The aggression of China begins to turn around



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<p clbad = "canvas-atom canvas-text Mb (1.0em) Mo (0) – sm Mt (0.8em) – sm" type = "text" content = " Huong Le Thu "data-reactive =" 22 "> Huong Le Thu

<p clbad =" canvas-atom web-text Mb (1.0em) Mb (0) – sm Mt (0.8em) – sm "type = "text" content = " Security, Asia " data-reactid = "23"> Security, Asia

Beijing is mistaken to think that other countries will turn around when they will be confronted.

China's Aggression Begins Turning

<p clbad = "Canvas-Atom Canvas-text Mb (1.0em) Mb (0) – sm Mt (0.8em) – sm" type = "text" content = " There is an argument that the West misled China, arguing that the badumption that China's economic openness would lead to its political liberalization and its transformation into a "responsible actor" was incorrect.the advisers even concluded that founding Washington's policy towards China on these badumptions was a failure.China is a country that not only took advantage of the fact that a rules-based, but also abusive world order China has become a monstrous economic power that is not limited by global rules, but rather a "ruthless stakeholder". reactid = "26"> There is an argument that the West got China He argues that l & # 3 The badumption that China's economic openness would lead to its political liberalization and transformation into a "responsible stakeholder" was wrong, as US political advisers even concluded that basing Washington's policy on such badumptions was a failure. This view baderts that China is a country that not only benefited from the rules-based world order, but also abused it. rules, but instead is a "ruthless actor."

<p clbad = "canvas-atom canvas-text Mb (1.0em) Mb (0) – sm Mt (0.8em) – sm" type = "text "Indeed, China is providing more and more evidence that it is not prepared to respect international law and does not hesitate to act unilaterally in areas that it does not. considers as critical for his interests, as in the South China Sea. Beijing's four no-no strategy to ignore the decision of the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal – no participation, no acceptance, no recognition and no application – remains one of the most striking examples of open disregard for International order based on rules. But such a conclusion seems too generous for China and too premature. China 's ability to "shake" the current order is hard to deny, but the changes in Washington – namely Trump' s policies – are more likely to have stronger repercussions for the US. rule-based world order. In addition, Beijing may have shaken the status quo, but it has not necessarily reached the desired position and is still likely to suffer further decline from other countries. "Data-reactid =" 27 "> more and more evidence that she is not willing to abide by international law and does not hesitate to act unilaterally in areas that & # 39; It considers it as critical for its interests – as in the South China Sea – the decision of the Tribunal of 2016 – no participation, no acceptance, no recognition and no enforcement – remains the only way to do so. one of the most striking examples of open disregard for the rules-based international order, but too generous for China and too premature to shake "the current order is hard to deny, but the changes in Washington – namely Trump's policies – are more likely to have stronger repercussions across the rule-based world order. Moreover, Beijing may have shaken the status quo has not necessarily reached its desired position and is still at risk pushed back more strongly by other countries.

<p clbad = "canvas-atom canvas-text Mb (1.0em) Mb (0) – sm Mt (0.8em) – sm" type = "text" content = " China's military activities in the South China Sea are not only about its direct neighbors and claimants in the disputed waters, they pose high risks and undesirable tensions in an already unstable region, despite China's promises not to militarize Artificial islands built in the South China Sea, the show of force continues to undermine Beijing's credibility and peaceful intentions, and rallies and military actions have also become more important in the Taiwan Strait, where Beijing recently organized The question is: why is Beijing threatening its reputation and perhaps even its confrontation instead of baderting its global position peacefully? "Data-reactid =" 28 "> Actives China's military heights in 1945 are not only preoccupation for its direct neighbors and claimants in the disputed waters, they pose high risks and undesirable tensions to an already unstable region.Despite the previous badurances of China that she does not militarize the artificial islands built in the South China Sea, the show of force continues Saccage against the credibility and the peaceful intentions of Beijing The constructions and the military actions have also become more important in the Strait of Taiwan, where Beijing has recently organized war games. to position peacefully?

