[ad_1]
RIO – Venezuelan economist and political badyst Luis Vicente Leon, chairman of the consulting firm Datanálisis, sees Nicolás Maduro's only wear and tear the only way to democratize the country. External pressure can accelerate change, but the key lies in internal opposition, he says. For this, it is necessary to have a leadership of the opposition mobilizing the population and credible to negotiate with the regime. Leon suggests that a possible negotiation should include the establishment of transitional justice, so that Maduro and senior officials of his regime not only act to save their skin.
– Without this exit, your opponent is not motivated and he is a kamikaze. And a kamikaze does not negotiate, he will fight to the death – he says.
The badyst is skeptical about the possibility that the military is turning against Maduro:
– The army is completely guarded. There would be no opportunity to do anything without Maduro and the intelligence services, especially those with command positions.
Read the full interview below.
What must the opposition do to succeed in democratizing Venezuela?
For me, the success of the opposition requires two fundamental elements, essential not only for Venezuela, but also for any authoritarian government that prevents the exercise of democratic rights. This comes from the story. First, the opposition must be able to maximize the cost of the status quo, that is, the cost to the government to do what it wants, to violate rights and to prevent the majority of its members from doing so. Express. The only way to put an end to this abuse of power and this violation of rights is to make it more expensive for Maduro to take them in advance than to negotiate them.
The opposition must work to increase costs. And these costs are due to a combination of factors. Clearly, the international position, which was that of the EU and the Lima Group, is to try to increase the costs and divide the Chavista group, with economic and financial sanctions against the population, but also to strangle the government. The sanctions against the government have to some extent the opposite effect to that expected because they also affect the population. But in any case, the logic is this: what they are trying, basically, is to increase costs. But it's a part. I would call it seasoning the dish, salt.
And what is the main ingredient?
The main ingredient is internal. How to make sure that the majority who wishes change expresses, how to carry out an internal action, that is to say that the majority wishes for change, that it hopes a change and that She is willing to make sacrifices and fight for rights. How to make them ready to sacrifice, to work and to fight for their rights, and to badert themselves so firmly that it creates a danger for the government he needs and is forced to negotiate. If this articulation does not exist, whatever the actions of the international community, the chances of success are very low, even nil.
What is needed for this joint?
Leadership can be trusted – and it does not exist today. To date, no Venezuelan opposition leader, although the population wants a change, has obtained approval of more than 30%. And even the People's Assembly only has 25% approval. So no leader of the opposition represents that majority of the population who wants to change or create a climate of trust. They can not mobilize people, and if they do not, it is very difficult to negotiate with the government and force it to give way. He will only negotiate if he has no alternative, will not do it himself, if he does, it will be because he does not want to do it. there is no other way out. It is therefore necessary to reinforce this pressure so that the government does not have any other choice.
How to facilitate this construction?
It is necessary to minimize the costs of leaving the government. That is, the opposition must be willing to negotiate even things that do not fall under the Constitution and the law. It is a transitional justice, in which things that are not in the Constitution are negotiated. One must be prepared to forgive acts that would undoubtedly be illegitimate and illegal. It will have to forgive acts and even incorporate actors who would otherwise be imprisoned or persecuted, but who would be forgiven, to make change viable. Without this exit, your opponent has no interest and he is kamikaze. And a kamikaze does not negotiate, he will fight to death. So you have to beat it, but it's a strength you will not win. This requires an articulation again. However, which opposition leader can stand in front of the people who want to be punished and say that the solution is to forgive those who hate each other? On the other hand, hate is an emotion, but does not generate solutions.
And how would that be forgiven?
I do not speak of blind pardons, but of a negotiation. It would be necessary to establish elements of integration of the adversary to allow the democracy to flow and to be saved. This requires your opponent to negotiate. Because, if your alternative is to destroy, eliminate and pursue, the probability is to get a negotiation that vanishes. One example is Chile and the transition from the Pinochet dictatorship, where many frogs had to be swallowed, and Pinochet took control of the Army, which is only examined many years later. And the same thing happened in Spain with Franco and South Africa: if you do not allow democracy to settle and you devote yourself to the constitutional and legal question, the possibility of negotiation is practically nil. .
How do people perceive the government?
People evaluate presidents after their lives – not because it allowed the institution of democracy or the way they ran in the election. People elect presidents according to their quality of life, their economic situation, the opportunity to get a job, the impact of inflation, the theme of infrastructure. And what happened in Venezuela? The country has lived the most perverse period of its republican era. It has experienced hyperinflation that has only occurred twice in this century and is very difficult to solve in the short term. The problem will be solved because it is unsustainable, but it will last all year and maybe next. It is still in the process of expansion and growth. In fact, we will have an exponential growth of inflation in the coming months, during which life will deteriorate and deteriorate. And how do people see Maduro? Evil because they will always evaluate the government for the impact on their lives. Its rate of approval is about 20%, which is surprisingly high considering the scale of the crisis. At these times, it is always necessary to remember the legacy of Chavez, which remains important. True, the Chavez credits or Chavez's legacy has a higher level, which means that most people who connect with Chavez reject Maduro.
And the leaders of the opposition?
The badessment of the ruling clbad in general is hardly better than that of Maduro, including leading opposition leaders, such as Henri Falcon, Henrique Capriles, Maria Corina Machado and Henry Ramos. None has more than 30% popularity. So, if Maduro has 20%, the others have 25% or 30%. This does not mean that the clues are the same, but that the adverse alternative does not have the ability to connect with people to represent the dream or prospect of change. And it's the same thing in the National Assembly and in the National Constituent Assembly – both have virtually no level of popular approval, which is unusual, because nearly 80% of people want change. And only 25% of the population approves the National Assembly.
And the army in this scenario? The Washington Post said the defense minister had asked Maduro not to take over.
The military theme is very complicated and is a black box. It's really very difficult to know what's going on inside. To be honest, I'm not very inclined to give credit to journalists who talk about intrigue in the military, but many more badumptions than realities. The military sector is completely guarded. There would be no opportunity to do anything without Maduro and the intelligence services, especially those with command positions. I do not think you can know what is going on inside without the army talking about it. But when they speak, it's because they've already come out. As long as they are inside, it's very unlikely. Of course, there are fractures, but I am also making badumptions.
Why do you support the government?
It is clear that the military sector is not composed of Martians, who are part of the same social structure. They are with Maduro because they participate in government, have power, resources, do business and get benefits. But of course, there must be differences, attacks, discontent, notions of the country's disaster and fears. Because the civil and military chavists are divided between those who are already subject to international sanctions and those who will be. So, even if they have a lot of money and power, they have to think about the future. This means that your resources will be limited, except in the country, and that they can be blocked at any time. This can lead to implosion pressures and it is possible that actors willing to negotiate with opponents who want change appear. Maduro is therefore at risk for his greatest ally. That's why he keeps it short to prevent it from falling on him.
Are there groups that seem more willing to lead the opposition?
I would not dare to say which sectors are more willing to lead the opposition, because it is completely polarized, divided, without leadership, without project and with completely different points of view on not only the way to face Maduro, but also to lead the country. in the future. There is first of all the first great division between radicals and moderates. Radicals believe the only way to change the country is armed struggle or foreign invasion, while moderates believe it is necessary to articulate, work, generate pressure, protests and ungovernability for change . Then there are differences between opponents who are inside and outside the country. External opponents believe that the only way to be actors in the future is to influence from the outside, so they seek foreign support. However, they do not take into account the capacity of change of the internal actors. Meanwhile, Venezuelans believe that outsiders work without considering the efforts and risks of those living in the country. They do not give them much confidence.
[ad_2]
Source link
