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Just one week before Zimbabwe's army overthrew President Robert Mugabe in November 2017, his top commander went to Beijing. What he discussed with his counterparts in the People's Liberation Army was never revealed. But the conclusion reached by General Constantino Chiwenga seems obvious: the 93-year-old leader is losing his grip and the only way to save the expanded regime is to get him out of prison.
It is now the turn of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir to be ousted by the army that has kept him in power for nearly three decades. This followed a similar round of demonstrations in Algeria earlier this year, which also ended with the dismissal of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika by an army he had led. The two countries are now entering a period of disorderly transition – but similar events could draw lessons: even if the peak figure may change, power structures under military rule may prove much more difficult to pbad. power.
The "Arab Spring" of 2011 that toppled strong men in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen – and brought about a catastrophic war in Syria – largely bypbaded Sudan and Algeria. But the frustrations of the population vis-à-vis the leaders of both countries have been simmering for years. These earlier revolts have shown several possible outcomes – almost none are particularly close to what the original protesters were hoping for. In Yemen and Libya, the sacking of a dictator was followed by an absolute war and chaos, while Syria shows how much brutality and energy these diets can exercise to survive. In Egypt, a period of domination by the Muslim Brotherhood was followed by another takeover by the army.
The transition from one strong man to another suits not only the leaders, but also the two nations that, since 2011, have become much more powerful supporters of the autocratic systems – Russia and China. Events in Sudan, Zimbabwe and Syria in particular have shown that both countries are capable of subtly shaping events, even if they can not control them.
RECENT CUTS
Indeed, in some ways, one of the most interesting lessons from these latest coups is perhaps what they could tell us about future leadership changes in Russia and China, the two autocratic states the more powerful of the world.
Neither Chinese President Xi Jinping nor his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin seem to run an immediate risk. Indeed, after eradicating their rivals and pushing their personality on their country like none other than Mao or Stalin, they are probably at the top of their powers. But that could of course have been said once for Zimbabwe Mugabe, Sudan Bashir, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and a host of other leaders finally dismissed. Xi and Putin are respectively 65 and 66, ten years younger than Bashir and nearly a quarter of a century younger than Mugabe when he was forced to leave power. The lesson for both, however, is that their age and opposition will eventually overtake them.
The two cities, Moscow and Beijing, have found the 2011 "Arab Spring" alarming, especially because of fears that Western-backed unrest is also threatening them. Putin's intervention in Syria showed how ready Moscow was to do everything in its power to strengthen its allies and interests, as evidenced once again by support for Venezuela. Meanwhile, China has continued to strengthen its ties with often corrupt and autocratic regimes in sub-Saharan Africa and beyond, notably with the provision of a surveillance technology seen as an attempt to export the type. of authoritarianism more and more observed in mainland China.
SUPPORT LIMITS
What the events in Zimbabwe showed particularly graphically, however, was the limits of this support to any individual. While Putin's support for Syria was largely based on maintaining the power of Bashar al-Assad, the Chinese state seems to indicate that it sees its relations much more with institutions and systems than with individuals.
This is somewhat ironic given Xi's increasing personalization of power in China. Nevertheless, the fall of Bashir has even given Chinese government newspapers an opportunity to discuss publicly the challenges posed to succession planning in an autocracy. A column of the Chinese government newspaper "Global Times" described the recent coups of state symptomatic of the "collective dilemma" of countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the column criticized the Western efforts to export democracy, saying that it had simply led to instability, conflict, communalism and secession. The writer in particular blamed South Sudan's escape, backed by the international community, which had taken government oil revenue from Khartoum, for contributing to the production of the current crisis. But it offered few alternative models to replace and actualize failing or just aging leaders.
Of course, part of the management of this process may simply be to provide a solution. While Mubarak, Bashir and others have often been imprisoned, their fate may be a little more comfortable. Mugabe, for example, has clearly maintained his expensive medical privileges – he is reportedly under treatment in Singapore, which is beyond the reach of nearly all his compatriots.
One model could be the one proposed to former Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who would have left his post and replaced by Putin to protect his personal well-being. Although the ousted leaders have often lost much of their wealth, they remain relatively comfortable.
Where this leaves larger populations with clear demands for change, the question is very different. Ridding an elderly leader, with or without the support of the army, clearly acts as a safety valve. But if it seems that nothing has changed, it may just be that it creates problems for the future. *** Peter Apps is a writer specializing in international affairs, globalization, conflict and other topics. He is the founder and executive director of the 21st century project of study. PS21, non-national, non-partisan and non-ideological think-tank. Paralyzed by a car crash in war zone in 2006, he also writes blogs about his disability and other topics. He was previously a reporter for Reuters and continues to be paid by Thomson Reuters. Since 2016, he is a member of the British Army Reserve and the British Labor Party and actively participates in fundraising for the party.
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