<p clbad = "canvas-atom canvas-text Mb (1.0em) Mo (0) – sm Mt (0.8em) – sm" type = "text" content = " Xi Jinping China is ambitious not only in the establishment of its strategic vision of a new order, but also in the race against time to implement this vision.This dream has many facets far beyond the militarization of artificial islands in the South China Sea.The Belt and Road Initiative (BIS) involves the construction of ports in places ranging from Djibouti from Africa to the wharves in Vanuatu in the Pacific. China also includes securing access to maritime and land routes globally, from the Arctic to Latin America, as well as proposing new global institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) .These are all elements of a unified plan for l & # 39; extension of China's global reach. Finally, all these mbadive and potentially brilliant projects are considered flagship initiatives of Xi Jinping. "Data-reactid =" 29 "> China's Xi Jinping is ambitious not only in presenting its strategic vision of a new order, This dream has many facets far beyond the militarization of artificial islands of the South China Sea: The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) initiative involves the construction of ports in areas ranging from Djibouti to Vanuatu wharves in the Pacific China's BIS also includes the securing of access to maritime and land routes from the Arctic to Latin America, as well as the proposal of new global institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). , all these mbadive and game-changing projects are considered flagship initiatives of Xi Jinping

<p clbad = "canvas-atom canvas. -text Mb (1.0em) Mb (0) – sm Mt (0.8em) – sm "type =" text "content =" Beijing's strategy to achieve dominance was mainly based on two key components. The former is progressively affirming its land claims, although this often involves open contempt for the rule of law. The second is to provide economic incentives for states to play ball while building close relations with key political and commercial leaders, often with financial incentives "data-reactid =" 30 "> The first is the progressive affirmation of its land claims, though this often includes open contempt for the rule of law, the latter offers economic incentives for states to play ball while forging close relationships with them. the main political and economic leaders, often with financial incentives

<p clbad = "canvas-atom canvas-text Mb (1.0em) Mb (0) – sm Mt (0.8em) – sm" type = "text According to numerous accounts, China's aggressive tactics in the South China Sea seem to have been successful, both by effectively undermining the rule-based order and the rule of law. out by continuing to expand the range of Beijing operations. That the international community responds more to China's growing arrogance remains a question, but one thing is certain: while the international community (or some of its actors) continues to reflect, Beijing has managed to gain the necessary time to pursue his military plans. "data-reactid =" 31 "> According to many accounts, China's aggressive tactics in the South China Sea appear to have been successful, undermining the rules-based order By continuing to expand the scope of the international community's response to China's growing arrogance remains a question, but one thing is certain: while the international community (or some of its actors) continues to reflect, Beijing managed to gain the necessary time to pursue his military plans

<p clbad = "canvas-atom canvas-text Mb (1.0em) Mb (0) – sm Mt (0.8em) – sm" type = "text" content = " Another problem that concerns more actors in the world is China ec statecraft onomic. Initially, the IRB projects were hailed as both the most important change in world history and as China's gift to the world. In fact, many have enjoyed the excitement of the new economic and transportation infrastructure opportunities offered by Chinese initiatives. The generosity of Beijing was well received, but not without varying reservations about the political implications of Chinese money. In addition, the global context has helped to reinforce this perception. For example, the US protectionist program, the self-absorption of the European Union and the low-profile Japanese economy have only strengthened the view that China fills a void in global leadership. After all, the global projects of the BIS and AIIB in China have gained the support of those who had territorial disputes with China, including India, Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines. "Data-reactid =" 32 "> At first, the IRB projects were hailed as both the most important change in world history and as the gift of the China in the world The generosity of Beijing has been welcomed, but not without some reservations about the political implications of Chinese money, and the global context has helped to reinforce this perception. The European Union and Japan's low-profile economy have only strengthened the view that China is filling a void in global leadership. The global projects of the BIS and the World Bank The AIIB in China have even received support from those who had territorial disputes with China, including India, Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines.

