"Although secret, but legal and safe"

Titus Meier , historian and author (photo: PD) [19659010] Mr. Meier, your dissertation can be interpreted as a defense of the so-called "secret army" P-26. OK?

As a historian, it is not up to me to defend anything. I have a question and I try to answer it. The question of whether the defense is political or not. However, in my analysis of Switzerland's readiness for resistance since 1945, I arrive at other conclusions that the PUK EMD on certain points.

They literally reduce to nothing the report of the PUK. For example, they refute the allegation that the P-26 was out of legality and acted as a private organization detached from the army and the administration.

I was able to prove beyond a doubt that preparations for resistance were still made within the federal administration. The P-26 was part of the staff of the Personnel Department within the Military Department. Senior managers were army officers or instructors and militia officers. The organization on the ground was created according to the principle of the militia, whose members were recruited according to a complex procedure

There was no explicit legal basis

but according to the 39; legal opinion of the time was not absolutely necessary. He had no combat mission – which he never came. It was a cadre organization formed in peacetime to organize political resistance in the occupation. Propaganda and sabotage were part of his tasks. For the guerrilla struggle, on the other hand, small units of the army were planned. The P-26 would not have had the necessary weapons or enough personnel. It is also important, when talking about "illegality", that the P-26 is still constitutional. The PUK did not dispute it.

However, parliamentary control was largely absent. The leaders of the P-26 appointed only parties of the Federal Council parties four people who were inaugurated in depth in the planning, but at the same time committed to absolute secrecy. A strange construction!

The group of elected representatives of all parties of the Federal Council you referred to – the 426 group – was indeed a purely advisory body, but very well received, for example with the request not to create a radio center in Abroad or more Recruit women for the P-26. For parliamentary control was the head of GPK, who perceived this until about 1983, but later did not ask more questions. The creation of a secret resistance organization, such as the P-26 and its predecessor, the special service, was known to the Parliament and the Federal Council. Anyone who wanted to know would have known, and this was true even when the global concept of defense was adopted in 1973.

However, secret resistance organizations and the public sphere do not generally go well together.

This voltage still exists. When the P-26 was designed around the year 1979, the cold war threatened to become hot. Think of the double decision of NATO or the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It seems understandable, then, that the secret was very much weighed and that the circle of insiders was so small.

So was the real scandal, not the existence of the P-26, but the way it treats the media and politics?

I arrive at this conclusion. The domestic atmosphere was extremely hot in the late 1980s: the Kopp case, the abolition of the army, the scandal of the cards. Historian Dorothée Liehr speaks of a sociopolitical battle of interpretation whose last act is the "discovery" of the "secret army" P-26. Some media have transformed every detail that they have found in a big scoop. The "Schweizer Illustrierte" marked the beginning when he fantasized about 2,000 men and women trained in silent bombing and massacre. More objectivity would have been appropriate

Does this also apply to the politics of the time?

The conscious left of power saw the opportunity to score and did everything to ensure that the unflattering debates of bourgeois Switzerland continue. After the fall of the Wall, the commoners did not want to be among the cold warriors, but the progressive forces. They have therefore distanced themselves from the P-26 and have partially supported the left claim of a PUK – presumably above all, in order to avoid losses in the upcoming elections. PUK, which was chaired by the Council of States Innerrhoder CVP Carlo Schmid and half was occupied by the commoners?

The report is a compromise: it includes accusing elements, but also exonerating, although the former clearly prevail. This can be explained with the experimental setup: The attention of a PUK is always on the flaws. Moreover, a PUK is condemned to success. Anyone who does not deliver sensational results must have done something wrong. Several PUK members have said that they want to end the report so that domestic politics can finally return to peace. They have undoubtedly succeeded in doing so

A PUK does not render a historical but political tribute

It is like that. PUK EMD was a kid from the time of change. She did not try to understand the P-26 historically. On the contrary, the secret resistance was viewed from the perspective of Murphy's Law: what could happen, it will happen. Thus, the charges laid in the report of a "overthrow of the democratic order" or of "self-activation", which provoked a particular outrage in the public, were of a purely theoretical nature . It's like classifying a policeman as a big danger to the population simply because he's carrying a service weapon. The effect of this way of thinking has been devastating

What about working with similar organizations called "stayed abroad", which still arouses today Controversy?

The supplementary report commissioned by the PUK has already answered this question. Pierre Cornu. Cooperation existed only with the British secret service MI6, and only in terms of training and equipment. In the early 1970s, Switzerland simply had no experience in building a secret resistance organization, and therefore received inspiration and know-how from the British . Finally, a unique structure in Switzerland was created in relation to the remaining foreign preparations

Did the British know more about the preparations for the secret resistance than the Federal Council?

It's too controversial for me. Of course, it may be that a dedicated expert in London knew more than the federal president in Bern. But every British tanker knew more about the Centurion than the leader of the EMD. The exchange involved a particularly sensitive area, but the cooperation was comparable to contacts with foreign armies and therefore harmless.

You have been able to speak with many contemporary witnesses. Is it safe to take the place of veterans without reserve? It is sometimes felt that you give a lot of understanding to the organization of the resistance.

The impression can be felt if we consider the harsh criticism of 1990. But also UEM PUK pointed out at that time that they were not doing any reproach members and did not make them unconstitutional. You must judge preparations very clearly from the time and not according to the standards of today. I had the advantage of having exclusive access to both Federal Archives files and private documents. I have therefore been able to compare the statements of the elders as well as the conclusions of the PUK with the written sources

What role has played Felix Nöthiger, who has long been at the forefront of the rehabilitation of former members of the P-26? to oral sources?

Felix Nöthiger gave me some contacts. Interestingly, many people I met did not care how their assignment is judged today. They knew that they had done the right thing, they said. This corresponds to the personality profile that was then recruited: not self-stars, but silent creators who perform their duty.

Following the publication of the PUK report, the Tages-Anzeiger titled: "Secret, anarchic, dangerous", The P-26 was so secret and so anarchic, apparently not, as it was then believed. But was it dangerous?

The assessment that the P-26 was dangerous was based on the assertion that the cadre organization had weapons and explosives. But that's wrong. Members did not have access to secret weapons depots, access only had the group for general staff services with a two-key system. And as I said, the danger that it was "activated" without the orders of the Federal Council and the Chief of Staff did not exist.

Was everything ok? Although Project 26 was top secret, it was not that no one knew it. To return to the title above, one could say that the P-26 was "secret but legal and harmless".

If all was so harmless, was it more than a costly screening exercise to create dead mailboxes? and the like was formed?

The question of utility is difficult to answer. It was of course an advantage in case of emergency that such a group is already organized. In the case of a Swiss occupation, it would not be necessary to start from scratch. The P-26 would certainly have been able to get news and information from the Federal Council. But she could not have liberated Switzerland. But it was not their job either.

Can you exclude that there is a successor organization to P-26?

With absolute certainty. Currently, there is no scenario in which one should expect a distribution by a foreign power. It would also be unthinkable today to build such a resistance organization without the participation of Parliament. We certainly learned something from that moment. The creation of the Business Review Delegation, which has access to state secrets, is a direct result of PUK EMD

You will disappoint many with your book because you are debunking "the secret army". ,

That does not overload me. As a historian, I have material to contribute to the discussion. I am curious to see how the defenders of this era are dealing with new discoveries, both politicians and journalists. There is always the possibility to admit that they have become smarter through research.