in Naivasha and Nakuru. Once again, central to the post-election violence was the outcome of which was inextricably connected to the land issue.

On his part, Kibaki tacitly supported Uhuru's candidacy in the controversial 2013 presidential election probably to reward him for his ethnic loyalty and support during his troubled tenure.

Uhuru's running in the race to succeed Kibaki in 2013 was William Ruto.

The two had been circumstantially drawn together by accusations against the International Criminal Court in the aftermath of the 2007 post-election violence.

They agreed to resolve the Kikuyu-Kalenjin land-related differences. They worked together within the Jubilee, an ethno-political alliance, a secured electoral victory, and became president and deputy president respectively.

Fast forward to the present. Ruto has popularized his presidential ambition so early and with such unprecedented vigor and aggression that his attitude towards the position of the individual.

Lately they also (mis) interpret Uhuru 's call for leaders' lifestyle audit to fight corruption as primarily directed against Ruto.

This aside, Ruto has a constitutional right to contest the presidency. Perhaps what should be of concern to Kenyans are the following: What dreams does he have for Kenya? Does it have plans to change Kenya's economy so that land grabbing and other forms of corruption become things of the past? Gold does he simply want to sustain the Kikuyu-Kalenjin swing of the presidential pendulum?

These are questions which will be stepped up in the future. Most likely, land, the central factor in presidential inheritance since Kenya's independence, will be his trump card.

For a Karl Marx once stated: "Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances. "