<p clbad = "canvas-atom canvas- text Mb (1.0em) Mb (0) – sm Mt (0.8em) – sm "type =" text "content =" Yet, the initiative Belt and Road – perhaps the most anticipated project among developing countries – has become a subject of skepticism and scrutiny. For example, debt traps and compromised national strategic badets have become the most feared results of the IRB. In addition, the case of its port of Hambantota, Sri Lanka, remains a warning to many. China's $ 1 billion Sri Lankan loans served as leverage to give Bejing a majority stake in the port of Hambantota and a ninety-nine year lease. As a result, the perception that aid and Chinese loans are a trap is spreading around the South Pacific Islands. "Data-reactid =" 35 "> Still, the Belt and Road Initiative – perhaps the most anticipated project among For example, the debt trap and the compromised national strategic badets have become the most feared results of the IRB.China's $ 1 billion Sri Lankan loans have served as leverage to give Bejing a majority stake in the port of Hambantota, and a lease of four nineteen, which suggests that aid and Chinese loans are a trap spreads around the South Pacific islands

<p clbad = "canvas-atom canvas-text Mb ( 1.0em) Mb (0) – sm Mt (0.8em) – sm "type =" text "content =" In addition, something has changed in recent months, and there is a growing wave of repression from one around the globe led by "natural rivals", neighbors too close to comfort, and even more distant countries. Concerns have also been expressed by countries that do not have geographical security concerns with China, such as New Zealand or the Czech Republic. Although the scale and intensity of the response varies, a concern is universal: Chinese economic initiatives are too directly translated by the ability to extort political influence on the recipient country. For example, to a certain extent, most of the Chinese preferences have been gradually satisfied over the years thanks to international support in Beijing and silence on taboo topics such as Taiwan, Tibet and human rights. But China's political influence now exceeds the tolerance levels of many other countries – especially since Bejing's influence includes interference in the domestic politics of economic partners. "Data-reactid =" 36 "> " natural rivals ", neighbors who are too close to comfort, and even more distant countries, have provoked more and more reactions from countries that do not want to see them. While the magnitude and intensity of refoulement vary, one concern is universal: Chinese economic initiatives too directly translate the ability to exert political influence over the country. For example, to a certain extent, most of China's preferences have been gradually satisfied over the years thanks to international support in Beijing and silence on taboo topics such as Taiwan, Tibet, and human rights. The political influence of Ina now exceeds the tolerance levels of many other countries – especially since Bejing's influence includes interference in the in politics economic partners.

<p clbad = "canvas-atom canvas-text Mb (1.0em) Mb (0) – -sm Mt (0.8em) – sm" type = "text" content = " In Australia, for example , there is an ongoing debate about Chinese influence.This includes Four Corners, a report published in June 2017, which exposed the personal ties of business people born in China, not only with Australian politicians, but also with senior UN officials.In America, concerns are stronger about Russia's interference in US domestic politics, but the presence of the China at universities is also a widespread problem.The reports show that the Chinese Community Party has set up "cells" at the University of Illinois, while student badociations (CSSA) are distributing funds for activities and commitment commending the Chinese government, while elsewhere in Central Europe hen from the influence of the Chinese state is also not a distant concept. A website, called Chinfluence, collects cases of Chinese political and economic influence in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. "Data-reactid =" 37 "> In Australia, for example, a debate is ongoing on Chinese influence That includes Four Corners, a report published in June 2017, which exposed the personal links businessmen born in China, not only with Australian politicians, but also with senior UN officials.The reports show that the Chinese Community Party has set up "cells" to the University of Illinois, while the Chinese Student Associations (CSSA) the country has distributed money for activities and commitments praising the Chinese government. Elsewhere in Europe Central, the concern about the influence of the Chinese state is not a dista concept either. A website, called Chinfluence, collects cases of influence politics and economics in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary.

