Danish and Nordea decipher Nordic self-image | Realtid.se

Per Lindvall

The Financial Times has published a lengthy review of the problems recently faced by Nordic banks, with Estonia's money laundering hero Danske Bank being the central event.

The question that needs to be answered is how countries wishing to raise their reputation for honesty and the great trust that exists between citizens, states and companies, and especially banks, could end up in the same situation.

After the scandal in Estonia, Danske Bank's stock price was halved, like that of Nordea.

Even the price of other banks is considered income, because it is not only in the Kingdom of Denmark that something is rotten, to use a Hamlet reference. Even in Sweden and the rest of the Nordic region there are serious problems.

It is true that the Nordic countries subscribe to the highest positions on the list of the least corrupt countries in the world, established by the anti-corruption organization Transparency International.

Denmark is ranked second after New Zealand. Finland is three, Norway four and Sweden seventh. But the truth about our low level of corruption is even more complex and less beautiful than these investments predict.

Self-reliance and our culture of consensus and increased profits means that many people do not want or dare to question something that really seems to be wrong, while at the same time it seems very good get by with money.

For example, we can take an example from the Financial Times list and, as a line-up specialist, Muddy Waters also binoculars on: Telia's business with Uzbekistan.

Uzbekistan is at the bottom of Transparency International's corruption list.

There, we also find Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Nepal, where Telia also operates or operates telecommunications operators.

Acquiring a license to operate an operator in these countries means in practice the granting of a free deduction right for the population, or the right to levy on a mobile phone tax if you want to be frank.

Many in the direction of Telia and among the main owners of the company should have asked a direct question: how did that happen when we got licenses in these countries?

They should have asked some additional question: the profitability and growth in these countries are very good, in Nepal, the EBITDA margin exceeds 60%, but if we want to make an exit, who will buy and how will we get it? # 39; money? ?

The Telia Swedes may attempt to blame some of the problems of their Finnish fusion partner, Sonera, who has been at the base of the East's expansion. And despite its exemplary ethics, Finland has a complicated trade relationship with its less ethically responsible neighbor in the east of Russia.
It may not be a coincidence that the Estonian bank branch in which Danske Bank paid money from Russia and the former Soviet republics of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan had been acquired from Finnish Sampo. .

The Estonian and Russian financial supervisors have already presented their warnings at that time.

Nordea's Finnish roots may also explain its complex relationship with the Russian currency, where, like Danske Bank, they now risk heavy fines from the United States for violating sanctions.

Problematic transactions were carried out between 2008 and 2014. The problem has increased as a result of charges of Hermitage Capital founder Bill Browder, whose Russian lawyer Sergei Magnitsky died in a Russian prison in 2009, according to which Nordea should have been a bank accountant for a large part of the money tax evasion emanating from companies executed through the Danske Bank intermediary.

The Baltic countries, where Swedbank and SEB are the main banks in the market, are complicated.

The countries are close to us geographically, but Russia is even closer to the three Baltic states.

The combination of the influences of Russian robber capitalism, a hierarchical culture and mother banks in search of dividends and expansion is at the root of the Baltic banking crisis.

In addition, the banking crisis had been considerably aggravated if the IMF and Sweden had not helped Latvia defend its currency during the recent financial crisis. It's easy to understand why Anders Borg and the rest of the finance ministry did this in the recent financial crisis. The balance sheets of the Swedish banks have thus avoided more stress than today.

The collapse of the Latvian bank ABLV, which laundered money, as well as the allegations of corruption directed against the head of the country's central bank at the beginning of the year, show that the sub- Less flattering culture survives.

Therefore, the fact that Swedbank and SEB rely unreservedly on critics to assert that they have pure flour in their Baltic bags may be a mistake.