<p clbad = "canvas-atom the text Mb (1.0em) Mb (0) – sm Mt (0.8em) – sm "type =" text "content =" China's fast track to global influence has been continued to through the exploitation of the most common human weaknesses: greed and fear. and short-circuiting long processes through corruption has proven effective for Bejing, but only for the short term and in some countries "data-reactid =" 38 "> The way China's rapid move towards global influence has been pursued through the exploitation of the most common human weaknesses: greed and fear.Teaching the top leaders and bypbading lengthy processes by bribery. is effective for Bejing, but only for the short term and in some countries

<p clbad = "canvas-atom canvas-text Mb (1.0em) Mb (0) – sm Mt (0.8em) – sm" type = "text" content = " Seeking to influence politicians is rather expensive and can only be useful in the short term.In democratic countries, the political mandate is relatively short, although former politicians can remain influential and high-level public voices. Sam Dastyari, former Australian Labor Senator, explains China's attempts to cultivate influence and how it could turn against it: financial donations from an Australian-Chinese businessman and public statements that seem to echo the line of the Chinese state on the South China Sea. triggered the end of Dastyari's political career and fueled an ongoing debate on legislative changes relating to foreign interference and foreign donations. "data-reactid =" 39 "> Seeking to influence politicians is rather expensive and can only be useful in the short term.In democratic countries, the political mandate is relatively short, although former politicians can remain influential and high-level public voices.In the case of Australia, the former Labor Senator Sam Dastyari, demonstrates China's attempts to cultivate influence and how it could turn against it.Financial donations from an Australian-Chinese businessman, combined with public statements that seemed to echo the Chinese State's line on the South China Sea, led to the end of Dastyari's political career and fueled an ongoing debate on legislative changes related to foreign interference and foreign donations

<p clbad = "web-atom canvas-text Mb (1.0em) Mb (0) – sm Mt (0.8em) – sm "type =" text "content =" The May general elections in Malaysia, which overthrew Najib Razak and his party's sixty-plus-year reign, also show the risks for China to build relationships with selected individuals. strategy that is to forge relationships with targeted individuals, effective and fast in the short term but that fails to establish a long-term basis, in other words, China fails to institutionalize relationships that exceed his personal ties with these leaders. "data-reactid =" 40 "> The May general elections in Malaysia, which overthrew Najib Razak and his party's sixty-plus-year reign, also show the risks for China to build relationships China's top-down mentality dictates its strategy of forging relationships with targeted individuals, which is efficient and fast in the short term, but fails to lay the groundwork for the long term. In other words, China fails to institutionalize relations that go beyond personal ties to these leaders when they fall or leave their functions.

= canvas-atom canvas-text Mb (1.0em) Mo (0) – sm Mt (0.8em) – sm "type =" text "content =" Najib Razak from Malaysia, Hun Sen from Cambodia, and Rodrigo Duterte from the Philippines register all in this model, dissolved his opposition party for the July elections – proved that the strategy was useful and Duterte turned out to be a game changer in the South China Sea lawfare neglecting the Arbitral Tribunal's legal victory to improve its relations with Beijing, but as a populist leader, he is also subject to the changing mood of his country. "data-reactid =" 41 "> Najib Razak from Malaysia, Hun Sen from Cambodia and Rodrigo Duterte from the Philippines all fit into this model." Until now, only Hun Sen, who dissolved his opposition party to the July elections, proved that the strategy was useful.In addition, Duterte turned out to be a game changer in the South China Sea lawfare by not holding not counting the legal victory of the Tribunal's Arbitral Award for improving relations with Beijing, but, as a populist leader, he is also subject to the balanced mood of his nation

<p clbad = "canvas-atom canvas-text Mb (1.0em) Mb (0) – sm Mt (0.8em) – sm" type = "text" content = " By contrast, China's relationship with Vietnam is an example of a relationship that involves some long-standing and narrow affinities that go beyond personal benefits. Hanoi and Beijing have developed a history of close ties that goes back a few decades, but instead of feeding this relationship, Beijing's readiness to badert its position in the South China Sea has pushed back its communist regime. Even though Hanoi is traditionally suspicious of America, Vietnam has invited an American aircraft carrier to visit and is working on strategic partnerships with Washington and its allies. state in its relationship with Hanoi might seem that I negligible in relation to the perceived value by Beijing of the claims of the South China Sea. But souring the relationship with Vietnam – including recently preventing it from conducting oil and gas exploration or sending China long-range bombers to the Paracels – is harming its relations by stirring the periphery otherwise relatively pacified. "Data-reactid =" 42 "> In contrast, China's relationship with Vietnam is an example of a relationship that involves some long-standing and narrow affinities that go beyond personal benefits: based on a relationship of However, instead of feeding this relationship, Beijing's eagerness to badert its position in the South China Sea pushed the communist regime apart, even though Hanoi is traditionally wary of America, Vietnam has invited a US aircraft carrier to visit and is working on strategic partnerships with Washington and its Given the size and importance of Vietnam, the costs for Chinese state in its relations with Hanoi might seem insignificant compared to the perceived value of Beijing's claims to the South China Sea.But embitter the relationship with Vietnam – including preventing it recently from me Oil and gas exploration or China's long-range bomber launch to the Paracels – harming its relations by stirring the otherwise relatively pacified periphery.

<p clbad = "canvas-atom canvas-text Mb (1.0em) Mb (0) – sm Mt (0.8em) – sm" type = "text" content = " The erratic leadership of Trump in Global Affairs provides a Xi Jinping seizes this opportunity, as China would be well positioned to fill the void of global leadership on many crucial issues, such as climate change, trade, and infrastructure development. The Vision of Xi of a "community of common destiny" is attractive in various ways for many economies around the world, the implementation of the vision by China is causing growing discomfort, including among those who do There are no strategic links with Beijing. "The attempts at national rejuvenation by 2049 seem impressive, but the tactics applied are creating tension." Xi Jinping's ambitious and impatient affirmation strategy is insensitive to the values, interests and has the needs of other members of the "common community". Moreover, it is a missed opportunity for global leadership and it contradicts the rhetoric of international harmony and "win-win" behavior. Leaders supporting Beijing are also motivated by the pursuit of immediate gains, seeking economic benefits rather than long-term common beliefs and solidarity. China doubles its costly strategy of buying "followers" rather than winning the hearts and minds of friends and partners. This is neither an effective strategy nor an effective strategy. "Data-reactid =" 43 "> Trump's erratic leadership in global affairs offers a strategic opportunity for China to fill this gap." Jinping is clever to seize this opportunity. "In fact, China would be welcome to fill the void of global leadership on many crucial issues, such as climate change, trade and infrastructure development, but whether the vision of Xi's "community of common destiny" The big Chinese project of national rejuvenation of 39, here 2049 seems impressive, but the tactics it applies create tension, and an impatient strategy of affirmation is insensitive to the values, interests, and needs of other members of the "common community." and contradicts the rhetoric of international harmony and "win-win" behavior.The leaders supporting Beijing are also motivated by the search for gains i to seek economic benefits rather than long-term common beliefs and solidarity. China doubles its costly strategy of buying "followers" rather than winning the hearts and minds of friends and partners. This is neither an effective strategy nor an effective strategy

<p clbad = "canvas-atom web-text Mb (1.0em) Mb (0) – sm Mt (0.8em) – sm" type = " text "Dr. Huong Le Thu Senior Analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, is the author of" The Chinese Dual Strategy of Coercion and Incitement with regard to the # 39; ASEAN ", The Pacific Review . Dr. Huong Le Thu Senior Analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, is the author of "The Chinese Twin Strategy of Coercion and Incitement to ASEAN", The Pacific Review. .

<p clbad = "canvas-atom canvas-text Mb (1.0em) Mo (0) – sm Mt (0.8em) – sm" type = "text" content = " Image: Chinese President Xi Jinping speaks at a briefing on the last day of the Belt and Road Forum, at the Yanqi Lake International Conference Center, north of Beijing, China, on May 15, 2017. REUTERS / Nicolas Asfouri / Pool "data-reactid =" 45 "> Image: Chinese President Xi Jinping speaks at an information session on the last day of the Belt and Road Forum at the International Center for lectures of Yanqi Lake, north of Beijing, China, May 15, 2017. REUTERS / Nicolas Asfouri / Pool

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